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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I argue that a group consciousness exists in organizations and
even in relationships between organizations. This group consciousness is capable
of thinking and learning. It guides actions, considers consequences; and interprets
outcomes. A limitation of organizationallearning theory is that it usually views the
firm as an autonomous unit. Firms are not autonomous. They are imbedded in a
myriad of interconnections where boundaries between firm and network are
blurred. For inter-firm learning this distinction is criticaL Focusing on the
autonomous firm implicitly focuses research on what firms learn from each other. I
take a relational approach to capture how firms learn with each other. My unit of
analysis is the buyer-seller dyad and I call this relationship learning.
My empirical context is industrial buyer-seller relationships. Based on 26
interviews across 13 dyads in combination with the relevant literature, we defined
relationship learning and developed a conceptual model (Selnes and Sallis 1999, p.
10). This dissertation refines and extends that work and offers an empirical test of
the model. The central variables that drive relationship learning are:
1. Collaborative objectives.
2. Trust.
3. Environmental uncertainty.
4. Structural complexity.
5. Asset specificity.
These variables are generally considered to have a positive influence on
relationship learning. However, the interaction of collaborative objectives and trust
has a dark side. First, there is the risk of opportunism where the parties may take
advantage of trust and exploit each other (Hamel 1991). Second, a high level of
trust is usually accompanied by strong positive emotions and liking (Jones and
George 1998). In such atmospheres it is unlikely that negative or critical
information will be exchanged because it may endanger the good atmosphere of
•
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the relationship, thus the benefit of constructive conflict is lost (Eisenhardt,
Kahwajy, and Bourgeois 1997). Third, as commitment increases, value systems
converge to the extent where the parties may develop a common identity
(Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996). This group-think (Janis 1989) may
hinder the creative processes found in more heterogeneous groups. This means that
as trust increases it will interact with collaborative objectives to actually reduce
relationship learning.
To test the model I combined the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) matrix
approach (Campbell and Fiske 1959), modeled as a covariance structure (Joreskog
1974), with Bagozzi and Edwards' (1998) general approach for representing
constructs in organizational research through applying structural equation
modeling at varying levels of aggregation. Stepwise aggregation provides
justification for either aggregating, or not aggregating measures and constructs. I
used a combination of structural equation modeling and two-stage least squares
regression. The findings support what Heide and John (1994) contend, that key
informants can in fact be used to measure particular inter-organizational constructs
that are a collective property of a higher order construct.
The findings also support the positive direct effects of the variables, and more
importantly, they support the negative interaction effect between collaborative
objectives and trust. That the interaction comes out as a negative effect relative to
relationship learning is, I believe, a surrogate-warning signal for isomorphism.
Institutional theory holds that organizational adaptation is a function of isomorphic
pressure (Martinez 1999). In lieu of a better plan, institutions conform to the status
quo in their environments. Assuming relationships to be quasi-organizations
(Håkansson and Snehota 1995), they are subject to institutional pressures. They
gain legitimacy through playing the game as others do. Conformity supplants
thinking!
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1. INTRODUCTION
"People' do not get married or divorced, commit murder or suicide,
or lay down their lives for freedom upon detailed cognitive analysis
of the pros and cons oftheir actions (Zajonc 1980, p. 172)."
Firms, like people, do not always consider the ramifications of actions. To say they
never consider ramifications, I believe, is wrong. In this dissertation I argue that a
group consciousness exists in organizations and even in relationships between
organizations. This group consciousness is capable of thinking and learning. It
guides actions, considers consequences, and interprets outcomes. These postulates
in themselves are not radical. There is an abundance of research on organizational
learning where firms are thought to have theories of action (Argyris and Schon
1978), organizational knowledge structures (Lyles 1988), shared mental models
(Senge 1990), or organizational cognition (Walsh 1995) to name a few. Whatever
the label, these collective knowledge structures impose meaning on the
organizational environment. They simplify interpretation of stimuli by furnishing a
basis for evaluating information.
A limitation of organizationallearning theory is that it usually views the firm as an
autonomous unit. Firms are not autonomous. They are imbedded in a myriad of
interconnections where boundaries between firm and network are blurred
(Håkansson and Snehota 1995). For inter-firm learning this distinction is critical.
Focusing on the autonomous firm implicitly focuses the research on what firms
learnfrom each other. While perfectly valid, it provides a limited picture of firms
learning with each other. My starting point, then, is to take a dyadic approach to
inter-organizational learning to capture what transpires between firms. This may
not capture the full complexity of the network, however, it will show the learning
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in relationships while retaining the degree of simplicity needed for a meaningful
analysis and interpretation of results within the limitations of current statistical
techniques.
Focusing on learning between firms implies relationships can learn. How? An
inter-organizational relationship is like an intangible, amorphous fog; it lacks form
and shape. It exists in another dimension separate from the organizations that
constitute it. Despite this, relationships have many attributes in common with
organizations. Consider a marketing channel. Inmost cases, products reach the
market through channels of intermediate actors. Raw materials are transformed,
combined, distributed, and consumed. There are producers, wholesalers, retailers,
and so on. Exchange between firms in marketing channels usually takes place in
series over time, thus the relationships are durable. There is a mutually oriented
interdependence of outcomes that none of the channel members can produce alone
(Håkansson and Snehota 1995, p. 25), thus performance is a function of conscious
vertical coordination between actors (Buvik and John 2000). To facilitate this,
channel members adapt to each other and the entire channel adapts based on some
common understanding and focus (Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell1996). If the outcome
is valuable and idiosyncratic, it may provide competitive advantage (Barney
1991). The relationships may be formally constituted through legal agreements
(MacNeiI1980), or socially constituted through shared perceptions of their
existence (Granovetter 1985). The relationships have a history and an anticipated
future (Axelrod 1984), and they attain a unique identity separate from their
members (Van de Ven 1976, p. 25). In sum, relationships are like quasi-
organizations (Håkansson and Snehota 1995). Accepting this and accepting that
organizations can learn, it is plausible, then, that relationships can learn as well.
Within the growing literature on inter-organizationallearning is the contention that
learning is taking place in or across relationships between organizations. It
involves building common understandings at the intersection between actors
(Lukas et al. 1996); it is reliant on intent, openness, and receptivity (HameI1991);
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it is a function of values and processes (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, and
Sparks 1998); and it is a valuable resource that can lead to superior performance
(Dyer and Singh 1998). What lacks is a formalized, empirically tested definition of
a construct of inter-organizationallearning. Within the cognitive tradition, Selnes
and Sallis (1999) followed Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell's (1996) suggestion to develop
a relationship learning construct in line with the process definition of the market
orientation construct (e.g. Kohli and Jaworski 1990), combined with Huber's
(1991) argumentation that organizationallearning affects the potential for behavior
change. My aim here is to further develop the definition of relationship learning
and empirically test it.
To meaningfully test the relationship learning construct it need be imbedded in a
context. Strictly speaking, firms can learn from each other across relationships,
however, learning with each other presupposes some degree of collaborative
objectives. Take relationship memoryas an example. Unlike organizational
memory, relationship memory spans the boundaries of organizations. The parties
develop idiosyncratic relationship memories that capture the common history of
the relationship. For example, in joint R&D projects disseminated information
becomes imbedded (memorized) at different places in the relationship like
individuals, databases, documents, and so on. If an individual in one organization
does not possess a particular piece of information generated in the relationship, but
knows it exists in the other organization, they can access (remember) it across the
relationship. In this way the learning (and remembering) has elements that are both
internal and external to the respective organizations, yet are captured within the
context of the relationship. Without the objective to collaborate, relational parties
suffer amnesia due to a lack of access to stored knowledge across the relationship.
In organizations, managers presumably have the authority to impose learning
strategies. They can at least strive to create an environment conducive to learning.
This is not the case in relationships. Collaboration is contingent upon a mutual
orientation between parties. Autonomous firms cannot mandate mutuality and
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collaborative objectives, thus they cannot impose relationship learning on another
finn. This is a bit like the adage, ''You can lead a horse to water, but you can't
make it drink." A powerful firm can impose its will over a weaker trading partner
(lead it to water), however, in lieu of the mutual objective to collaborate and learn
together, it cannot make the weaker partner drink.
Consistent with the literature on learning in inter-organizational relationships (e.g.
Dodgson 1993b; Hamel1991), is the argument that collaboration enhances
learning. Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) identified two perspectives on
collaboration and learning.
The classical economic perspective on collaboration, largely dominated by
transaction cost economics, involves reconciling risk versus return. Reliance on
external partners involves risk primarily because actors are assumed to be
opportunistic. When environmental uncertainty is high and investments in
nontransferable specific assets are high, risk is high. Transaction cost economics
suggests that in such situations the most efficient way to govern transactions is to
internalize them within the organization. Current transaction cost thinking expands
the original discrete boundary choice between markets and hierarchies to include
hybrid forms like collaboration where direct ownership is substituted with formal
(e.g. contracts) and informal (e.g. norms of information sharing and trust) control
mechanisms in relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
The transaction cost approach has at least two problems related to collaboration
and relationship learning. First, the classical rigid governance form envisaged in
transaction cost economics is not very conducive to learning because formal
agreements are static, whereas learning is dynamic (Powell et al. 1996). Second, it
focuses attention on individual organizations that learn from each other in a
competitive race to learn (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, and Sparks 1998). For
example, Hamel (1991) laid the groundwork for a theory of inter-organizational
learning. He proposed that intent (collaborative versus competitive), receptivity
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(ability to absorb knowledge), and transparency (openness with information) are
key determinants of inter-organizationallearning. He warns, however, that failure
to out-learn one's partner could render a firm first dependent, then redundant
within the relationship. This suggests a strategy of competitive intent with high
receptivity but low transparency. Such a strategy would inhibit the relationship and
undermine collaborative learning, and despite the inter-organizational setting it
places emphasis on the individual firm.
An alternative perspective is found in the economic sociology literature,
specifically in network theory (e.g. Granovetter 1985). A central thesis of network
theory is that economic behavior is imbedded in social relations. Seen this way,
collaboration and learning are social construction processes (Powell et aL 1996).
Relationships and collaboration emerge through exchange between parties
(Johanson and Mattsson 1987), and as a result of the social exchange the parties
may come to trust each other (Håkansson and Johanson 1988). Trust is the
antithesis of opportunism and is an important concept in the network approach
(Johanson and Mattsson 1987). Effective learning between partners depends on a
climate of trust ingrained in organizational modes of behavior, and supported by
the belief in the mutual benefits of collaboration throughout the organization
(Dodgson 1993b).
At face value, the network theory approach to collaboration fits well with the
concept of relationship learning. Collaboration, trust, and relationship learning are
intuitively attractive as positive reinforcing forces in cycles of learning. Doz
(1996) proposed that a set of initial conditions either facilitated or hampered inter-
firm learning in alliances. As alliances evolve the parties go through cycles of
evaluation, revision of the initial conditions, and learning. The alliance cycles will
either spiral up towards success or down towards failure. Evaluation either leads to
growing trust or growing suspicions. Suspicion will undermine the potential for
success, while trust will support it. Trust, then, supports relationship learning and
collaboration, however, what of the cost?
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A manifestation of trust is adaptation (Hallen, Johansen, and Seyed-Mohamed
1991). In the course of a relationship the parties demonstrate trust as they adapt to
each other and influence each other toward adaptation. The systems strive to fit
each other and isomorphism sets in, exposing the dark side of trust. The once
separate systems become too homogenous. Neither part offers unique perspectives
or novel ideas because they are the same. Trust breeds complacency. Neither party
questions the other and they get locked into patterns of doing things. In sum, they
act without thinking. Assuming thinking to be an integral part of learning, trust
carries a potentially high cost.
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION
This research is in response to criticism that organizationallearning theory focuses
too much on the individual firm locked in a learning race (Larsson, Bengtsson,
Henriksson, and Sparks 1998). Thus far I have established my fundamental article
of faith: inter-organizational relationships are cognitive entities capable of
learning. My focus is on dyadic learning processes. The setting is the vertical
relationship between buyers and sellers in the marketing channel. My premise is
that relationship learning is distinct from organizationallearning with respect to
mutuality, which entails such things as relationship memory and collaborative
objectives. Trust plays a dual role by both facilitating and impeding relationship
learning.
I rely heavily on inter-organizational theory (e.g. transaction cost economics,
network theory, resource-based theory, and agency theory) for describing
relationship formation and the motivation for relationship learning. Organizational
learning theory underpins development of the relationship learning construct.
My objectives are to (1) further develop the relationship learning construct, (2)
relate it to existing inter-organizational theory, (3) operationalize the constructs as
perceptual measures, and (4) conduct an empirical test of the model. Through this
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my theoretical contribution is to empirically demonstrate that relationships can
indeed learn and that trust carries a potentially high cost that is largely
unrecognized in the extant literature. I highlight the hazard of isomorphism and the
complacency it breeds.
The practical implications are tightly coupled to current issues in marketing.
Emphasis on tighter more responsive vertical coordination in marketing channels
is increasing. Trends like relationship marketing and market orientation underscore
the importance of inter-organizational research in learning. The increasingly
popular oxymoron "mass customization" in the relationship marketing literature
(e.g. Sheth and Parvatiyar 2000) is contingent upon learning about every
customer's needs and preferences. In the market orientation literature there is a
direct link to relationship learning. Slater and Narver (1995) argue that a market
orientation provides strong norms for learning from customers and competitors,
however, appropriate organizational structures and processes for higher-order
learning must compliment it. They refer directly to the organizationallearning
literature, specifically Argyris' (1977) double-loop learning.
In the organizationallearning literature it is widely accepted that learning takes
place on different levels related to the magnitude of change in the collective
knowledge structures. Argyris and Schon (1978; 1996) described levels of learning
as learning loops. Adjusting
strategies in response to observed
outcomes while the organization
<hervation carries on with its present policies
Single-l~""'l-' or achieving its present objectives
is single-loop learning. Double-
loop learning occurs when
adjustment involves the
modification of an organization's
underlying norms, policies, and
D:lJble-locp
Adjust:J:ænt
Figure 1.1, Learning Loops
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objectives.
The magnitude or level of learning is increasingly important. The half-life of
useable market knowledge is shrinking in the face of compressed life cycles,
fragmenting markets, proliferating media and distribution channels (Day 1994b),
and hypercompetition (Volberda 1996), thus firms need to learn faster and be
innovative. An avenue to this is higher-level learning, McKee (1992, p. 235)
observed that product innovation requires two types of learning for two types of
product innovation. Incremental innovation like product adaptation requires very
focused expertise and incrementallearning, while generative innovation like
developing new products requires more radical thinking and generative learning.
March (1991) captured this thinking in his exploitation and exploration dichotomy.
Exploitation is about extending existing competencies within a familiar frame of
reference, whereas exploration is about experimenting with newalternatives that
challenge the status quo way of thinking.
Perhaps the best way to challenge the status quo is to contrast it with alternatives.
On one hand, organizations may function well in an isolated environment free
from disruptive disturbances. However, for long-term viability external stimuli are
imperative. Sources of innovation do not reside exclusively within firms (Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996) and novel ideas often come from outside firm
boundaries (Cohen and LevinthaI1990). Managed properly, relationship learning
should provide alternative perspectives that generate novel ideas. It can stimulate
the firm to reconsider current practices and enable the firm to achieve higher-order
learning (Lyles 1988). In sum, relationship learning may be a valuable resource
for competitive advantage in so far as it contributes to developing non-
substitutable, fast learning, difficult to imitate links between collaborating parties
(Dyer and Singh 1998).
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1.2 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The dissertation is organized as follows. I spend considerable effort in chapter two
explaining and positioning the relationship learning definition. It lies at the heart
of the research and represents the single greatest theoretical contribution of the
research. In chapter three I argue for the variables in the relationship learning
model and offer hypotheses as to their effects. This is based on the qualitative
portion of the study. Chapter four is divided between describing the qualitative
methodology used in developing the model and the quantitative methodology used
for testing it. I entirely devote chapter five to measure validation because it
represents an important methodological contribution of the research. Chapter six
presents the analysis and results of the hypothesis test. The discussion in chapter
seven summarizes the theoretical and methodological contributions of the
research, then loffer practical implications and ideas for future research.
In the appendices I show the interview guide used in the qualitative research, and
the questionnaire used to collect the quantitative data. I also show my SPSS syntax
for exporting the data to Prelis as well as the two-stage least squares syntax. This
is followed by the Prelis syntax and Lisrel syntax used to validate the
measurement model and structural model. Only final models are shown. While on
one hand this may seem excessive, it leaves a clear trail for the validation of my
research as well as for replicating the procedures.
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2. RELATIONSHIP LEARNING DEFINED
"Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In
our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying
to understand the mechanics of a closed watch. He sees the face and
the moving hands, even hears it tick, but he has no way of opening the
case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism
which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may
never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his
observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the
real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the
meaning of such a comparison (Einstein and Infeld 1938, p. 31)."
For me, the essence of what Einstein and Infeld are saying in the opening citation
is that we all have a unique perspective on reality. This has bearing on the
following discussion of how to define relationship learning. Any research,
consciously or unconsciously, is grounded in the basic assumptions of the
researcher (cf. Zaltman, Pinson, and Angelmar 1973, p. 10). Despite our efforts for
objectivity in science, we are intrinsically subjective beings. Some researchers
strive to overcome this by holding as closely as possible to empirical observability.
Ineffect, they restrict their interpretation of a closed watch to what they observe
without speculating as to the mechanism. However, as Hunt observes, "Restricting
'knowing' to 'knowing with certainty' is not just being prudently conservative or
cautious. Rather, because it denies even the possibility that we can learn or 'know'
on the grounds of accumulated experience, such a restriction amounts to nothing
less than nihilism (1993, p. 83)."
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Based on the field interviews and a review of the relevant literature, in this chapter
I argue for and propose a definition of relationship learning. My starting point is
previous work by Selnes and Sallis (1999). My intent here is to expand the
discussion and in so doing hopefully sharpen the argumentation. My rationale is
that while there is a plethora of work on organizationallearning theory,
contributions to inter -organizationallearning theory are somewhat scant. Beyond
'--------- ---_./~w__..-_· ...- .. ···-.,-."····,,--~.,~.......__...,.~"'e_.•...._._'·-'""···, -,.
the "it has not yet been done" argument, I believe this to be a worthy endeavor
because of key differences between the construct~:1tei~~i~nship learning is unique
(t~orga:riiZa.ti~~~I·i~~i~g because of the mutuality element it relies on
i
collaborative objectives, information processing across organizational boundaries,
(
:t
and relationship memory that is a function of the interaction between parties.
I begin by explaining how I believe learning takes place in and between
organizations. I then describe two dichotomies that I perceive in the literature: the
~ral-cognitive dichotomy, (cf. Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 806; Huber 1991, p.
89; Shrivastava 1983, p. 8) and the values-process dichotomy e. . Hame11991;
Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell1996). In so doing I position this research. Finally, I
describe the elements that together constitute the definition of relationship
learning.
2.1 HOW DO ORGANIZATIONS LEARN?
(In the early 1960s the metaphor of the organization as an organism in symbiotic
\, existence with its environment gained popularity as an alternative perspective to
\
the formalized mechanistic view that served management. (e.g. Burns and Stalker
1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Woodward 1965). Inthe mechanistic view,
knowledge and thinking was concentrated at the top of the firm, and
communication flowed from the top down as instructions for specialized workers
in a clearly defined hierarchy. Inthe organic view, when problems cannot be
broken down by management and distributed to specialist roles in the hierarchy,
individuals must think for themselves in light of the tasks of the firm as a whole.
Rather than management being the brain of the organization, the entire
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organization is the brain. In such an organic structure, as a group, individuals
endow an organization with its culture, behaviors, goals, and other characteristics
not attributable to anyone individual. While it is arguable that the organization is
nothing without the people, it is also plausible that the group synergy is greater
than the sum of the individuals (Powell et al. 1996, p. 116). Herein lies the-_
collective consciousness of the organization.
~-------,--------------------------
Accepting the possibility of group consciousness infers the viability of
__ ~'·'O'''~_·''''''-·-'''''_''-·'_~''''_'·'=-·C'~'''''''~'~'''"
organizationallearning (e.g. Argyris and Schon 1978; Cyert and March 1963;
Hedberg 1981). Consider the behavior of firms. They consciously adjust when
theyenter or exit a market, restructure, or change operating procedures. Assuming
the adjustments are not by random chance, they must be based on previously
learned knowledge. It is arguable that one or a very few people who manage the
organization decide upon these changes, therefore, it is not the organization that
learns but those few people. However, from a broader perspective, the decision-
makers receive much of their stimuli through channels in the organization. These
channels learn what information to pass on and what information to filter out, and
which decisions to take at their particular level and which decisions to refer further
up the channel. As the channels become long and numerous, as characterized by
t large organizations, and decision pressure rises in unstable environments, it'"becomes increasingly important that information be properly filtered andacted.on.It is logical that the leader of a large organization cannot possibly make every
decision that takes place within the organization. The position of this dissertation
--'""" .....-_.~.~-~ ••._-".._'".~..~.".~'''''--- ..''',;,.''...,......"_.-",,~~-;,>.-,_.,
is that even in a two-person organization, as soon as either person begins to act out
of consideration for the other person' s position within the organization, a
"", .. ",_,.",,,; ••• ,"> ""·~"···,-"""""·:,,,,,_,,,,"'i"'''· ..Ae.,< ..,~. ":._",,~_ ..•_ _, .•", •.
collective consciousness is born and organizationallearning is possible.
Symbiosis is the mutually beneficial coexistence of two or more organisms (Sykes
1978, p. 923). Many if not all organizations exist symbiotically in relationships
with other organizations (cf. Håkansson and Johanson 1988; Starbuck 1992;
Thorelli 1986). Broadly, an inter-organizational relationship is a mutual
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orientation of at least two organizations toward each other (Johanson and Mattsson
1987), wherein interaction norms are established. If norms are shared expectations
about behavior (Heide and John 1992, p. 34), then a core element of relational
exchange is a norm of reciprocity (Oliver 1990, p. 244). This implies mutual "
...... ,":. ,,"" .... ""~·.wI" .........:""1.. :""''M'''''.·· ..
knowledge about each other, awareness of each other's interests, and willingness
"t<'J11araneiitionToTliem~ 'fraiso"~~';;~th;t'~;g;i~~ti~~~t~~tions are constrained ,___ ......~,__ f._,,_.~_....; ;.,_~',....
and determined by relationships with other organizations (Granovetter 1985).
Therefore, just like with the collective consciousness in organizations, as soon as\
~ there are norms of reciprocity in an inter-organizational relationship, a collective
(, consciousness between organizations is born and relationship learning is possible.
2.2 THE BEHAVIORAL-COGNITIVE DICHOTOMY
In simplistic terms, behaviorists see the learning entity as a black box into which
they do not peer. Their focus is to examine the change in probabilities of certain
behaviors (responses) given certain stimuli. Behaviorist theories have in many
ways been eclipsed by more recent cognitive theories that consider the contents of
the black box. Cognitive theorists take into account information processing and
problem solving rooted in collective knowledge structures. It is a misnomer,
however, to consider the cognitive approach as superior to, or as a replacement for
behavioral theories, rather, the two approaches while distinct in many ways are
arguably complementary (cf. Inkpen and Crossan 1995; Kim 1993; Lukas et al.
1996).
As will come clear, my position with this research reflects the cognitive tradition
and I favor a process definition. The following discussion is relevant because I see
the alternatives, behaviorism and values, as greatly contributing to my
understanding of relationship learning.
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2.2.1 BEHAVIORAL THEORIES·
Levitt and March define organizationallearning as, "Encoding inferences from
history into routines that guide behavior (1988, p. 320)." Their definition is
premised on three fundaments:
• Action stems from legitimacy rather than intention or consideration of
consequences.
Action is based on history rather than anticipation of the future.
Action is target oriented.
•
•
From these fundaments it can be inferred that organizations only think to the
extent that they search existing routines to determine the most legitimate action.
Search for existing routines is both a function of available options and the ability
to identify them as options. This, in tum, is a function of how often a routine is
used, how recently it was used, and its proximity to the searcher. Unused routines
or routines distant to the searcher are not very accessible and risk being forgotten.
When there is no routine, organizations revert to trial-and-error experimentation
(Levitt and March 1988, p. 328).
As uncertainty in the organizational environment grows, the likelihood of not
finding a match will also grow. In such an environment organizations must spend a
great deal of time in trial and error experimentation. It also means that because
actions are directed responses to specific stimuli, without a trigger there would be
no action or thinking. The ramifications are that organizations are backward
looking; they do not consider hypothetical reactions to disturbances; and they do
not possess the capacity to consider, "What if ... ?"
I find it tough to imagine such a complete lack of conjecture. In a collective sense,
if the group does not know what to do it simply experiments to find a successful
routine. Lacking the ability of conjecture means that any untried action is
presumably as likelyas any other. What then is the purpose of strategy? Of course
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this is an exaggeration and behaviorists would claim that firms will continually try
to adaptively improve. Nevertheless, I believe that the behavioral approach tells
only part of the story and I contend that so long as there is collective strategy in
organizations there is at least a shadow of conjecture and thus cognition.
A clue to the behaviorist penchant for history dependent adaptation may be found
in the seminal work of Cyert and March (1963; 1992). In developing their
behavioral theory of the firm they state that one of their major research
commitments is to, "Link models of the firm as closely as possible to empirical
observations of both the decision output and the process structure of actual
business organizations (1992, p. 2)." A directly observable model is the paramount
goal of objective science. Their definition of organizationallearning reflects this:
"Organizations learn: to assume that organizations go through the
same processes of learning as do individual human beings seems
unnecessarily naive, but organizations exhibit (as do other social
institutions) adaptive behavior over time (Cyert and March 1963, p.
171). "
Observable behavioral change, however, is arguably only a manifestation of
learning rather than learning itself. For instance, through learning, an entity may
not change its behavior because it learns that the optimal course of action is
inaction. There is no observable change, and therefore no observable learning,
however, learning has taken place.
Cyert and March assume an adaptive system to have the following properties:
1. "There exist a number of states of the system. At any point in time, the system
in some sense "prefers" some of these states to others.
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2. There exists an external source of disturbance or shock to the system. These
shocks cannot be controlled.
3. There exists a number of decision variables internal to the system. These
variables are manipulated according to some decision rules.
4. Each combination of external shocks and decision variables in the system
changes the state of the system. Thus, given an existing state, an external
shock, and a decision, the next state is determined.
5. Any decision rule that leads to a preferred state at one point is more likely to
be used in the future than it was in the past; any decision rule that leads to a
non-preferred state at one point is less likely to be used in the future than it was
in the past (1992, pp. 117-118)."
This stepwise conceptualization of
organizationallearning conjures a
rational decision-tree-like process.
While valid and relevant, it
captures only part of the learning
phenomenon. It lacks a dimension
for conjecture by relying sole ly on
history, and it is tied to
observability thus denying the
option of inaction.
2.2.2 COGNITIVE THEORffiS
Stable State
Allimm~
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Routine Routine
! •Trial
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Cognitive theories dominate the organizationallearning field, as evidenced by the
rich diversity of literature. Cognitive theorists generally agree that an entity learns
through processing information that leads to a change in the state of knowledge.
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Figure 2.1, Decision Tree
Responses are not simply a matter of probabilities, but rather, they are a function
of information search (both in memory and externally) and reasoning (Shrivastava
1983, p. 8). Beyond information processing they disagree. Cognitive theorists
striving for objectivity accept that learning involves cognitive change, however,
they define organizationallearning in such a way as to require behavioral change
and thus observability (e.g. Argyris and Schon 1978; Dodgson 1993a; Senge
1990). For example, Argyris and Schon (1996) define organizationallearning as:
"Organizationallearning occurs when individuals within an
organization experience a problematic situation and inquire into it on
the organization's behalf They experience a surprising mismatch
between expected and actual results of action and respond to that
mismatch through a process of thought and further action that leads
them to modify their images of the organization or their
understandings of organizational phenomena and to restructure their
activities so as to bring outcomes and expectations into line, thereby
changing organizational theory-in-use (1996, p. 16)."
Again, observable change is arguably only a manifestation of learning rather than
learning itself. Learning can take place and not precipitate any observable
behavior. Limiting a learning definition to observable, quantifiable phenomena
greatly inhibits its scope.
Organizationallearning researchers who accept a greater degree of subjectivity
and distance themselves from strict observability recognize that learning can affect
the potential to change behavior (e.g. Huber 1991, p. 89; Huber 1996, p. 822;
Sinkula 1994, p. 36; Slater and Narver 1995, p. 63). In other words, if an
organization learns something, it may choose not to change behavior based on the
new knowledge. For example, Slater and Narver define organizationallearning as:
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"At its most basic level, organizational learning is the development of
new knowledge or insights that have the potential to influence
behavior (1995, p. 63)."
This definition reflects a cognitive approach and allows for the potential change of
behavior, thus not requiring observable behavior change.
2.2.3 RECONCILING BEHAVIOR AND COGNmON
Fiol and Lyles define organizational adaptation as, "The ability to make
incremental adjustments as a result of environmental changes, goal structure
changes, or other changes (1985, p. 811)." and organizationallearning as, "The
development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the
effectiveness of those actions, and future actions." By so doing they attempt to
resolve the behavioral-cognitive debate by defining behaviorallearning as
adaptation and cognitive learning as possessing the ability for conjecture. In other
words, organizationallearning transcends time. Unconscious adaptation, as it
were, is not organizationallearning because it lacks the past-future association.
Therefore, Fiol and Lyles (1985) reject the premise of the behaviorist approach to
organizationallearning by re-labeling it as organizational adaptation.
My difficulty with accepting Fiol and Lyles' (1985) reasoning is that when an
organization detects some sort of environmental change and makes a conscious
adjustment, be it incremental or not, it is arguable that the organization is learning
at a shallow level rather than a deep level (cf. Argyris and Schon 1996; Slater and
Narver 1994). Arguably, Fiol and Lyles' (1985) definition of adaptation is simply
single-loop learning, that is, changing strategies or actions without revising the
underlying values (Argyris and Schon 1996, p. 21). Fiol and Lyles, however, state
that, "Within the category of cognition development it is possible to identify a
hierarchy based on the level of insight and association building. Two general
levels are referred to as lower- and higher-level learning (1985, p. 807)." Thus,
they do not consider behaviorallearning as associated with lower levellearning, it
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is a separate construct, and the way they resolve the debate is to add another
dimension.
Fiol and Lyles (1985) liberally quote and concur with Hedberg (1981) in
developing their definitions, yet even they point out the ambiguity in Hedberg' s
reasoning when he postulates that in one form of learning, "Behavior requires no
understanding (1985, p. 805)." Hedberg states that, "It is misleading to equate
learning with adaptation (1981, p. 3)," which implies that his opinion corresponds
with that of Fiol and Lyles (1985). Yet in the very next sentence he says,
"Organizationallearning includes both the processes by which organizations
adjust themselves defensively to reality and the processes by which knowledge is
used offensively to improve the fits between organizations and their environments
(1981, p. 3)." He does not clarify the difference between adaptation and
adjustment, although it may be inferred that adjustment involves a greater degree
of conscious thought than adaptation. This, however, begs the question of when
does adaptation become adjustment?
Mahoney (1995) attempts to synthesize resources-based theory with learning
theories (both cognitive and behavioral) based on the premise that, "Core
competencies are a function of the tacit understanding, skills, and resources that a
firm accumulates over time (1995, p. 92)." Organizationallearning is thus an
avenue to develop key resources, which in turn contribute to sustainable
competitive advantage. He loosely follows the definition that organizational
learning is a process whereby shared understandings change, although he borrows
from many perspectives across the cognitive-behavioral dichotomy, therefore, he
is not committed to any specific position. Rather, he sees the positions as
complementary .
I Inkpen and Crossan (1995) also see cognitive and behaviorallearning ascomplementary. They develop a conceptual framework for studying organizationallearning and apply it to learning in joint ventures. They employ it at the individual,
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change (observable) and
cognitive change
(unobservable). Rather than
consider the two in strict
opposition, however, they
argue that, "Cognition and
behavior are so tightly
intertwined that it is
counter-productive to define learning as change in either one or the other. ...
Different types of learning will depend on whether there is cognitive and/or
behavioral change (Inkpen and Crossan 1995, p. 599).",,!his imWi~t!E~! le.~ing" .."
Figure 2.2, Behavioral and Cognitive Learning
(Adapted from Inkpen and Crossan 1995, p. 599)
can involVe adjllitiag Qal¥ beha.tior. on..cyc.o.gvitiQD; M"both. However, when only...
one is adjusted, cognitive dissonance arises because of the tension between the
mismatch of cognition and behavior, therefore, ultimately they will both be
adjusted to attain a balance.
My position is that behavioral and cognitive learning are simply different
manifestations of the same phenomenon. While there is no clear consensus on a
_•• Mil .11.. ""I;i:I.'.,"" ..not{j"',.",.. ..,,, ..,,.,.,,,._,.,,.~.;.,.,, ...,,',, .•.•..',._..",.""."." .."." ..;.,',. __,.....
definition of ~earninQ,mostwriters;<l:æ:e,~that there are both cognitive and
~;'},;~":.,'~';!:!f1I"'~_.,~,-"./. ....'-"',.'t •. ."- ..... _..•.. ",,_,0,0, -···'I·.,_'· .. ,.,_;'"":,~',<""j,'~_,, ..•."':..,.."''l>'''''''''',.,..-''-....'''"'~" ...."c_."';,~-"'t'iI~"""'):.~'.,~;W,liJ.;";,."":.,,.;,,,.:,~,·,,.'..',.:_',',
l>eh~!~,tS.~mellts (£h!J~~~~F.aulkner 19~,8.,P: ~§21N~hough the behavioral
approach is somewhat distinct from the cognitive approach, it is complimentary
rather than contradictory. When it comes to defining relationship learning I favor
the cognitive tradition. Placing too much emphasis on observability risks greatly
constricting a learning definition. I choose to risk measurement error at the gain of
~~~"._;''''''~iI'<'.,,_.
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capturing a more realistic glimpse of the phenomenon. I judge this as preferable to
knowingly measui[ng-oiily'~ p;1of it. .. -. .'_._~
2.3 THE VALUES-PROCESS DICHOTOMY
Like market orientation, relationship learning can be defined as either a process or
a set of values. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Narver and Slater (1990) provided
the first attempts to define market orientation as a process including information
acquisition, dissemination, and organizational responsiveness. Deshpande, Farley,
and Webster (1993) followed by defining it as a set ofvalues that put
organizational stakeholders first.
2.3.1 REIATIONSHIP LEARNINGV ALUES
A value is an enduring belief that some mode of conduct or end-state is preferable
to its opposite, and it guides actions, attitudes, judgments, and comparisons in
specific situations (Rokeach 1973). Given its guiding function, a value will set the
stage for how something will be approached.
l Hamel (1991) provided the foundation for a considerable amount of the recentl work on inter-organizational learning, He proposed a set of key determinants of
l inter-organizationallearning~ (collaborative versus competitive), receptivity
~ (ability to absorb knowledge), and transparency (openness with information).
'\):::~::t:::i:e~:~::~: ::::~~:;::; :f:'::d::values
in so far as his key determinants describe approaches to modes of conduct.
Hamel's research setting encompassed relationships between American and
Japanese automobile manufactures. Intent, receptivity, and transparency in the
relationships reflect values captured in racism, egoism, nationalism, and so on. He
quotes a Japanese manager as saying, ''We had the attitude of students, and our
Western partners the attitude of teachers (1991, p. 96)." Thus, the Japanese
receptivity took advantage of American openness. The Japanese intent was to
learn, the American intent (though most likely not conscious) was to teach.
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2.3.2 REIATIONSHIP LEARNING PROCESSES
Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell (1996) develop a theoretical model of the antecedents and
consequences of organizationallearning in marketing channels. They propose that
while organizationallearning occurs ~!lhiJL4I.9iYi<iYatQrga:nizations,it is a
_"''''''''~''''''''''_'''''''' "<""~""""",~~,)",,,.,",,,,, ....,,.,,.•, ••,,.,, .._.,.,,,.~"." .._.,.,.,,"·,i·'·~'·:_·"'··Y"" -",_- " . -_-, _-,' -
relationship learning construct in line with the market orientation construct (e.g.
Kohli and Jaworski 1990), consistent with Sinkula (1994) and Slater and Narver
(1995), encompassing information acquisition, dissemination, and shared
interpretation. Their fundamental proposition is that organizationallearning in
marketing channels is a process of understanding and gaining new insights.
Many researchers agree that organizationallearning involves some kind of
information processing (e.g. Day 1994a; Lukas et al. 1996; Shrivastava 1983;
Sinkula 1994; Slater and Narver 1995). Huber (1991) suggests four distinct
organizationalleaming constructs:
"Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is
obtained. Information distribution is the process by which information
from different sources is shared and thereby leads to new information
or understanding. Information interpretation is the process by which
distributed information is given one or more commonly understood
interpretations. Organizational memory is the means by which
knowledge is stored for future use (1991, p. 90)."
The common thread through the constructs is their process nature, and collectively
they are referred to as information processing (Sinkula, Baker, and Noordewier
1997, p. 308). The information processing perspective assumes that "An entity
learns if, through its processing of information, the range or likelihood of its
potential behaviors is changed (Huber 1991, p. 89)." Information processing in
relationships is about reducing ambiguity between multiple, often conflicting
interpretations.
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2.3.3 RECONCILING VALUES AND PROCESSES
Clearly, relationship learning can be defined as either values or processes. They
are intrinsically intertwined so that both impact relationship learning. A distinction
that can be made is that values are at the root of attitudes. An attitude is held by an
entity and is directed at something (Fishbein 1980), while the process is more a
function of the interplay between the entities. Because my focus is on the
interactional dyadic dimensions of relationship learning I will concentrate on
processes. A weakness in this is that I measure the magnitude of the process, but
this says nothing directly about the quality. Alternatively, I could attempt to
'~:"""--'_';~~""-_'~:"":,"""Ie..
measure outcomes aricI·t1i\is'capture~~~~eof the quality element. Outcomes,
_-. ._._.~._.~ _~._.,".._.""""",__."",_,,,,,,,,_".""~';"~=''-'''''''' .." .... _ ,,', .c ;,'''''''_ '_ , ._-",,,,, .... <J';O"'1'l •••
however, often occur substantially distant in time from the learning episode and
are thus attributed to spurious relationships with other events (Levitt and March
1988, p. 325).
2.4 RELATIONSHIP LEARNING: A COGNITIVE PROCESS
I treat information processing in a relationship as encompassing information
sharing, mutual interpretation, and memory integration. In the relationship context
information sharing captures both elements of acquisition and distribution.
2.4.1 INFORMATION SHARING
Information at its most primary level is a stimulus that could cause a shift in
expectations or evaluations (Driver and Streufert 1966, p. 272). For organizations
the stimulus can be internallike detecting errors (Argyris and Schon 1978, p. 2), or
externallike feedback from other organizations (Levitt and March 1988, p. 319) or
environmental changes (Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 811; Hedberg 1981, p. 9). In the
context of relationship learning I limit myself to information sharing between two
organizations. Other information may impact relationship learning, however, it is
exogenous to the construct. That is, it influences the process but is not directly
influenced by the process (von Krogh and Roos 1996, p. 125).
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Information sharing implies some minimal degree of collaborative effort from both
parties, distinguishing it from information acquisition that entails only the effort of
one party. Respondents in the field interviews saw it as impacting learning.
"Mostly we learn through communication. This is exactly the point we are trying
to make with our customers .... We want them to refer to us when they are
developing new products or if they are making changes. We are trying to find
contact points, regional and worldwide who will work with us.... This is
something we are really working with, that is, to gain a mutual understanding with
our customers for how we operate."
The amount and type of information will influence relationship learning, as will
the media and the way the information flow is organized. Organizations can suffer
information under-load or overload, and similar to just-in-time delivery, they need
the right information at the right place at the right time.
The type of information will impact its transfer because information often contains
knowledge. Two types of knowledge are widely recognized: migratory and tacit.
Relative to tacit knowledge, migratory knowledge can relatively easily and quickly
be moved because it can be articulated and encoded in a formula, a design, a
manual, a book, or a piece of machinery, or because one person is capable of
knowing it (Badaracco 1991, p. 35). So long as you have access to the manual or
the expert, you have the knowledge. Tacit knowledge is much more difficult to
transfer because it is captured in the norms, attitudes, information flows, and
decision processes of particular relationships among individuals and groups
(Badaracco 1991, p. 79).
Media refers to how information is transferred and has two dimensions: the variety
of cues it can provide and the rapidity of feedback (Daft and Huber 1987). Cues
are more likely related to interpretation, while rapidity will affect the amount of
information sharing.
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Information flow refers to how the relationship between parties is organized. The
most relevant dimension is how many contact points exist between the two firms.
For example, in the specialty chemicals industry there were several contact points
at all levels of the organization. In most cases information was transferred between
the two relevant people who were involved. That is, the person who needed the
information in one company and the person who held the information in the other
company interacted directly. By contrast, in the farmed salmon industry
information flow was usually funneled through sales people and purchasing
agents. There was very little interaction between firms across other functions. This
is likely related to product complexity and the type of information necessitated in
the exchange (Metcalf, Frear, and Krishnan 1990, p. 29). In the farmed salmon
industry the product is relatively standardized, thus the sales and purchasing
people have the basic knowledge needed for the meaningful transfer of
information. In the specialty chemicals industry, however, the products are
complex and customized such that sales and purchasing people may lack the
knowledge for a meaningful dialogue that is more relevant between, for example,
two chemical engineers.
2.4.2 INTERPRETATION
Interpretation is the process of giving meaning to information (Daft and Weick
1984). In relationships every message is in actuality two messages, the sender's
and the receiver's (MacNeil1980, p. 9). Necessarily, there must be some degree of
mutual interpretation for relationship learning to occur.
Ring and Van De Ven (1994) suggest that in the developmental processes of inter-
organizational relationships the parties informally and formally negotiate their
joint expectations. They commit to the relationship through formal agreements and
psychological contracts, and they execute their commitments. Throughout the
cyclical process they continually assess the efficiency and equity of the
relationship. Crucial to the success of the relationship process is sense making.
Through sense making the parties clarify their identity in relation to each other and
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if the relationship is successful they gradually build mutual interpretations. Over
time, personal relationships supplement formal relationships, psychological
contracts supplement formal contracts, and formal contracts begin to mirror
implicit understandings.
Contact across the relationship is the primary mechanism for building mutual
interpretation. In the field interviews we found that most interactions between the
two parties were related to solving some sort of operational problem, and thus
were addressed in operational kinds of meetings or simply on the telephone.
Hedberg (1981, p. 16) concurs with thiswhen he identifies how organizational
learning is triggered. He suggests that while people and opportunities can trigger
organizationallearning, it is more typically triggered by problems.
There were also many examples where the parties met face-to-face at organized
information-forums, such as customer visits and trade shows, in order to build an
understanding for each other. Cross-functional teams in customer visit programs
have been suggested as a mechanism for creating learning arenas (McQuarrie
1993, p. 23). Meeting face-to-face is important for the level of information
ambiguity because media vary in their capability to convey meaning, therefore, as
ambiguity increases it demands richer media (Wathne, Roos, and von Krogh 1996,
p.62).
2.4.3 MEMORY INTEGRATION
"In its most basic sense, organizational memory refers to stored information from
the organization's history that can be brought to bear on present decisions (Walsh
and Ungson 1991, p. 61)." I extrapolate this concept to relationships. This
presupposes that the organizations in a relationship build a common interpretation
of information that is then stored in memory, and that the information is
retrievable at a later point in time (McKee 1992, p. 233). Common interpretation is
fundamental to relationship memory because information is often context specific,
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therefore, retrieving it out of context may render it unrecognizable or unusable
(Starbuck 1992, p. 722).
Memory is retained at the individual, organizational, and relationallevel.
Individuals retain information based on their direct experiences and observations,
stored in their memories as cognition (Lee, Courtney, and O'Keefe 1992, p. 27;
Walsh 1995, p. 281). Unlike individual memory, organizational and relationship
memory is decentralized (Moorman and Miner 1997, p. 92), and unlike
organizational memory, relationship memory spans the boundaries of
organizations. Relationship memories are captured in the shared beliefs, values,
assumptions, norms, and behaviors that transcend the organizational boundaries
and are captured in the relationship. It.transcends personnel turnover and the
passage of time through systems of socialization and control (Levitt and March
1988, p. 326).
Lukas, Hult, and Ferrell (1996) divide organizational memory into four ''bins'' that
they label: physical capital, organizational formations, social capital, and
organizational culture. Accepting that relationships are formally (MacNeil1980)
and socially (Granovetter 1985) constituted, that they have histories and futures
(Axelrod 1984), and that they become quasi-organizations (Håkansson and
Snehota 1995), allows me to extrapolate Lukas et al.'s (1996) conceptualization to
the relationallevel.
The physical capital bin represents retention in computers, documents, individuals,
and so on that transcend organizational boundaries (Håkansson and Johanson
1988, p. 369). It is the easiest to access and understand, and is thus very useful in
facilitating decisions and aiding in problem solving (Quinn, Anderson, and
Finkelstein 1996, p. 74). For example, injoint R&D projects disseminated
information becomes imbedded (memorized) at different places in the relationship
like individuals, databases, documents, and so on. If an individual in one
organization does not possess a particular piece of information generated in the
43
relationship, but they know it exists in the other organization, they can access
(remember) it across the relationship. In this way the learning (and remembering)
has elements that are both internal and external to the respective organizations, yet
are captured within the context of the relationship. From the field interviews, it
came through very clearly that this bin is a function of input quality
(memorization). Input quality relates to routines for input and information
dissemination. In one organization there was no incentive or encouragement to
input information into electronic databases. On the sales staff only one person had
developed a database and it was highly personalized, thus it was not openly
accessible to other sales staff. This type of dysfunctional memory would propagate
what Day (1994b, p. 23) refers to as organizational amnesia. That is, an
organization fails to know what it knows.
Relational formations are such things as relational structure, routines, processes,
and so on. By changing the formations, the relationship is recording what it has
learned. For example, standard operating procedures are inherited between
organizations to achieve fit, and in so doing the relationship is recording what is
learned. The field interviews revealed several relationship-domain specific
behavioral routines that were adjusted or customized across relationships, such as
logistic systems and production processes.
Social capital represents the network of ties between individuals within and
outside of the organization. Burt (1997) describes social capital as "credit slips" a
person can use in time of need. Respondents in the field interviews said that when
faced with a problem they often referred to their personal network of contacts for a
solution, and that the network transcended organizational boundaries. Håkansson
and Johanson (1988, p. 369) also observed that personal networks transcend the
boundaries of the organizations.
Relationship culture is the most opaque of the four bins in that it is largely tacit
(Garud and Nayyar 1994, p. 375). It represents the norms and values captured in
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the relationship and while evolving, it transcends time thus functioning as a
repository for memory. Along with social capital, organizational culture is very
difficult for competitors to imitate and thus from a resource perspective can be a
unique source of competitive advantage (Barney 1991).
2.5 DEFINITION
Based on the preceding discussion, the following definition of relationship
learning is offered:
A supplier and a customer learn in a relationship to the degree that
information is shared among the two parties, the information is jointly
interpreted, and then integrated into relationship-domain specific
memory that will change the range or likelihood of potential
relationship-domain specific behavior (Selnes and Sallis 1999, p. 10).
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3. A MODEL OF RELATIONSHIP LEARNING
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality
(Einstein 1923, p. 28)."
Under what conditions does relationship learning occur? This refers to the
environmental, organizational, and inter-organizational conditions that induce
relationship learning. To identify these conditions we (Selnes and Sallis 1999)
conducted 26 interviews across 13 industrial buyer-seller relationships and
reviewed the literature on inter-organizational relationships, organizational
learning, and inter-organizationallearning. This chapter integrates our findings
with the literature to propose what drives relationship learning.
My argumentation so far has been premised on two firms that learn with each
other in a collaborative relationship based on some sort of mutual orientation.
However, simply because firms collaborate in a relationship does not mean they
learn together. They may, for example, collaborate to utilize unused factory
capacity, achieve economies of scale, or gain access to capital (Child and Faulkner
1998). These factors motivate a marriage of convenience where learning in the
relationship is not a goal, although it may be a byproduct where the firms get
knowledge from each other. Given my premise of a mutual orientation where firms
learn with each other, I posit that a collaborative objective that includes learning is
the most fundamental variable to motivate relationship learning. This is consistent
with the literature on inter-organizational relationships and learning (Dodgson
1993b; Hamel1991).
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There are many perspectives on motives for firms to collaborate (cf. Child and
Faulkner 1998), I refer to Kogut (1988) who generalizes to three: the transaction
cost motive, the strategic-behavior motive, and the organizationallearning motive.
From a transaction cost perspective (e.g. Williamson 1981), in situations of high
environmental uncertainty and high investments in nontransferable relationship
specific assets, internalizing transactions minimizes costs. Current transaction cost
thinking expands the original discrete boundary choice between markets and
hierarchies to include hybrid forms like collaboration where direct ownership is
substituted with formal (e.g. contracts) and informal (e.g. norms of information
sharing and trust) control mechanisms in relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide
1997).
Transaction cost economics focuses on governance problems and the conditions
under which the cost of conducting economic exchange in a market may exceed
the cost of organizing the exchange within a firm (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). A
key assumption of transaction cost economics is that actors are opportunistic to the
extent of being self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1981, p. 554).
However, if business transactions take place in series is it wise to exploit your
trading partner? Axelrod's, "Shadow of the future (1984, p. 113) ", succinctly
captures the essence of why trading partners are unlikely to be inclined to
opportunism. The future matters because both buyer and seller are able to punish
each other in subsequent interactions (Haugland and Grønhaug 1996), and the
reputation for being a valued trading partner can be a valuable asset (Powell et al.
1996). Recent transaction cost theory recognizes trust, the antithesis of
opportunism, as an informal control mechanism (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, p.
48). Network theory (e.g. Håkansson and Johanson 1988; Johanson and Mattsson
1987) holds that trust is an important variable in business relationships. Generally
speaking, trust is a critical variable in any collaborative relationship (cf. Child and
Faulkner 1998), therefore, I posit that it is an important variable for relationship
learning.
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Borrowing from transaction cost economics, I posit that environmental uncertainty
will also motivate relationship learning. Environmental uncertainty is
operationalized two ways in transaction cost economics (Rindfleisch and Heide
1997, p. 42). Most often it is treated as one-dimensional in that it focuses only on
the unpredictability of the environment (e.g. Heide and John 1990; Noordewier,
John, and Nevin 1990). The other is two-dimensional, distinguishing between
volatility and complexity (Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990, p. 199). Volatility creates
uncertainty through constraining rationality (Williamson 1975). Rational decisions
are difficult or impossible under quickly changing conditions. Complexity
constrains rationality because problem solving becomes difficult or impossible
(Spence and Brucks 1997). For relationship learning both dimensions are
important. Environmental uncertainty will be used to explain the volatility of the
environment whereas structural complexity will be used to describe the complexity
within the relationship.
Again borrowing from transaction cost economics, I posit that asset specificity will
also motivate relationship learning. Williamson identifies three types of asset
specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity, and human asset specificity.
Human asset specificity is, " ... learning by doing (1981, p. 555)," meaning
accumulating know-how in long-term relationships. It locks the partners into the
relationship by introducing switching costs and can be developed through further
learning. Accumulating specialized knowledge in a relationship can lead to
competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998, p. 662; Grønhaug 1996, p. 219).
From the strategic behavior perspective (e.g. Porter 1985), when complementary
assets create synergies that allow for competitive advantage, firms will be
motivated to collaborate. In contrast to transaction cost economics, rather than
minimizing costs the motive is to gain advantage. This is related to resource-based
theory where combining valuable, idiosyncratic resources can create competitive
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advantage (Barney 1991), and the relational view (e.g. Dyer and Singh 1998)
where these combinations can take place across organizational boundaries.
With the third motive, organizationallearning, firms are motivated to collaborate
in order to transfer knowledge, especially tacit knowledge (Fiol and Lyles 1985).
Because tacit knowledge is not explicitly codifiable, it is only transferable through
working together (Child and Faulkner 1998, p. 66). This is related to the concept
of grafting whereby one organization grafts another organization into its structure,
thus creating a knowledge pool. Huber (1991, p. 97) suggests that as the pressure
to learn faster increases, grafting will increase as a fast way to acquire knowledge.
To summarize, the principal antecedent variables for relationship learning are:
6. Collaborative objectives.
7. Trust.
8. Environmental uncertainty.
9. Structural complexity.
10. Asset specificity.
3.1 COLLABORATIVE OBJECTIVES
Relationship learning happens when there is a commonality of interests based on a
mutual orientation where firms are aware of each other' s interests and prepared to
pay attention to them (Heide 1994). Reciprocity is a core element of this kind of
relational exchange (Oliver 1990, p. 244), contributing to a balance in social
relations, promoting predictability and shared expectations (Bagozzi 1995, p. 276).
To reflect this I propose that firms have collaborative objectives that encompass a
reciprocal commonality of interests manifested in joint goals. This is more
restrictive than simple collaboration that can take place for other reasons where
goals may be divergent.
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Collaborative objectives enhance learning in inter-organizational relationships
(Badaracco 1991; Dodgson 1993b; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989). Firms often
collaborate as a means for creating knowledge or accessing knowledge that resides
outside firm boundaries (Huber 1991; Prahalad and HameI1990). Joint goals
legitimate collaboration between parties (Scott 1987, p. 32), and facilitate
relationship formation (Doz 1996, p. 69; Ring and Van De Ven 1994, p. 97). The
scope of joint goals will influence how and the degree to which the two parties
will collaborate (Borys and Jemison 1989, p. 237; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992, p.
76). A narrow scope mayencompass such things as providing for reliable
deliveries, while a broad scope may include more complex objectives like
improving key processes, developing new products, developing new markets, and
so on. It follows that the more ambitious the joint goals in a relationship, the more
reasons there should be to learn (HameI1991; Powell et al. 1996).
HI: Collaborative objectives are positively related to relationship learning.
3.2 TRUST
The management and sociology literatures recognize two separate views of trust,
one is based on confidence in predictability and the other is based on confidence in
goodwill (Ring and Van De Ven 1994, p. 93). Anderson and Narus define trust in
working relationships as, "The firm's belief that another company will perform
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, as well as not take
unexpected actions that would result in negative outcomes for the firm (1990, p.
45)." During the field interviews it became quite clear that in many working
relationships the parties trusted each other in a very calculative way. They trusted
the consistency of each other's actions, yet this did not necessarily entail
considering positive or negative outcomes, at least not to the extent that it changed
actions. They did not appreciate opportunism in the sense of self-interest seeking
with guile (e.g. Williamson 1981), however, they did appreciate that each
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organization needs to prioritize its own interests, which at times means making
decisions that will have negative consequences for the other party. For example,
one respondent in the field interviews told of how his supplier closed an
unprofitable supply plant in his region, necessitating transporting supply from a
more distant plant, thus increasing his expenses. He did not like it, but it did not
affect the level of trust because he understood and agreed with the supplier's
rationale. Therefore, regarding relationship learning, trust is conceptualized as the
confidence one party has in an exchange partner' s reliability and integrity (Morgan
and Hunt 1994, p. 23). This parallels Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman (1993, p.
82) and Selnes (1998, p. 309) by reflecting confidence and expectations as
opposed to more restrictive definitions that encompass goodwill as an additional
element of trust (e.g. Ring and Van De Ven 1992, p. 488).
Doney and Cannon (1997, p. 35) observed that trust in buyer-seller relationships
exists at both the inter-organizational and the interpersonallevels. At the inter-
organizationallevel, trust operates as a governance .mechanism (Bradach and
Eccles 1989, p. 104), reduces conflict, enhances satisfaction (Anderson and Narus
1990, p. 45), and is closely connected to commitment to the relationship (Morgan
and Hunt 1994, p. 22; Selnes 1998, p. 310). At the interpersonallevel between the
two organizations, trust facilitates effectiveness of persuasion and communication
processes (Doney and Cannon 1997, p. 41). Results from the field interviews
support this. When questioned about the difference between inter-organizational
trust and interpersonal trust, one customer commented, "I would extrapolate that
and say, well, the more you trust the people, the more personal relationships you
have with people from your suppliers, the more that you're in a position to learn
something from them. Probably they are more open-minded and are willing to give
you information, whereas, on a company level it's more an abstract relationship
rather than something personal."
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998, p. 142) propose a model of how
interpersonal and inter-organizational trust are related. While they propose that
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individuals can trust individuals in other organizations and they can also trust the
organization itself, organizations are incapable of trusting. This differs
fundamentally from the position of this dissertation because to accept that
organizations can learn also implies that organizations can trust. As two
organizations interact and trust builds, routines will be established between the
organizations that may be characterized as manifestations of trust (Dodgson
1993b, p. 84) In the same sense that routines are memories of organizational
learning (Cyert and March 1992, p. 119), and further organizationallearning may
result in changing these routines, relationship learning to trust may also change the
inter-organizational routines. Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 144) refer to this as inter-
organizational norms that are recreated in interpersonal trust orientations. Heide
and John define norms as, "Expectations about behavior that are at least partially
shared by a group of decision makers (1992, p. 34)." Accepting this definition of
norms makes it plausible that an inter-organizational norm of trust can in actuality
be considered as inter-organizational trust as opposed to simply a person in one
organization trusting another organization. For present purposes trust is treated as
a single dimension because the levels of trust reinforce each other with respect to
relationship learning. Lack of one does not negate the positive influence of the
other.
When the parties in an exchange trust that they will not be harmed, exploited, or
put at risk by the action of the other party, they are more likely to share
information (e.g. Morgan and Hunt 1994) and to forsake short-term gains at the
expense of the other party (Axelrod 1984). Some researchers go so far as to say
that mutual trust is a condition for relationship learning (Child and Faulkner 1998,
p. 292). A climate of inter-organizational trust supplants interpersonal trust that is
susceptible to personnel turnover or personality clashes between individuals across
the inter-organizational relationship (Dodgson 1993b). Based on this I hypothesize
that:
H2: Trust ispositively related to relationship learning.
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3.3 THE INTERACTION EFFECT
It is generally acknowledged that trust facilitates collaborative behavior in
customer-supplier relationships (Das and Teng 1998; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh
1987), and likewise, collaborative behavior facilitates trust (Håkansson and
Johanson 1988). Thus, there is a reciprocal relationship between collaborative
objectives and trust. This interaction between the variables is where we perceive a
hidden cost, which can be illustrated by looking at the relationship between trust
and control.
Trust and control playa balancing act in a relationship. As the relationship
between two organizations develops, calculative trust, based on explicit control
mechanisms and credible information, gives way to relational trust (Rousseau,
Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998), thereby reducing transaction costs (Nooteboom,
Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997, p. 313). Because trust potentially reduces costs it
is attractive to develop, although it is seldom the only control mechanism. Using
the analogy that organizations are like oceans, explicit control mechanisms retain a
role as life jackets in lieu of exclusive reliance on trust (Ring and Van De Ven
1994, p. 96). In one dyad from the field interviews, the two parties had developed
a partnering contract in order to secure that sensitive information would not be
distributed to outsiders, and that all records of sensitive information would be
destroyed if the collaboration were terminated. While not restricting information
sharing, the contract acted as a life jacket against opportunism in the event of
relationship dissolution.
Control mechanisms, while perhaps bolstering trust can also reduce it (Das and
Teng 1998, p. 501). They can give the impression of distrust, which in turn may
lead to further control mechanisms, which creates more distrust, and so on in a
negative cycle. Furthermore, control mechanisms can propagate rigidity in
response to problems where flexibility may be a better solution (Rousseau et al.
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1998, p. 400). Conversely, control mechanisms provide feedback as to the
trustworthiness of the other party, thereby contributing to building trust. Das and
Teng (1998, p. 501) explain this inconsistency by dividing control mechanisms
into formal control and social control. Formal control refers to explicit rules,
procedures, and contracts, whereas social control relies on values and norms.
Formal control mechanisms imply distrust, whereas social control mechanisms do
not explicitly limit behavior, thereby instilling trust. The chemical buyers from the
field interviews said that they rarely tested products from the suppliers, relying on
reputation as a control mechanism. It was understood (social norm) that for a
supplier to do anything but supply the specified product would be foolish.
Whatever the case, there is a tendency to relinquish formal control as trust
develops in a relationship. This is where the potential cost comes in. First, there is
the risk of opportunism where the parties may take advantage of trust and exploit
each other (HameI1991). Second, a high leveloftrust is usually accompanied
with strong positive emotions and liking (Jones and George 1998). In such
atmospheres it is unlikely that negative or critical information will be exchanged
because it may endanger the good atmosphere of the relationship, thus the benefit
of constructive conflict is lost (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois 1997). Third,
as commitment increases, value systems converge to the extent where the parties
may develop a common identity (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996). This
group-think (Janis 1989) may hinder the creative processes found in more
heterogeneous groups. The ramification is that as trust increases it may interact
with collaborative objectives to actually reduce relationship learning. Therefore, I
hypothesize that:
H3: The interaction of trust with collaborative objectives is negatively related to
relationship learning.
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3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
Assuming firms are not self-sufficient, resource dependency theory suggests that
firms will seek to reduce environmental uncertainty through establishing formal
and semi-formal links with other firms (Heide 1994). The greater the
environmental uncertainty, the greater the need for inter-firm collaboration and
relationship learning (Dodgson 1993b, p.79). Firms are motivated to learn together
to gain some controlover the uncertainty or to buffer the consequences (Jap 1999,
p. 464). In the field interviews and literature review three core elements of
environmental uncertainty surfaced: (1) external competition, (2) external shocks,
and (3) technological complexity.
3.4.1 EXTERNAL COMPETmON
Inboth the literature (e.g. Hallen, Johansen, and Seyed-Mohamed 1991, p. 84) and
field interviews, increasing competition in the market was cited as one of the
major drivers of relationship learning. Globalization of markets through cross-
border trade agreements such as the WTO, EU, and NAFTA, and improving
communication and transportation technologies are opening up previously
protected markets (Levitt 1983, p. 92; Ohmae 1989, p. 153). Consequently,
companies are under increasing pressure to develop their learning capabilities, not
only internally but in relationships as well. This is supported by results from the
field interviews. In response to the increasingly competitive environment, all of
the interviewed companies are experimenting with different types of learning
arrangements, from loosely coupled sales agreements to tightly governed
partnership contracts. As one supplier said, "The competitive situation has brought
this about. There is more pressure from the end market and from our customers.
We feel there is a greater need for information sharing and learning in order to
gain a competitive advantage."
3.4.2 EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Jolts and hyper-turbulence have been identified as driving organizational change
(Meyer, Brooks, and Goes 1990, p. 102). Volberda (1996, p. 359) and others
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discuss a shift in the organizational paradigm to hyper-competition, meaning an
environment, "Fraught with uncertainty, diverse global players, rapid
technological change, widespread price wars, and seemingly endless
reorganization (llinitch, D'Aveni, and Lewin 1996, p. 211)." In the field
interviews, shocks were often equated with unexpected fluctuations in demand and
supply. In one case, three large customers of one supplier simultaneously started
large jobs. The supplier did not have the capacity to satisfy the sudden increase in
demand, causing a supply crisis for all three customers. The responsible sales
agent had been maintaining an arms-length relationship with the customers, which
did not facilitate the transfer of what turned out to be critical information. The
poor information flow had a direct negative consequence for the customer' s
performance, as well as negative consequences for the relationship. All parties
were motivated to form closer ties and increase relationship learning in order to
avoid future shocks.
In the farmed salmon industry there were ramifications from the "mad cow" crisis.
Consumer awareness of sources of food dramatically increased, making it
important for retailers to be able to trace the origin of their products. Several
producers and retailers implemented systems of tracability, enabling them to
follow particular lots of salmon back to specific farms and even to specific
hatcheries. Information flow and precision of information can be equated to
relationship learning, which some salmon producers now use as a competitive tool
to differentiate themselves from less organized or less integrated producers.
According to Cyert and March (1992, pp. 117-118), an organization attains some
sort of preferred state. When an external disturbance or shock that is beyond the
control of the organization disrupts the preferred state, the organization adjusts to
attain an alternative preferred state. This reactionary view is consistent with
behaviorallearning because the organization relies solelyon inferences from
history to guide organizational action. The organization is incapable of conjecture.
Consistent with the cognitive approach, relationship learning is forward-looking
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which should reduce the frequency and magnitude of shocks (Slater and Narver
1995, p. 66). Itwill also facilitate cooperation and mutual adjustment to the
unexpected (Day 1994b; Sinkula 1994).
3.4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Huber (1996) suggests that technological change, which is happening at an
increasing pace, is increasing environmental uncertainty and turbulence.
Recognizing that no single organization can keep up with all technological
changes and be excellent in every function, many organizations are focusing on
developing core competencies and may discontinue developing or maintaining
other capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel1990). To compensate for lost
competencies, organizations often establish relationships, and to keep pace with
changes in their core competencies they pursue learning. Luckily, the same
technological development that is creating the turbulence is also providing part of
the solution. Technological development in information technology is allowing for
the reestablishment of communication through the value-chain, effectively
reconnecting producer and consumer (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995).
Product life-cycles are growing shorter forcing companies to speed up their
product and market development processes (Day 1994b, p. 9; McKee 1992, p.
233). Even simple products often require advanced technology in their production,
transportation, or sale. Where technological development is moderate, as in many
commodity markets, the benefits from relationship learning are likely to be low.
Where development is rapid, as in telecommunications, the benefits from
relationship learning are likely to be high because even small improvements in
products, systems, or people will have great value. In the field interviews, every
respondent gave accounts of technology related pressures to increase relationship
learning. A commodity chemicals supplier said one of the main reasons they are
pursuing relationship learning is to stay abreast of technological changes that
could alter the market, and thus their market share. The changes could come in the
form of new logistic systems or a shift to an entirely new product. In the farmed
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salmon industry, some producers are relying on technological advances in
smoking and filleting to produce more consistent products as well as reduce waste
in processing. This is contingent, however, on consistency and quality from the
fish farms right down to the retailers, thus necessitating relationship learning
throughout the entire value-chain.
As competition, shocks, and technological complexity increase they contribute to
environmental uncertainty, thus motivating organizations to pursue relationship
learning.
H4: Environmental uncertainty is positively related to relationship learning.
3.5 STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
"The structural complexity of a collectivity refers to the number of differentiated
elements that must be contended with and integrated in order for an inter-
organizational relationship to act as a unit (Van de Ven 1976, p. 26)." The
rationale is that as the number of differentiated elements increases, the amount of
required interaction increases exponentially, which contributes to complexity. I
divide structural complexity into two dimensions: transaction complexity and
relationship complexity. Transaction complexity relates to the product or service
in the exchange, whereas, relationship complexity relates to how the exchange is
organized.
3.5.1 TRANSACTION COMPLEXITY
Organizations in relationships have to exchange information in order to coordinate
and plan actions (Anderson and Narus 1990). Characteristics of the products in the
relationship will have a significant effect on the amount of information exchange
as well as the time required in the exchange (Metcalf et al. 1990). Therefore,
transaction complexity varies primarily by the technological complexity of
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products as well as the number of products involved in an exchange. Absorptive
capacity refers to the ability to recognize, assimilate, and apply external
information, and is a function of the organization's prior related knowledge
(Cohen and Levinthal1990, p. 128). Technological complexity will challenge
absorptive capacity, thus motivating relationship learning.
Low transaction complexity is exemplified by the farmed salmon industry. There
is only one product with a few derivatives and although it is biological the product
it is relatively simple in terms of manufacture. High transaction complexity is
exemplified by the specialty chemicals industry. There are several products, all of
which must be produced within very strict specifications. The technology to
produce the products is usually complex, and delivery can be complex because of
the often volatile nature of the products.
3.5.2 RELATIONSHIP COMPLEXITY
Relationship complexity relates to how the exchange process is organized. It varies
primarily with the number of contact points and social distance between the buyer
and the seller (Ford 1980, p. 344). Some relationships are organized with very few
contact points, like only sales and purchasing, which translates to low complexity.
As the number of contact points increases, so too does the complexity of the
relationship. Social distance relates to the existence of social ties between
organizations. Close social ties can act as a lubricant in the exchange relationship
by providing common understanding (Heide and John 1992).
The farmed salmon industry is a good example of low relationship complexity
because nearly all buyer-seller contact happens between a couple of people. While
they may be geographically and culturally distant, this is buffered because the
complexity of the information exchanged is low and they do not have to consider
many contact points between the organizations. A high complexity relationship is
exemplified by a global supplier of chemicals and a global manufacturer where
several functional areas (marketing, sales, R&D, production, procurement, and
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distribution) are involved from both sides of the relationship, and where both
parties have severaloperating units around the world. One supplier described just
such a relationship. "Our customer has regional and world-wide operations, and so
do we. We have sales organizations and eleven production sites. We deliver to
some customers from several different production sites. There are staff contacts,
joint R&D contacts, and contacts at the CEO level. In other words, it is very
complex for both parties to understand all of the information that is exchanged."
As structural complexity increases, information uncertainty and ambiguity are
likely to increases as well. This will most likely create problems in the
relationship. As the number of serious problems grows, the parties in the
relationship are likely to be more motivated to learn and thus reduce the pressure
of unsolved problems (Lee et al. 1992, p. 25).
He Structural complexity is positively related to relationship learning.
3.6 ASSET SPECIFICITY
Asset specificity will motivate relationship learning in several ways: as a control
mechanism, as a credible commitment to the relationship, and as a reinforcement
of the relationship.
Asset specificity increases risk in transactions by introducing switching costs. To
the extent that assets are idiosyncratic to a relationship, switching means giving up
future returns on those assets (Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001). As the asset
specificity of an exchange increases, to reduce the hazard of opportunism the
trading parties will be motivated towards relational exchange (Heide 1994). As the
relationship develops expectations converge, thus reducing uncertainty generated
by independent parties (Williamson 1975, p. 25), acting as an implicit control
mechanism (Ouchi 1979). Asset specificity in a relationship also acts as a credible
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commitment to the relationship (Williamson 1981). It reassures the other party
about intentions (Hallen et al. 1991), contributing to trust in the relationship.
Finally, human asset specificity (Williamson 1981) as it relates to experience with
tacit knowledge will facilitate communication of complex information between
firms (Zander and Kogut 1995, p. 79).
H6: Asset Specificity is positively related to relationship learning.
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3.7 THEORETICAL MODEL OF RELATIONSHIP LEARNING
Figure 3.1, Relationship Learning Model
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3.8 MODEL SUMMARY
What the model suggests are five direct effects between the independent variables
(collaborative objectives, trust, environmental uncertainty, structural complexity,
and asset specificity) and the dependent variable (relationship learning). While
interesting, it is the hypothesized interaction effect between collaborative
objectives and trust on relationship learning that is most novel within existing
theory. The interaction effect modifies the positive linear effect of collaborative
objectives by introducing a negative curvilinear trend. Figure 3.2a shows the
hypothetical positive linear relationship between relationship learning and
collaborative objectives without the interaction effect. Figure 3.2b shows the
hypothetical negative curvilinear influence with the interaction effect included.
A B
Relearn ~II' Relearn Il'
..
Collab Collab + (Collab x Trust)
Figure 3.2, The Interaction Effect
The ramifications are that by disregarding the interaction between collaborative
objectives and trust, parties to relationship learning may not be realizing its full
potential.
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4. METHODOLOGY
"Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything needs
pounding (McGrath, Martin, and Kulka 1982, p. 53)."
This chapter describes the two-step methodology used for developing and testing
the relationship learning model. The reason for choosing a two-step design is the
emergent state of the theory (e.g. Pine, Peppers, and Rogers 1995). There have
been suggestions for how to define a relationship learning construct (e.g. Lukas et
al. 1996), although nobody to my knowledge has specifically proposed or tested a
definition. Different variables have been proposed as antecedent (e.g. Hame11991)
or consequent (e.g. Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) to relationship learning,
however, no proposed linkages have gained any significant degree of acceptance
in the research community.
When proposing constructs, argumentation can be based on conceptual and
empirical perspectives (Singh 1991). The conceptual perspective is concerned with
building sound theoretical arguments for the domain of a construct and its
relationship to related constructs. The empirical perspective offers estimated
measures as evidence for or against the proposed constructs and relationships. The
emergent state of relationship learning theory calls for conceptual development,
thus it is appropriate to begin with induction (research then theory) for developing
the relationship learning construct and model, then deduction (theory then
research) for testing it (Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring 1982, p. 104). Each step
can reveal findings that the other may not have made salient, and in conjunction
they establish the validity (are we measuring what we want to) and reliability (are
we measuring it accurately) of the research.
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In describing the methodology I address dyadic measurement issues, the empirical
context, sampling, and measure development.
4.1 STEP ONE: DEVELOPING THE MODEL
In step one, the objective was to attain a deeper understanding of the learning
process in industrial customer-supplier relationships, with the goal of developing a
testable model for step two. A logical consequence of the objective, then, was to
choose an exploratory research design. An exploratory design using qualitative,
inductive methodology provides ideas and insights about phenomena (Churchill
1999, p. 101). It is particularly helpful in focusing problems into testable
hypotheses.
Constructs are abstractions of phenomena like learning, uncertainty, or trust (Judd,
Smith, and Kidder 1991, p. 42). In theory development it is important that
definitions and operationalizations of constructs be unambiguous and easily
replicable as well as being broadly accepted (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981, p.
201; Peter 1981, p. 135). To accomplish this, Churchill (1979) suggests specifying
the domain of the construct by comparing definitions and operationalizations in
previous research. Combining previous research with evidence from data enhances
confidence in the constructs (Eisenhardt 1989).
Theories describe how constructs are interconnected, and constructs acquire
meaning only within the context of a theory (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias
1996). While relationship learning is distinct from organizationallearning, it is
nevertheless closely related. Organizationallearning theory and inter-
organizational research provide an overview of theoretically related constructs for
developing the relationship learning model. A priori specification of a list of
constructs is helpful because if they prove important as the theory emerges they
give it empirical grounding (Eisenhardt 1989). To this end, two specific issues
dominated the exploratory research:
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• Construct validity - Are we measuring what we intend to?
Nomological validity - How does relationship learning fit with other
constructs to which it is theoretically related?
•
Construct validity is, "The degree to which a measure assesses the construct it is
purported to assess (Peter 1981, p. 134)." It is closely related to reliability in that it
is concerned with the accuracy of a measure (Churchill 1979), however, it extends
this notion to include what is being measured. A particularly important issue with
construct validity is confounding, which is when operational variables can be
interpreted in terms of more than one construct (Cook and Campbell 1979).
Nomological validity is concerned with the predicted pattern of relationships
between constructs (Cook and Campbell 1979), and can be thought of in terms of
constructs and theories as nomological nets (MeehI1990). Imagine a fishnet
encompassing all reality; the knots represent constructs and the strands represent
theories. Construct validity is concerned with the verisimilitude (truth-likeness) of
the knots, while nomological validity is concerned with the verisimilitude of the
strands that connect them.
4.1.1 RESEARCHCONTEXT
A heterogeneous set of buyer-seller dyads was desirable to capture the entire
spectrum of learning relationships from low to high (John and Reve 1982, p. 518;
Kumar, Stem, and Anderson 1993, p. 1635; Seidler 1974, p. 817). Eisenhardt
(1989, p. 537) argues for this on the grounds that using polar cases renders the
focal phenomenon transparently observable. This suggests theoretical sampling as
a way of selecting cases on the basis of pre-specified criteria as dictated by the
focal phenomenon. To this end, Iselected organizations based on expected levels
of relationship learning.
Allowing for the incumbent weakness of generalizing:
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• The farmed salmon industry represents low learning: the product is fairly
standardized and there are few contact points across the relationship.
Suppliers were from the farmed salmon industry, with buyers from
smokers, canneries, agents, and supermarket chains.
The commodity chemicals industry represents medium learning: while the
product is standardized, there are many more contact points across
relationships, thus increasing complexity. Suppliers were commodity
chemical manufacturers with buyers from the construction industry.
The specialty chemicals industry represents high learning: it has both
complex products and complex relationships. Suppliers were specialty
chemical manufacturers with other more refined specialty chemical
manufacturers as buyers.
•
•
The supplier organizations were contacted at the upper-management level and
asked to participate in the study. Once recruited, the manager supplied a few
names of people within his or her own company who were central to key-customer
relationships. These people were recruited and in tum supplied the names of their
key contacts in the key-customer organization. The key-customer informants were
then recruited. Informants were from sales, R&D, procurement, quality control,
and divisional management.
4.1.2 THE INTERVIEWS
In conjunction with the literature review, 26 interviews across 13 buyer-seller
dyads were used to develop the model. Two interviewers conducted the
interviews, initially together but later alone. Eisenhardt suggests that using
multiple investigators, "Builds confidence in the findings and increases the
likelihood of surprising findings (1989, p. 538)."
The interviews typically lasted about 60-90 minutes and were based on a prepared
interview guide (see Appendix for full version). Six specific areas were discussed,
although the format was very open because it was important that respondents were
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free to express their beliefs on learning in the relationship. Each interview was
tape-recorded and protocols were developed.
Question 1 (generallearning)
This series of questions focused on how they learn, what they learn, and their
perceptions of the complexity of the learning.
Question 2 (memory and processing)
The focus here was on how they perceived memory to function in the
relationship and what facilitated it. Topics like information sharing,
accessibility, and storage were covered.
Question 3 (driving forces and benefits)
Here we focused on what was motivating learning in the relationship and the
factors that influenced the motivation. We also asked about benefits and
consequences.
Question 4 (learning by the other party)
In this section we tried to capture the respondent's perceptions of how the
other party in the relationship viewed learning and if they saw changes in the
other party based on the learning.
Question 5 (organizational questions)
These questions were very structurally oriented covering how the
relationship was organized. This included things like complexity,
centralization of authority, openness, and formality.
Question 6 (suggestions)
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We closed the sessions by asking how relationship learning could be
improved. The point was to encourage freethinking in the respondent to
bring out issues we may have missed.
4.1.3 DATAANALYSIS
In the tradition of truly inductive grounded theory, phenomena should be allowed
to emerge from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 1; Strauss and Corbin 1990,
p. 23). We used a quasi-grounded theory approach to data analysis in that as
phenomena emerged we continually evaluated them against the literature. There is
a reciprocal relationship between the data and the literature in that both offer ideas
and both offer tests of the ideas generated from their respective opposite. We
expect this iterative process to contribute to attaining high construct validity and
nomological validity.
The protocols were imported into a program dedicated to analyzing qualitative
data (Nudist). The structure of Nudist allows for what Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.
61) refer to as open coding. A code is an abstract label given to an excerpt oftext
representing the underlying meaning or theme of the text. The label usually allows
for a continuum from low to high along a particular dimension. For example, in
one of the interviews the respondent said, "We respect them, but often we do not
trust what they say." This text unit could be labeled both "respect" and "trust". It
would indicate high respect, but low trust. In the course of coding all the
interviews, several other text units may also fit with these codes. When a code
contains several text units it is an indication of significance to the process captured
in the interviews. If a code has very few text units it may be deemed insignificant,
or possibly it is appropriate to merge it with a related code. The purpose is to attain
a high level of abstraction with a parsimonious approach to categorizing, resulting
in a simple but effective description of the process taking place in the data.
Initially, 68 codes were derived from open coding. No associations were drawn
between codes in the first round. In the second round, axial coding was conducted
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whereby the initial codes were combined into a hierarchical structure in relation to
each other. In many cases codes were merged when the concepts turned out to be
very similar. Insignificant codes were deleted, helping to eliminate individual
idiosyncrasies of key informants. The resultant hierarchy was divided into four
primary dimensions; motivators, moderators, the relationship learning construct,
and consequences. These were distilled down into the relationship learning
construct and model.
Despite that I identify consequences, in this dissertation I limit myself to
antecedents with relationship learning as the dependent variable. I have done this
because at this point to include consequences would thrust the dissertation into a
normative managerial domain as opposed to a descriptive theoretical domain.
While in subsequent work my aim will be to further explore normative dimensions
and managerial implications of the theory, given my purpose to contribute to the
theoretical development of relationship learning I believe it is inappropriate here.
4.2 STEP TWO: TESTING THE MODEL
In step two the objective was to test the construct and model of relationship
learning. The primary goal was to develop and refine the measurement scale.
Because the model implies untested causal relationships between constructs, the
logical choice was to use a causal research design. A causal design using
quantitative, deductive analysis measures the degree to which a phenomenon is
present (Kirk and Miller 1986), and provides evidence concerning the
hypothesized cause-effect relationships (Churchill 1999 p. 140). Because of time
and money constraints the causal design was carried out in a cross-sectional study,
which unfortunately compromises testing the necessary condition of time-order
occurrence (Churchill 1999, p. 145). Despite this it still allows for a strong test of
the measurement instrument and perceptual consistency between the buyer-seller
informants.
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4.2.1 DYADlC MEASUREMENT
The level of a theory (e.g. individual, organizational, dyadic) concerns the target
phenomenon that a researcher is trying to explain. The level of measurement and
level of analysis should reflect the level of the theory (Klein, Dansereau, and Hall
1994, p. 199). Relationship learning is a dyadic level phenomenon existing
between two organizations, thus the measurement and analysis should also be
dyadic. Intuitivelya dyadic phenomenon would require measurement from both
sides (Heide and John 1994).
A complicating factor for measuring the constructs in the relationship learning
model is that they are latent (i.e. not directly observable). Properties of latent
constructs must be inferred indirectly from other indicators (Heide and John 1994).
To facilitate this, in marketing research data is frequently collected from key
informants, however, this potentially confounds the level of measurement when
the level of the theory is at a higher order than the individual. To overcome this
Seidler (1974, p. 817) suggests a sample of at least five key informants from each
segment of the organization to which the measure applies, and that the informants
should be chosen on the basis of expertise. In a dyadic setting this translates to at
least five key informants from each side of the dyad, raising the dilemma of how
to combine key informant reports.
Know ledgeable informants may have dissimilar opinions about the same
phenomenon because of such things as different levels of expertise, their
background, or their position within their organization (Kumar et al. 1993).
Combining informant reports to form an average confounds separating systematic
informant bias from random error in the statistical analysis, which becomes critical
if the systematic informant bias accounts for a substantial proportion of the total
variance (Phillips 1981). Unless perceptual agreement is established a priori,
averaging responses masks possible reliability problems. Kumar et aL (1993, p.
1637) proposed a hybrid approach where prior to combining the reports, consensus
is sought when key informants substantially differ. This would effectively
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eliminate systematic informant bias, however, it exposes informants to conformity
bias, thus simply hiding the reliability problem in a different way. As a result of
these difficulties it is common to rely on single key informants (Heide and John
1994).
In the present research one key informant per side of the dyad is used. The
ramifications are not deemed serious because the focus of the measurement is on
the dyad, and John and Reve (1982) showed that key informants across a
wholesaler-retailer dyad can provide reliable and valid reports on concrete dyadic
phenomena. I am not concerned with perceptual agreement within the respective
organizations, what I care about is perceptual agreement across the dyad.
Perceptual disagreement will be controlled for by partitioning the variance
between respondents.
Having two key informant reports, one from each side of the dyad, still raises the
dilemma of how to combine them into a dyadic measure. There is great potential
for systematic differences between informants (Phillips 1981), suggesting that
aggregation to form an average is inappropriate. Instead, as per Phillips (1981) and
John and Reve (1982), the reports should be modeled as reflective indicators (one
seller and one buyer) within a multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM) (Campbell
and Fiske 1959), modeled as a covariance structure (Joreskog 1974). This allows
for partitioning of the variance into trait (construct of interest), method (systematic
informant bias), and random error.
4.2.2 THE MEASUREMENT STRATEGY
Churchill (1979) recommends multiple measures of latent constructs. Using
multiple reflective indicators for a construct entails having a sample of items
tapping different nuances of the construct (Bollen and Lennox 1991). Changing
out items in the sample has no effect so long as they are reflective, as opposed to
formative, and equally reliable (Churchill 1979).
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Evidence of construct validity comes from testing for convergence within
measures and divergence between measures of theoretically related constructs.
Convergent and discriminant validity can be assessed simultaneously through a
multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM) (Campbell and Fiske 1959), which can be
modeled as a covariance structure (Joreskog 1974). In this case, the informant
reports constitute the methods (the buyer is one method and the seller is another
method), while the constructs, like trust or asset specificity, constitute the traits.
The model presented in figure 4.1 is in line with both Phillips (1981) and John and
Reve (1982) and entails modeling the MTMM matrix as a restricted factor
structure model. The lambda (A.) parameters indicate the correspondence between
Figure 4.1, Multitrait-Multimethod Measurement Model
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the measure and the trait, providing evidence of convergent validity. The phi (<I»
parameters indicate the inter-correlation between traits, providing evidence of
discriminant validity.
An additional advantage of this approach is the assessment of the reliability and
validity of the dyadic measurement. The delta (6) parameters are the error terms
for the indicator variables. The square of lambda for a construct to an indicator,
plus the square of lambda for its corresponding connection of an informant to the
indicator, plus the delta error term accounts for the variance in an observation. The
lambda for the construct to an indicator is the explained variance in the construct.
The lambda for an informant to an indicator is the systematic variance
idiosyncratic to that informant. Thus, the variance can be broken down into trait
variance, systematic informant bias, and random error, allowing for assessment of
the systematic differences between buyers and sellers reporting on the construct.
Measurement theory states (Churchill 1979): Xo= XT+ Xs+ XR
Where:
Xo = Observed score
XT= True score
Xs = Systematic error
XR= Random error
A measure is reliable if XR= zero and valid if Xo = XT, thus a measure can be
reliable but not valid.
The ramifications are:
• So long as random error is not excessive, the measures are reliable .
Systematic error affects the validity of the measure; therefore, the
systematic variance should also be as lowas possible.
•
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• The seller and buyer random error can be compared to ascertain who
provides the most reliable measure of a given construct.
The seller and buyer systematic variance can be compared to ascertain who
provides the most valid measure of a given construct.
•
4.2.3 SAMPLING
High variance on the relationship learning variable was deemed the key
consideration when determining the sampling frame and how to draw the sample
(Kumar et al. 1993; Seidler 1974). A stratified convenience sample was drawn
from databases covering Norwegian and Swedish industry. There were no
statistical considerations in selecting suppliers, we simply started in Norway
continuing until the selected categories were exhausted, then we turned to Sweden
so as to increase the sample size. Practicallimitations dictated when we stopped.
Although only Norwegian and Swedish suppliers were recruited, buyers came
from all over Europe. Several industries were chosen for their expected levels of
relationship learning, on a spectrum of low to high. There is a weakness in
generalizing for specific industries, although the goal of capturing the learning
spectrum should still be accomplished. The industry labels are:
Telecommunications
Food production
Fish wholesalers
Fish producers
lighting equipment
Fertilizer producers
Iron works
Ventilation equipment
Heating equipment
Refrigeration equipment
Paper suppliers
Cement producers
Chemical producers
Office furniture
Plastic suppliers
Transformer producers
Construction equipment
Data processing
Machinists
Computer suppliers
Electronic suppliers
Control instruments
Programmers
Machine maintenance
Table 4.1, Sampled Industries
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All companies with over 50 employees in the selected industries were contacted.
The size limitation was imposed to assure that respondents came from formal
organizations as opposed to, for example, family operated companies where
routines may be highly idiosyncratic (Weick 1965).
A desirable condition of the MTMM matrix approach is that the methods should
be maximally different for the test to be strong (Campbell and Fiske 1959). In the
present context the methods are the respondents from either side of the dyad,
which presents a dilemma of how to select respondents. In the Phillips (1981)
study, the common thread between key informants was membership to the
organization and was not related to any relationship between the key informants.
In fact, following the criteria set out by Campbell and Fiske (1959) regarding
using different respondents as methods, he recruited informants that specifically
differed as much as possible so that inter-informant agreement could not be
attributed to a shared methods factor such as positional bias. This may, however,
be problematic because Patchen (1961) found that measuring between
organizational levels produced unreliable results, which he reasoned was at least
partly due to a lack of common perspective between respondents. John and Reve's
(1982) sample was made up of dyadic wholesaler-retailer relationships where the
retailer sample was based on recommendations from the wholesaler. They
reasoned that their sampling satisfies the maximally different methods criterion
because key informants came from opposite sides of a dyad. Because John and
Reve's (1982) key-informants were paired on the basis of recommendation they
probably had the necessary level of common perspective suggested by Patchen
(1961). In the present research we recruited key informants across the dyad based
on recommendation. By doing this, the buyer and the supplier use each other and
their respective organizations as reference points when completing the
questionnaire.
Following the criteria set out by Campbell (1955), respondents were recruited
based on their knowledge regarding the focal research issues. The supplier
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organizations were contacted at the upper-management level and asked to
participate in the study. Once recruited, the upper-manager was asked to supply a
few names within his or her own company of people who were central to the
supplier-customer relationships. Once a respondent was recruited, he or she was
asked to supply names of their key contacts in a key-customer organization. A
respondent in the key-customer organization was then recruited directly by the
supplier. Both respondents were faxed or mailed the questionnaire.
4.2.4 QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT
We used Churchill's (1979, pp. 67-69) approach to questionnaire development.
Scales from several other relevant empirical studies were combined with new
items to make one scale of 213 questions. New items were based on relevant
conceptualliterature, results from the field interviews, input from colleagues, and
logic. Several items were deemed redundant because of excessive inter-item
overlap and were, therefore, eliminated. The questionnaire was then tested on six
suppliers. Comments from the suppliers and our colleagues were used to guide
revisions. Several questions were revised or eliminated, and then the questionnaire
was tested across 12 dyads. Analysis of the results guided final revisions, resulting
in a 64-item scale.
While Phillips (1981) found dyadic measurement to be invalid and unreliable,
John and Reve (1982) showed that problems were related to the types of issues
being addressed. Reports were unreliable and invalid with respect to what they
termed, "Dyadic sentiments". This is in contrast to, "Structural dimensions," of the
relationship that are less open to interpretation by individual key informants. In
other words, when measuring a higher order construct, as the dimensions about
which an individual is supposed to report become more open to idiosyncratic
interpretation, as with sentiments, the more likely perceptions will differ between
key informants, and thus reliability and validity are weakened. Given this, it is
important that survey questions reflect bilateral expectations as opposed to
expectations held by the individual (Heide and John 1994).
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Consistent with Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) and Anderson and Weitz (1992)
we used a dyadic approach when developing the scales. It is broadly accepted that
question wording affects responses, and that even minor changes can have
profound effects on how a respondent answers (Churchill 1999). To eliminate the
effect of inconsistent wording across the dyad and its incumbent error, we used
parallel, generic wording such that all respondents received identical
questionnaires. For example, one of the measures of information sharing was, "It
is my company's policy to openly share information in this relationship."
Items were worded quite specifically as opposed to globally. For example, instead
of asking respondents to respond to a global statement like, "There is a lot of
information sharing between the organizations," we were more specific, "Our
companies exchange information related to changes in the technology of the focal
products." Patchen (1961) found that global questions can suffer from low
reliability and validity as respondents think of different specifics, or weight the
specifics differently when formulating answers. Asking a series of questions on
different specific issues places a demand on the respondent's expertise, however, it
should reduce arbitrary answers. It also allows us the freedom to generalize from
the specifics rather than letting the respondent do it.
Given that testing was done in Norway, we received several comments regarding
that the questionnaire was in English. It was suggested that response rates might be
substantially negatively affected in the main survey. To alleviate this, the
questionnaire was translated into German, French, Swedish, and Norwegian, as
well as being offered in English. Translations were all based on the English
original and then back-translations were made from the second language back to
English. Unexpectedly, several minor flaws in the English questions were
addressed as a result of this process. The questionnaires were all checked a third
time by people fluent in both English and the second language. All translators and
controllers had the second language as their mother tongue. They were selected
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from exchange university students studying inNorway. Responses across
languages were compared for significant differences by running a one-way
ANOVA with language as the factor defining groups of cases and the aggregated
construct measures for each side of the dyad as the dependent variables. Sellers
and buyers were tested separately. No significant differences across languages
were found.
4.2.5 REFLECTIVE MEASUREMENT
Reflective multi-item scales were used for all constructs. Formative indicators
influence the latent variable, whereas, reflective indicators are symptoms of the
latent variable (figure 4.2). Imagine you have the flu. You may have caught
(formed) the flu by exposing yourself to other people with flu, neglecting to eat
and sleep properly, and going out without being properly dressed. Symptoms,
(reflections) may be a runny nose, fever, and headache. With reflective indicators
you need a sample of items making up the multi-item scale, each tapping different
nuances in the construct they represent (Bollen an~ Lennox 1991). This should
increase reliability as measurement error decreases with more items (Anderson and
Gerbing 1988).
Using the MTMM matrix approach made it particularly important to use reflective
indicators because they should be significantly correlated within latent variables,
REFLECTIVE INDICATORS FORMATIVE INDICATORS
Figure 4.2, Reflective and Formative Measurement
(Adapted from Bollen and Lennox 1991, p. 306)
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but not between latent variables. There is no theoretical basis for assuming
formative indicators to be correlated (Bollen and Lennox 1991). The MTMM
matrix is based on assessments of inter-item and inter-method correlations, and is
thus dependent on reflective measures. In addition, the internal consistency of a
scale can be assessed by Cronbach's Alpha, which is also dependent on reflective
scales because it is determined through correlations.
4.2.6 ORDINAL-LEVEL SCALES
In line with Heide (1994), Heide and John (1992), and Jap (1999), a seven point
(ordinal) Likert-type scale was used on the first 56 questions with appropriate
anchors such as Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7) orfrom Low (1) to
High (7), with a category for Not Relevant (?) on all questions. While ordinallevel
scales are common in social science research, there are ramifications for the
statistical analysis. Many estimation methods, like maximum likelihood or
ordinary least squares (both of which will be used), assume normally distributed
continuous variables. The distribution of ordinal variables usually differs from that
of continuous variables and is often abnormal (Bollen 1989). They are often
excessively asymmetric and peaked. One partial remedy is to combine individual
scales to form multi-item indicators because distributions tend to average out and
become more normal, but this is no guarantee. Instead, alternative estimation
methods are recommended, although they are not unproblematic.
The structural equation modeling for the relationship learning data will be done in
Lisrel (Joreskog and Sorbom 1996a). Lisrel uses either a covariance matrix or
correlation matrix as input. For measurement model estimation with metric (ratio
level) variables, a Pearson Product Moment correlation matrix is recommended as
input because it gives a standardized solution allowing for unit free comparisons of
coefficients within the model (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998). With
ordinallevel data with three or more categories, however, a polychoric correlation
matrix is appropriate (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) because it compensates for
skewness (asymmetry) and kurtosis (peakedness) problems that are characteristic
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of ordinallevel data. This means that for the relationship learning data the
polychoric correlation matrix would seem to be the appropriate input choice.
Unfortunately, polychoric correlation matrices require using the weighted least
squares (WLS) estimation method that requires very large sample sizes (into the
thousands). Given that the sample size with the present data is 315 for each side of
the dyad, minus cases with missing data, WLS estimation with a polychoric
correlation matrix is not possible.
Olsson (1979) showed that applying confirmatory factor analysis to ordinal data
may lead to incorrect conclusions when the data is highly skewed. Olsson, Foss,
Troye, and Howell (2000) refined this by showing that maximum likelihood
estimation is robust against kurtosis abnormality. Estimating a series of models
with varying degrees of kurtosis, comparing ML, WLS, and generalized least
squares (GLS) estimation methods, even at relatively extreme levels of kurtosis,
ML produced reliable results. The kurtosis levels for the relationship learning data
(presented in the analysis) are well within the levels used by Olsson et al. (2000).
Skewness is also reasonable, therefore, any violations of the assumption of
normality are deemed to be inconsequential for the relationship learning data so
maximum likelihood estimation with a Pearson Product Moment correlation
matrix as input was used.
4.3 THE MEASURES
Some of the measurement items are new and some are adapted from previous
research. Satisfaction, dependency, and performance were measured, however,
they were not used in the present analysis.
4.3.1 RElATIONSHIP LEARNING
Seventeen items were used to assess the degree of relationship learning. Seven
items addressed information sharing, four interpretation, and six memory
integration. Previous studies by Anderson and Narus (1990), Hedberg (1981),
Heide and John (1992), Jaworski and Kohli (1993), Moorman (1995); Moorman
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and Miner (1997), Noordewier et al. (1990), and Slater and Narver (1996)
provided guidance in developing the items.
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?). * indicates a removed
item.
INFORMATION SHARING
1. * Our companies exchange information on successful and unsuccessful
experiences with products exchanged in the relationship.
2. * Our companies exchange information related to changes in end-user
needs, preferences, and behavior.
3. Our companies exchange information related to changes in market
structure, such as mergers, acquisitions, or partnering.
4. Our companies exchange information related to changes in the
technology of the focal products.
5. * Our companies exchange information as soon as possible of any
unexpected problems.
6. Our companies exchange information on changes related to our two
organization's strategies and policies.
7. Our companies exchange information that is sensitive for both parties,
such as financial performance and company know-how.
INTERPRETATION
1. It is common to establish joint teams to solve operational problems in the
relationship.
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2. It is common to establish joint teams to analyze and discuss strategic
issues.
3. The atmosphere in the relationship stimulates productive discussion
encompassing a variety of opinions.
4. * We have a lot of face-to-face communication in this relationship.
MEMORY INTEGRATION
1. In the relationship we frequently adjust our common understanding of
end-user needs, preferences, and behavior.
2. In the relationship we frequently adjust our common understanding of
trends in technology related to our business.
3. * In the relationship we frequently evaluate, and if needed adjust our
routines in order-delivery processes.
4. We frequently evaluate and if needed update the formal contracts in our
relationship.
5. We frequently meet face-to-face in order to refresh the personal network
in this relationship.
6. We frequently evaluate, and if needed update information about the
relationship stored in our electronic databases.
4.3.2 COLLABORATIVE OBJECTIVES
The scope of collaborative objectives will influence how and the degree to which
the two parties will collaborate. It follows that the more ambitious the
collaborative objectives in a relationship, the more reasons there should be to
learn. We attempt to capture this by assessing the degree of focus on joint goals.
Previous studies by Borys and Jemison (1989), Hamel (1991), Heide and John
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(1992), Håkansson and Johanson (1988), and Sheth and Parvatiyar (1992)
provided guidance in developing the items.
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Low (1) to High (7) with a
category for Not Relevant (?).
1. To what degree do you discuss company goals with the other party in
this relationship?
2. To what degree are these goals developed through joint analysis of
potentials?
3. To what degree are these goals formalized in a joint agreement or
contract?
4. To what degree are these goals implemented in day-to-day work?
5. To what degree have you developed measures that capture performance
related to these goals?
4.3.3 TRUST
Trust of the other party was measured with eight items. These items were adapted
from the scales developed by Doney and Cannon (1997), Morgan and Hunt
(1994), and Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998). The first intention was to try
and distinguish between three dimensions of trust. Interpersonal trust between
respondents across they dyad, trust of the respondent of the other organization as a
collective entity, and collective inter-organizational trust. The measures failed to
discriminate between the dimensions, so in the analysis three redundant items (1,
2, and 3 below, 11, 12 and 13 in the questionnaire) were dropped leaving a five-
item scale representing the general construct of trust at various levels. The eight-
item scale is presented here.
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The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?). * indicates a removed
item.
1. * I trust the contact people from the other organization.
2. * I trust that the contact people from the other organization are
concerned about my well being.
3. * I believe that the other organization will consider my company's well
being when making important decisions.
4. I believe the other organization will respond with understanding in the
event of problems.
5. I trust that the other organization is able to fulfill contractual agreements.
6. We trust that the other organization is competent at what they are doing.
7. There is general agreement in my organization that the other
organization is trustworthy.
8. There is general agreement in my organization that the contact people in
the other organization are trustworthy.
4.3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
Previous studies by Heide and John (1990), Heide and John (1992), Huber (1996),
Jaworski and Kohli (1993), Meyer, Brooks, and Goes (1990) Noordewier et al.
(1990) provided guidance in developing the items.
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The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?). * indicates a removed
item.
1. End-user needs and preferences change rapidly in our industry.
2. * The competitors in our industry frequently make several aggressive
moves to capture market share.
3. Crises have caused some of our competitors to shut down or radically
change the way they operate.
4. It is very difficult to forecast where the technology will be in the next 2-3
years in our industry.
5. In recent years, a large number of new product ideas have been made
possible through technological breakthroughs in our industry.
4.3.5 RELATIONSHIP COMPLEXITY
Complexity of the relationship was addressed with five items we developed
reflecting the number and complexity of the products and operational units
involved in the relationship. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) provided guidance in
developing the items.
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?). * indicates a removed
item.
1. * There are several different products exchanged in our relationship.
2. These products are generally very complex.
3. * These products are highly customized for this relationship.
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4. There are many operating units involved from both organizations.
5. There are many contact points between different departments or
professions between the two organizations.
4.3.6 ASSET SPECIFICITY
We measured asset specificity with two items adapted from Heide and John
(1990).
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
1. Our company has made significant investments dedicated to this
relationship.
2. Our company has made several adaptations to accommodate the other
party's technological norms and standards.
4.3.7 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Five questions addressed the importance of the relationship and respondent
competence.
1. Choose the appropriate question:
a) This customer represents approximately __ % of our total sales.
b) This supplier represents approximately __ % of our total supply.
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2. What is the primary focus of your business?
Circle one
a) Producer b) Wholesaler c) Retailer d) Service
Provider
e) Other
3. How long have you personally been with your company? .-Jyears.
4. How long have the two companies been involved in the relationship?
years.
5. How long have you personally been involved in the relationship with the other
company?
_____ -Jears.
4.3.8 RELATIONSHIP PERFORMANCE
Previous studies by Kalwani and Narayandas (1995), Kumar, Stem, and Achrol
(1992), and Noordewier et al. (1990) provided guidance in developing the items.
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
1. The relationship with the other company has resulted in lower logistics
costs.
2. Flexibility to handle unforeseen fluctuations in demand has been
improved because of the relationship.
88
3. The relationship with the other company has resulted in better product
quality.
4. Synergies in joint sales and marketing efforts have been achieved
because of the relationship.
5. The relationship has a positive effect on our ability to develop successful
new products.
6. Investments of resources in the relationship, such as time and money,
have paid off very well.
7. The relationship helps us to detect changes in end-user needs and
preferences before our competitors.
4.3.9 DEPENDENCY
Two items were adapted from Heide and John (1990).
The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
1. The other company can easily be replaced if the relationship was
terminated.
2. Our company's systems and processes can easily be adapted to a new
partner.
4.3.10 SATISFACTION
Five items were adapted from Selnes (1998).
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The items were measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
1. In our company we are very satisfied with this relationship.
2. In our company we find this relationship more attractive than other
relevant alternatives.
3. In our company we are highly motivated to continue this relationship.
4. Inour company we are highly motivated to collaborate in this
relationship.
5. In our company we talk favorably about this relationship.
4.4 SUMMARY OF MEASURES
Although I have shown measures for relationship performance, satisfaction, and
dependency they were not used in the analysis. They are used for subsequent
analyses with more normative implications. The next two chapters describe the
analysis. Chapter 5 deals with validating the measures, chapter 6 with hypothesis
testing. I divided it this way for the sake of clarity.
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5. MEASURE VALIDATION
This chapter presents a detailed description of how the data was screened and
prepared for hypothesis testing. I begin by describing a procedure for aggregating
measures, and then move on to address the quality of the data.
5.1 REFINING MEASURES BY AGGREGATION
Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) proposed a general approach for representing
constructs in organizational research through applying structural equation
modeling at varying levels of aggregation. Aggregation can take place in two ways
that affect construct depth or dimensionality. By depth they mean that a construct
can be modeled with all of its multiple items loading individually, or the indicators
can be summed (aggregated) to form sets of indicators or a single indicator. By
dimensionality they mean that some constructs can be represented by multiple sub-
dimensional constructs, or the sub-dimensions can be aggregated to form a single
construct. Multidimensional constructs can also be examined through the use of
first-order, second-order, or higher-order models (Marsh and Hocevar 1988).
Thus, constructs can be represented at various levels of depth and dimensionality.
There are three reasons why aggregation may be advantageous for the present
research. First, in a case like relationship learning it can simplify interpretation. By
virtue of the definition, the relationship learning construct carries the meaning of
its contents without needing to refer to its sub-dimensions (information sharing,
interpretation, and memory integration) and their influence on the potential for
behavior change. Second, summing ordinal scales effectively increases the number
of categories, thus transforming the variable towards continuous from categorical
(Bollen 1989, p. 438), which may help to normalize the distributions of the ordinal
scales. Third, aggregation can also improve model fit because of the potentially
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No aggregation (Noagg)
Part aggregation (partagg)
Full aggregation (Fullagg)
~
large discrepancies between correlations of
so many indicators within and between
constructs, which inflates measurement
error (Bagozzi and Edwards 1998).
Any aggregation is contingent upon
theoretical rationale. Substantively, I have
built the argument that relationship
learning is three-dimensional; therefore, it
is a good candidate for aggregation. From a
measurement perspective I have built
arguments for the reflective operational
indicators for each construct in the model;
therefore, aggregation of indicators is
theoretically plausible. What remains is to
provide statistical evidence for
aggregation. However, first I will clarify
terminology with reference to figure 5.1.
No aggregation (noagg) refers to modeling
all indicators on all dimensions of all
constructs. Part aggregation (partagg)Figure 5.1, Aggregation Levels
refers to summed indicators loading on all
dimensions of all constructs. Full aggregation (fullagg) refers to summed
indicators on all constructs, and the three dimensions of relationship learning
aggregated to one construct with one summed indicator. The seller and buyer data
are never aggregated.
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5.2 INTEGRATING THE MTMM MATRIX
The aggregation procedures are integrated into the multitrait-multimethod
(MTMM) matrix approach (Campbell and Fiske 1959) to jointly examine the
internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of the
constructs at various levels of aggregation. I perform confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) at the noagg level to get a detailed view of the statistical properties of each
indicator. In so doing I can check that indicators load significantly, converge on
the correct construct, and discriminate between other constructs. Problematic items
can be removed before the model is analyzed at a more aggregated level. The
partagg level analysis allows me to test my rationale for aggregating the
relationship learning construct. I expect the three dimensions to be highly
correlated to the extent where they converge on one dimension. The fullagg level
allows for the most parsimonious representation of the model.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of a MTMM noagg measurement model. The model
suggests that informant reports are a function of the reality of what is being
measured, the systematic bias introduced by the key-informants, and error. The
basic logic of the MTMM approach is that different methods measuring the same
trait should be highly correlated. In this case, the informants from each side of the
dyad are modeled as separate methods measuring the same phenomenon. Two
informants reporting on the same phenomenon should agree (highly correlate) if
their reports are to be judged reliable and valid as composite measures (Phillips
1981). Alternatively, low correlations between informant reports can indicate
expected differences in perspectives (Wathne et al. 2001). Distinct traits should
not be highly correlated, as evidence of discriminant validity.
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Individual
Indicators
Two Traits
Two Methods
Figure 5.2, MTMM Matrix
"'34
The ksi (;) factors represent latent independent variables. The methods (;1 and
;2), which in this case represent the buyer and the seller sides of the data, are
aloud to correlate, as represented by the curved line labeled phi 12 (<1>12).The
indicators (Xs) represent individual items reported by the individual key-
informants from their respective sides of the dyad. They are set to load onto the
methods with respect to which side of the dyad they represent, and onto the traits
with respect to which construct they represent. The traits (;3 and ;4) represent two
distinct constructs, for example, external uncertainty and internal complexity. In
the example, each construct has four indicators, two from the seller side and two
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from the buyer side of the dyad. The constructs are aloud to correlate, as
represented by the curved line labeled phi 34 (<1>34).This model allows for the
partitioning of variance at the indicator level between traits, methods, and error.
Trait variance is equal to theta squared O.?) for each construct loading, method
variance is equal to theta squared (i..?) for each method loading, and error variance
is equal to theta-delta (811). Good model fit indicates convergent validity when
controlling for methods factors. This model can be broken down into a trait-only
model for a stricter test of convergent validity.
Individual
Indicators
Two Traits
cp 34
Figure 5.3, Trait-Only Model
A trait-only model (figure
5.3) allows for a test of
convergent validity without
methods factors. Again,
good model fit indicates
convergent validity. The
model suggests that
informant reports are a
function of the reality of
what is being measured and
error. Ifmodel fit is not
satisfactory, then partitioning
the variance between traits,
methods, and error is
necessary to determine if the
traits explain a sufficient
portion of total variance, or
ifmuch of the variance is
due to the systematic bias of
key-informants because of
their perspective from one
side of the dyad.
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5.3 SCREENING THE DATA
This section describes basic data screening procedures carried out prior to running
the measurement models. This includes response rates, missing data, normality,
reliability, and unidimensionality.
5.3.1 RESPONSE RATES
Of 780 supplier companies contacted by telephone, 665 agreed to recruit a buyer
respondent and participate in the study. Both respondents were faxed or mailed the
questionnaire. One follow-up call was made to non-respondents within a week of
sending the questionnaire. In total, 317 questionnaires from dyads were returned.
The response rates were virtually identical, presumably because buyers were
recruited directly through the suppliers. Most likely buyers felt some degree of
pressure to participate on behalf of the seller referent. Two sets of responses had
excessive outliers, and given no reason to suspect they represented a characteristic
of the population they were removed from the analysis. The 315 dyadic responses
used in the analysis represent a 41% response rate based on the 780 suppliers
initially contacted. This response rate is consistent with other recent marketing
channel studies lying roughly in the middle (e.g. Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999;
Doney and Cannon 1997; Grayson and Ambler 1999; Jap 1999). Because the vast
majority of respondents opted for the fax, responses were quite immediate, thus we
did not compare early and late responses to assess non-response bias.
5.3.2 MISSING DATA
Regarding missing data the most widely used approach is to apply listwise
deletion, which removes any observation that has missing information for any of
the variables. This can create problems with inconsistent estimates if the missing
values are not missing at random, which introduces systematic bias into the
sample, or if the number of missing cases is large relative to the sample size. As
the effective sample size drops toward the number of observed variables, the
seriousness and magnitude of the missing data problem grows (Bollen 1989, p.
370).
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Randomness is examined through a graphical display of the missing data with
cases on one axis and indicators or variables on the other (Hair et al. 1998). No
consistent patterns were found at the indicator level, thus the missing values are
assumed to be random.
Prelis (Joreskog and Sorbom 1996b) generates a table of percentages of missing
values. The most extreme cases were under 10% with no aggregation, 16% with
partial aggregation, and 16% with full aggregation. Given that the absolute worst
effective sample size (n=264) far exceeds the number of observed variables (the
maximum is 68 with no aggregation), missing data do not constitute any problem.
5.3.3 N()R~fI1(
Univariate normality was checked at the individual item level and aggregated
levels because heavily skewed, flat, or peaked distributions may influence
correlations and factor solutions (Hair et al. 1998). Kurtosis and skewness
statistics calculated in SPSS for individual indicators as well as the two levels of
aggregation were all less than one. What is most important is that the kurtosis
statistics (see table 5.1 for partial and full aggregation) are all substantially higher
than the skewness statistics, indicating that deviations from normality are most
likely caused by kurtosis, not skewness. Olsson et al. (2000) found that maximum
likelihood estimation in structural equation modeling is robust against abnormality
Seller Buyer
Variable Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Collaboration 0.033 -0.965 -0.105 -0.710
Trust -0.365 -0.684 -0.246 -0.676
Complexity 0.228 -0.601 0.191 -0.704
Uncertainty -0.155 -0.910 -0.169 -0.930
Asset Specificity -0.214 -0.739 -0.189 -0.503
Infshare -0.323 -0.849 -0.101 -0.816
Interpretation -0.129 -0.656 -0.150 -0.687
Memory -0.275 -0.640 -0.149 -0.524
Relearn -0.261 -0.605 -0.137 -0.822
Absolute Average -0.162 -0.739 -0.117 -0.708
Table 5.1, Univariate Normality (SPSS)
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related to excessive kurtosis, thus it is acceptable to use maximum likelihood
estimation on the relationship learning data.
Prelis 2 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1996b), a companion program to Lisrel8, provides
D'Agostino's (1986) tests of univariate normality. Table 5.2 shows partial and full
aggregation values generated after refining the scales in the reliability and
unidimensionality analyses. Although we are concerned about multivariate
normality, the univariate tests have merit because they pinpoint variables that
sharply deviate from a normal distribution (Bollen 1989, p. 422). P-values greater
than 0.05 (assuming 0.= 0.05) would indicate univariate normality, insofar as they
show that the skewness and kurtosis are not significantly statistically different
from that of normal distributions. Again, from the table we see that deviations
from normality are more related to kurtosis than skewness, therefore, given the
Olsson et al. (2000) conclusions regarding normality and kurtosis, deviations from
normality in the relationship learning data are not a problem.
Skewness and
Skewness Kurtosis Kurtosis
Chi-
Variable Z-Score P-Value Z-Score P-Value Square P-Value
scollab 0.307 0.759 -4.460 0.000* 19.990 0.000*
bcollab 0.085 0.933 -3.483 0.000* 12.141 0.002*
strust -2.626 0.009* -3.076 0.002* 16.358 0.000*
btrust -1.363 0.173 -3.561 0.000* 14.539 0.001*
sTRxCB 2.421 0.015* -4.238 0.000* 23.819 0.000*
bTRxCB 3.034 0.002* -3.006 0.003* 18.241 0.000*
scomplex 1.275 0.202 -3.630 0.000* 14.804 0.001*
bcomplex 1.902 0.057 -2.366 0.018* 9.215 0.010*
suneert -0.769 0.442 -4.876 0.000* 24.362 0.000*
buncert -1.173 0.241 -4.694 0.000* 23.409 0.000*
sasset -2.202 0.028* -3.892 0.000* 19.996 0.000*
basset -2.081 0.037* -3.045 0.002* 13.604 0.001 *
sinfshare -1.117 0.264 -6.255 0.000* 40.370 0.000*
binfshare -1.199 0.230 -2.412 0.016* 7.256 0.027*
sinterpr -0.448 0.654 -3.645 0.000* 13.487 0.001 *
binterpr -0.565 0.572 -3.696 0.000* 13.980 0.001 *
smemory -1.020 0.308 -3.329 0.001 * 12.121 0.002*
bmemory -1.060 0.289 -2.258 0.024* 6.224 0.045*
sreleam -0.515 0.460 -3.216 0.001 * 10.609 0.005*
breleam -0.739 0.009* -3.683 0.000* 14.104 0.001*
* indicates abnormal at a. = 0.01
Table 5.2, Test of Univariate Normality for Continuous Variables (Prelis)
98
5.3.4 REUABll..ITY ANALYSIS (COEFFICIENT ALPHA)
As a test of reliability, Churchill (1979, p. 68) recommends that coefficient alpha
should be calculated prior to any factor analysis. All scales except complexity
were above the recommended 0.7 cutoff (Nunnally 1978). By dropping items 1
and 3 the complexity scale passed the reliability test (see Table 5.3). The three
remaining items should still sufficiently represent the construct because they deal
with both product and relationship complexity.
Variable Items Seller Buyer
Collaboration 1-5 0.9361 0.9120
Trust 4-8 0.9248 0.8874
Complexity 2,4,5 0.7260 0.7297
Uncertainty 1-5 0.8538 0.8367
Asset Specificity 1-2 0.7535 0.7296
Information Sharing 1-7 0.8795 0.8387
Interpretation 1-4 0.8177 0.8052
Memory 1-6 0.8735 0.8185
Relationship Learning 1-17 0.9431 0.9215..Table 5.3, Reliability Analysis (Coefficient Alpha)
5.3.5 UNIDlMENSIONALITY
A necessary condition when constructs are measured with multiple indicators is
that they are acceptably unidimensional, that is, each set of indicators has only one
construct in common. A relatively straightforward test of unidimensionality is to
run an exploratory factor analysis. Items should have loadings greater than 0.4 on
the first factor with the theoretically correct sign (Anderson and Weitz 1992, p.
23), and they should load properly (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999, p. 164). That is,
they should not significantly cross-load on multiple factors.
I ran the analysis on all possible pairs of constructs using eigen values to
determine the number of factors. The recommended cutoff eigen value is 1 for a
factor to be considered significant, although if the number of variables is below 20
there is a tendency to extract a conservative number of factors (Hair et al. 1998, p.
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103). Therefore, in some cases I reduced the cutoff to below 1 to force a two-
factor solution. Allloadings were significant, however, there were some problems
with cross-loading. As a result I dropped items 1,2, and 5 from the information
sharing scale, item 4 from the interpretation scale, item 3 from the memory scale,
and item 2 from the uncertainty scale. Given that all of the constructs were still
measured with multiple indicators and none of the dimensions within constructs
disappeared, there should be no problem in removing these items.
Cross-loading between information sharing, interpretation, and memory
integration was so serious that I chose not to remove any indicators based on this
criteria. Itwould have adversely affected measurement of the constructs. Instead, I
take the cross-loadings as an indication of the close relationship between the
constructs and as support for a single relationship learning construct.
As a check on the exploratory factor analysis I examined item-to-total correlations
for individual items (Nunnally 1978). Items for each construct should be highly
correlated with the composite scale score (Churchill1979, p. 68). The rule of
thumb is that correlations should exceed 0.5 (Hair et al. 1998). The correlations
ranged from 6.29-9.00 and all were significant at the a=O.Ollevel (two-tailed),
thus mirroring the exploratory factor analysis.
The final check of unidimensionality is to run a confirmatory factor analysis to
assess convergent and discriminant validity at the item level between pairs of
constructs (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). These assessments are developed and
shown in the next section.
5.4 THE MEASUREMENT MODEL
A two-step approach to structural equation modeling is often recommended
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988), whereby the measurement model is initially
specified and validated prior to the structural model. The measurement model
specifies relationships between observed measures and their corresponding latent
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variable, and latent variables are allowed to correlate. No structural relationships
are specified. That is to say, causal relationships are not inferred (Bollen 1989, p.
182). The rationale is that this alleviates the interaction of the measurement and
structural models allowing for a more accurate assessment of validity and
reliability (Hair et al. 1998, p. 600).
Based on robustness against abnormality and ease of interpretation, Pearson
correlation matrices were generated in Prelis for input into LisreI. The interaction
effect, represented as the product of collaboration and trust, was calculated in
Prelis prior to input into Lisrel.
5.4.1 SCALE!NV ARIANT ESTIMATES
To attain scale invariant estimates you can either fix one indicator loading on each
latent construct to 1, or fix the diagonal of the phi matrix to 1 (recommended by
Anderson and Gerbing 1988, p. 415). All final solutions for the measurement
model were attained by manually fixing the diagonal of the phi matrix to one. For
the discriminant validity tests I resorted to fixing one indicator for each latent
construct in order to attain model convergence.
5.4.2 STARTING VALUES
Inmany of the initial models I did not attain convergence, and the program asked
for better starting values. Default starting values for parameter estimation in Lisrel
8.30 are O. Starting values are simply initial estimates, and in some cases the
program needs help in starting iterations by manually setting them (Joreskog and
Sorbom 1996a, p. 18). The program may suggest starting values or you can
systematically try different ones. This should have no substantive effect on the
solution. To attain solutions for all final models I had to suggest starting values in
the range of 0.3-1.
5.4.3 OFFENDING ESTIMATES
Offending estimates are estimated coefficients that exceed acceptable limits, for
example, negative error variances or standardized coefficients greater than 1.
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When offending estimates are encountered, they must be resolved before
interpreting the results because a change in one part of the model may significantly
affect other parts of the model (Hair et al. 1998, p. 610).
Allloadings between indicators and their related constructs should be significant
and in the proper direction (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p. 106), thus verifying
the relationships. Problematic loadings should be resolved before model
aggregation. Aggregated
indicators that include
insignificant individual
indicators may hide
unresolved problems and
adversely affect
interpretation (Bagozzi
and Edwards 1998). At
the partagg level I had
identification problems
with the phi parameters
related to asset specificity.
By fixing the asset
specificity loadings to the
values suggested at the
fullagg level I attained a
good model. My primary
goal at the partagg level
was to examine the
relationships between
information sharing,
interpretation, and
memory integration prior
to aggregating the
Parameter Scale Variable Estimate t-value
(std. error)
1.1,1 Collab Seller 0.76 (0.08) 9.00
1.2,1 Buyer 0.70 (0.07) 9.69
1.3,2 Trust Seller 0.49 (0.16) 3.06
1.4,2 Buyer 0.47 (0.15) 3.15
1.5,3 TRxCB Seller 0.72 (0.10) 7.26
At;,3 Buyer 0.64 (0.09) 7.04
")....,,4 Complex Seller 0.71 (0.06) 11.37
I.S,4 Buyer 0.75 (0.05) 14.75
~,5 Uncert Seller 0.68 (0.07) 9.08
1.10,5 Buyer 0.66 (0.07) 9.41
An,6 Asset Seller 0.69 (0.10) 7.00
1.12,6 Buyer 0.47 (0.08) 5.99
A13,7 Relearn Seller 0.64 (0.13) 4.87
1.14,7 Buyer 0.63 (0.12) 5.40
A1,S Seller Collab 0.46 (0.11) 4.29
1.3,S Trust 0.71 (0.11) 6.23
A5,S TRxCB 0.56 (0.12) 4.81
1.7,S Complex 0.37 (0.08) 4.51
~,s Uncert 0.35 (0.10) 3.56
An,s Asset 0.50 (0.11) 4.39
1.13,S Relearn 0.68 (0.12) 5.56
A2,9 Buyer Collab 0.46 (0.09) 5.28
~,9 Trust 0.60 (0.12) 4.97
At;,9 TRxCB 0.57 (0.09) 6.44
As,9 Complex 0.34 (0.08) 4.06
1.10,9 Uncert 0.32 (0.10) 3.27
A12,9 Asset 0.49 (0.07) 6.54
1.14,9 Relearn 0.59 (0.12) 5.01
Table 5.4, Final Factor Loadings Fullagg
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relationship learning construct. Therefore, I was not concerned with the asset
specificity problems.
In the partagg with only traits model, the correlations in the phi matrix between the
relationship learning constructs (information sharing, interpretation, and memory)
exceeded 1, which is theoretically impossible given that a correlation matrix was
used as input. The parameters should be between -1 to 1, although Joreskog
(1999) demonstrated that in models with high multicollinearity it is quite possible
to get standardized coefficients greater than 1. When this happens, the options are
to consider dropping a construct or to ensure true discriminant validity between the
constructs. Dropping a construct is not an option. Discriminant validity tests
indicate that there are problems between the constructs, supporting the argument to
aggregate the three elements into a single construct of relationship learning. The
problem disappeared with aggregation. Final factor loadings at the fullagg level
are shown in table 5.4.
5.4.4 INTER-ITEM CORRELATIONS
To improve model fit, the program will often suggest allowing error terms for
indicators to correlate. In most situations this would be theoretically unfounded,
and thus a violation of the assumption with maximum likelihood estimation that
error terms should not be correlated. In a case like relationship learning where
identical measures are taken across a dyad, it is conceivable that the error of the
responses could be highly correlated. As an experiment to improve model fit I
allowed the errors across the dyad to correlate, however, there was no particular
improvement in model fit, therefore, in the final models none of the error terms
between respondents were allowed to correlate.
Because the interaction variable is a direct function of the variables that formed it
(collaboration and trust), it is feasible that error terms should correlate. Indeed,
model fit improved substantially when these error terms were allowed to correlate.
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5.4.5 MULTITRAIT-MULTIMETHOD CORRELATIONS
Consistent with the criteria set out by Campbell and Fiske (1959, p. 82) for
assessing convergent and discriminant validity by the multitrait-multimethod
matrix, the next step is to examine correlations. The rule of thumb is that we want
high correlations between methods (informants) to establish convergent validity,
and low correlations between traits (scales representing constructs) to establish
discriminant validity (Churchill 1979, p. 70). However, Bollen and Lennox (1991,
p. 309) demonstrate how correlations alone can lead to erroneous conclusions,
therefore, they recommended cross validation with confirmatory factor analysis.
For the sake of space, only full aggregation is shown for all constructs in table 5.5.
Partial aggregation is shown in table 5.6 for the components of relationship
learning to allow for assessment as to whether the construct should be aggregated.
The shaded inter-method (buyer and seller respondent) correlations should exceed
other relevant cross-construct correlations. Correlations in bold in both tables
show possible problems with discriminant validity for all constructs except
complexity. The high correlation between constructs may be problematic within
the model, however, it supports aggregating information sharing, interpretation, .
and memory integration into a single relationship learning construct.
Table 5.5, Fullagg Correlations
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5.4.6 FIT INDICES
In confirmatory factor analysis, overall model fit determines the degree to which
the model fits the sample data (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p. 124). Fit
measures evaluate the entire model and can indicate inadequacies not apparent
with individual components (e.g. t-values) (Bollen 1989, p. 256). In that no single
fit measure is universally agreed upon as being superior, and each has inherent
strengths and weaknesses, Lisrel 8.30 provides several. It is wise to assess several
fit measures.
5.4.6.1 CHI-SQUARE
The chi-square statistic tests whether the observed and the estimated matrices
significantly differ. A non-significant chi-square relative to the degrees of freedom
indicates that the matrices are not statistically different, and thus the data.fit the
model (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p. 125). This is bolstered by the P value
which should be greater than 0.05 (assuming a = 0.05) to consider the model as
acceptable (Bagozzi and Yi 1988, p. 77). An alternative is to use the normed chi-
square, which is the ratio of the chi-square statistic divided by the degrees of
freedom (Hair et al. 1998; Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). As a general rule the chi-
square statistic should be divided by the number of degrees of freedom, and the
result should be between 1 and 2. Values below 1 indicate the possibility of over-
fitting, while values greater than 2 indicate that the model needs improvement
(Hair et al. 1998).
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When using chi-square in structural equation modeling, sample size needs to be
considered. As the sample size increases, the chances of rejecting the model
increases (Bagozzi and Yi 1988, p. 77). As a rule of thumb, the sample size
becomes critical above 200 (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p. 125). In this case,
the smallest effective sample size is n=255, which casts doubt on relying too
heavily on chi-square.
5.4.6.2 ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMA TJON (RMSEA)
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is a measure of the
discrepancy between the generated and the true covariance matrices, and is less
sensitive to sample size than chi-square. Browne and Cudeck (1992) suggest that
values below 0.05 indicate good fit, with zero indicating perfect fit. Olsson, Troye,
and Howell (1997) cast doubt on this when comparing across estimation methods,
therefore, it is important to compare it with other fit indices.
5.4.6.3 GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (GFI)
The goodness of fit index (GFI) is a non-statistical measure within a range of O-l.
It indicates the relative amount of variances and covariances jointly accounted for
by the hypothesized model (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p. 125). Zero indicates
a poor fit of the data to the model, while one indicates a perfect fit. Though
debatable, the generally accepted threshold indicating an acceptable model is 0.9
(Hair et al. 1998).
5.4.6.4 ADJUSTED GOODNESS OF FIT INDEX (AGFI)
The adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) also indicates the relative amount of
variances and covariances jointly accounted for by the hypothesized model. It is
basically the same as GFI, except that it is adjusted for the number of degrees of
freedom relative to the number of variables (Schumacker and Lomax 1996, p.
126). The range will usually be between O -1, with values greater than or equal to
0.9 indicating an acceptable fit (Bagozzi and Yi 1988, p. 79).
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The advantage of GFI and AGFI over other methods (especially chi-square) is that
they are, according to Joreskog and Sorbom (1984), not affected by sample size
and are relatively independent of normality. However, this is buffered by Marsh
and Hau (1996) who postulate that AGFI incorporates a penalty for parsimony
because of its dependence on degrees of freedom. In other words using AGFI
could encourage adding constructs to attain better fit.
5.4.6.5 CRmCAL N
Critical N is a goodness of fit measure indicating the sample size that would make
the obtained Chi-square just significant at a chosen significance level. Bollen
(1989) recommends that CN should be at least 200.
5.4.7 MODEL FIT
When models without methods factors achieve poor fit, the next step is to include
methods factors to assess if lack of fit is attributable to biases associated with the
informants from either side of the dyad (Phillips 1981, p. 400). The methods
represent a systematic source of distortion, meaning the difference in perceptions
between sellers and buyers on the same phenomenon.
Noagg Partagg Fullagg
No No No
Methods Methods Methods Methods Methods Methods
df 1567 1508 95 79 54 39
Chi2 4287.72 2746.87 478.57 117.84 333.49 71.30
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.001
RMSEA 0.11 0.051 0.14 0.039 0.15 0.046
GFI 0.56 0.77 0.81 0.96 0.83 0.97
AGFI 0.52 0.74 0.65 0.91 0.68 0.92
NFl 0.67 0.79 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.98
NNFI 0.75 0.88 0.88 0.99 0.89 0.98
CFI 0.76 0.89 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.99
CN 126 188 86 297 77 276
Table 5.7, Fit Indices
Table 5.7 shows fit statistics for the final measurement models after resolving
estimation difficulties and dropping troublesome items. Models were estimated
with and without methods factors for all levels of aggregation. For all levels of
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aggregation methods factors were important to achieve good fit. Model fit also
improves with aggregation, which may be a function of inflated error from
including all indicators in each construct at the noagg level (Bagozzi and Edwards
1998, p. 53). In addition to the discussed fit indices I also show the normed fit
index (NFl), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), and the comparative fit index
(CFI). In all cases the suggested cutoff is that values should exceed 0.9.
Clearly, methods factors were necessary to achieve good model fit, and fit
improved considerably with aggregation.
5.4.8 VARIANCE EXTRACTED
Although measures of a construct may satisfy the composite reliability criterion,
this says nothing about the amount of variance captured by the construct compared
to the amount of variance due to measurement error (Fornell and Larcker 1981, p.
45). To attain this information, FornelI and Larker (1981) suggest a measure of
variance extracted that should exceed 0.5; otherwise, variance due to measurement
error is larger than variance due to the construct.
Noagg Partagg Fullagg
Collaboration 0.62 0.68 0.68
Trust 0.54 0.40 0.41
TRxCB ----- 0.55 0.69
Complexity 0.45 0.62 0.61
Uncertainty 0.40 0.51 0.51
Asset Specificity 0.46 0.47 0.47
Information Sharing 0.38 0.45 -----
Interpretation 0.46 0.53 -----
Memory 0.37 0.57 -----
Relationship Learning ----- ----- 0.66
Table 5.8 shows
mixed results.
Some constructs
improved with
aggregation, while
some did not. Asset
Specificity is the
only measure that is
not satisfactory at
any level of aggregation. Interestingly, it again highlights the importance of
Table 5.8, Variance Extracted
examining scales at each level of aggregation.
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5.4.9 COMPOSITE RELIABILITY
Fornell and Larker (1981, p. 45) suggest a measure of composite reliability to
assess the internal consistency of the indicators of the latent constructs. They
recommend that composite reliability should exceed 0.7. Reliabilities for models
with methods factors are listed in table 5.9. At noagg the measures are all highly
reliable, however, at higher levels of aggregation uncertainty, asset specificity, and
trust drop below the cutoff. This contradicts the previous Cronbach Alpha
reliability calculations.
Noagg Partagg Fullagg
Collaboration 0.94 0.81 0.81
Trust 0.92 0.57 0.58
CBxTR 0.93 0.82 0.81
Complexity 0.82 0.76 0.76
Uncertainty 0.80 0.67 0.67
Asset Specificity 0.77 0.63 0.63
Infshare 0.78 0.62 -----
Interpretation 0.84 0.70 -----
Memory 0.85 0.73 -----
Relationship Learning ----- ----- 0.80
Table 5.9, Composite Reliability
5.4.10 PARTITIONING THE VARIANCE
According to Phillips (1981, p. 405), partitioning the variance between trait,
method, and error provides an indication for the reliability between informants as
well as an indication of the validity of the reports. In addition, comparisons can be
made of the distribution of variance between components at the different levels of
aggregation. High trait variance and low error variance means that the measures of
traits explain the majority of what is going on in the data. High method variance
means that the variance is due to systematic differences between respondents
across the dyad. In this case we are looking for high trait variance with low
method and error variance. Trait variance and method variance are calculated by
squaring theta ()..2) for each construct's respective factor loading, and error
variance is equal to theta-delta (81\).
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At the noagg level (table 5.10) the average trait variances between seller (39%)
and buyer (40%) are about equal, however, the systematic error is considerably
higher for the seller (21%) than for the buyer (12%). This means the validity of
either side to report on the constructs is about equal. Trust and information sharing
are the lowest at about 30%.
Seller Buyer
Trait Method Error Trait Method Error
Collab1 0.58 0.16 0.26 Collab1 0.35 0.38 0.27
Collab2 0.61 0.15 0.24 Collab2 0.36 0.28 0.36
Collab3 0.64 0.13 0.23 Collab3 0.32 0.38 0.29
Collab4 0.56 0.18 0.26 Collab4 0.31 0.48 0.21
Collab5 0.61 0.12 0.27 Collab5 0.40 0.30 0.30
Trustl 0.27 0.40 0.33 Trustl 0.49 0.03 0.48
Trust2 0.31 0.46 0.22 Trust2 0.56 0.04 0.40
Trust3 0.30 . 0.48 0.22 Trust3 0.67 0.04 0.29
Trust4 0.28 0.55 0.17 Trust4 0.55 0.04 0.41
TrustS 0.23 0.55 0.22 TrustS 0.50 0.07 0.43
Complex1 0.22 0.04 0.74 Complex1 0.23 0.09 0.68
Complex2 0.49 0.08 0.43 Complex2 0.55 0.04 0.42
Complex3 0.56 0.05 0.39 Complex3 0.50 0.05 0.45
Uncert1 0.35 0.12 0.54 Uncert1 0.37 0.02 0.61
Uncert2 0.29 0.14 0.57 Uncert2 0.41 0.03 0.56
Uncert3 0.44 0.04 0.52 Uncert3 0.37 0.05 0.58
Assetl 0.46 0.12 0.42 Assetl 0.40 0.05 0.55
Asset2 0.44 0.08 0.48 Asset2 0.40 0.01 0.59
Infshare1 0.27 0.26 0.47 Infshare1 0.31 0.08 0.60
Infshare2 0.26 0.25 0.49 Infshare2 0.34 0.10 0.56
Infshare3 0.35 0.14 0.52 Infshare3 0.41 0.12 0.47
Interpl 0.49 0.10 0.41 Interpl 0.36 0.04 0.60
Interp2 0.52 0.10 0.38 Interp2 0.41 0.10 0.49
Interp3 0.31 0.18. 0.51 Interp3 0.37 0.14 0,49
Memoryl 0.29 0.25 0.46 Memoryl 0.38 0.05 0.56
Memory2 0.35 0.25 0.40 Memory2 0.34 0.08 0.58
Memory3 0.34 0.20 0.46 Memory3 0.31 0.04 0.65
Memory4 0.19 0.28 0.53 Memory4 0.28 0.08 0.64
Memory5 0.31 0.18 0.51 Memory5 0.35 0.12 053
Average 0.39 0.21 0.40 0.40 0.12 0.48
Table 5.10, Partitioning the Variance-Noagg
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At the partagg (table 5.11) and fullagg (table 5.12) levels, the buyer trait variances
are about equal (37% and 38%), as are the systematic errors (26% and 24%).
While the systematic error is considerably higher than at the noagg level, the
reports are equally valid for all levels when considering only buyers. At the
partagg level the seller trait variance average is 42% and systematic error average
is 26%, which is not markedly different from any of the other partitionings.
Seller Buyer
Trait Method Error Trait Method Error
0.59 0.20 0.20 Collab 0.49 0.19 0.32
0.24 0.50 0.26 Trust 0.23 0.31 0.46
0.50 0.34 0.16 CBxTR 0041 0.31 0.28
0.58 0.14 0.29 Complex 0.52 0.12 0.37
0041 0.13 0046 Uncert 0.50 0.06 0.43
0048 0.25 0.27 Asset 0.22 0.27 0.51
0.23 0.45 0.32 Infshare 0.29 0.37 0.34
0040 0.29 0.31 Interp 0.35 0.30 0.35
0.32 0.48 0.20 Memory 0.34 0.36 0.30
verage 0042 0.31 0.27 Average 0.37 0.26 0.37
Table 5.11, Partitioning the Variance, Partagg
Seller reports present a very interesting picture at the fullagg level. Average trait
variance is 47% with systematic error at 29% and random error at 25%. The seller
reports are thus clearly more valid on average at reporting on the relationship
learning model at the fullagg level. It is also interesting to note that the
relationship learning construct is more validly measured as an aggregated
construct than when measured as individual elements. Again this supports
Seller Buyer
Trait Method Error Trait Method Error
0.58 0.21 0.21 Collab 0.49 0.21 0.30
0.24 0.50 0.26 Trust 0.22 0.36 0.42
0.52 0.31 0.17 CBxTR 0.41 0.32 0.27
0.58 0.14 0.29 Complex 0.50 0.12 0.38
0.46 0.12 0.42 Uncert 0.44 0.10 0.46
0.48 0.25 0.27 Asset 0.22 0.24 0.54
0.41 0.46 0.13 Relearn 0.40 0.35 0.26
verage 0.47 0.29 0.25 Average 0.38 0.24 0.37
Table 5.12, Partitioning the Variance, Fullagg
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aggregation of the construct.
Particularly problematic constructs at the fullagg or partagg levels are trust for
either sellers or buyers and asset specificity on the buyer side. This does not show
up at the noagg level for asset specificity. The noagg level gives indications of
possible problematic items, however, dropping more items may begin to adversely
affect measurement of the constructs.
5.4.11 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
Testing for convergence and divergence between different measures, often referred
to as convergent and discriminant validity, establishes construct validity. Cook and
Campbell refer to, " Testing for a convergence across different measures or
manipulations of the same thing and, second, testing for a divergence between
measures and manipulations of related but conceptually distinct things (1979, p.
61)."
5.4.12 CONVERGENT VALIDITY
Convergent validity refers to the degree to which multiple attempts to measure the
same concept by maximally different methods are in agreement (Campbell and
Fiske 1959). A test of convergent validity is to examine the goodness of fit indices
and t-values associated with the individual items (Anderson and Gerbing 1988, p.
416), at each level of aggregation without method (respondent) factors (Phillips
1981, p. 400). Good fit and significant t-values indicate convergent validity. All t-
values for factor loadings in all final models were significant, however, as shown
previously in table 5.7, none of the models without methods factors achieved good
fit, thus convergent validity is only attained for models with methods factors.
Substantively this means that there are systematic differences between sellers and
buyers when reporting on this model.
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5.4.13 DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY
"Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a given construct is different
from other constructs (John and Reve 1982, p. 520)." The easy test of discriminant
validity is to estimate a confidence interval (± two standard errors) around the
standardized correlations between latent constructs (off diagonal of the phi
matrix). The phi matrix for fullagg with methods and traits is shown in table 5.13.
Standardized correlations are shown with standard errors in brackets. At the
fullagg level all constructs pass the easy test, although trust has some very high
standard errors.
Collab Trust Complx Uncert Asset Relearn Seller
Collab 1
Trust 0.58 1
(0.12)
Complx 0.15 -0.37 1
(0.12) (0.35)
Uncert 0.72 0.76 0.01 1
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Asset 0.60 0.22 -0.02 0.83 1
(0.09) (0.27) (0.16) (0.07)
Relearn 0.77 0.63 0.02 0.88 0.60 1
(0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.12)
Seller 1
Buyer 0.56
_(0.15)
Table 5.13, Fullagg Phi Matrix
A stronger test of discriminant validity is to perform a chi-square difference test
between pairs of constructs in two models. I do not test the interaction effect
because it is the product of collaboration and trust so it will be so highly correlated
with its parent constructs that it will certainly and fail the test. In the first model
the constructs are allowed to freely correlate. In the second model the correlation
between constructs is fixed to 1.A significant difference indicates discriminant
validity (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982). The test is conducted for pairs of constructs
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to eliminate interaction between multiple constructs that may distort results
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988, p. 416). All constructs easily pass this test (see table
5.14).
Cutoff for X2 = 3.84
(1 degree of freedom) Restricted Unrestricted
X2 X2
Collab and Complex 187.84 18.85
Collab and Uncert 47.38 3.33
Collab and Asset 65.19 8.13
Collab and Relearn 71.74 47.29
Collab and Trust 86.67 35.74
Complex and Uncert 160.55 1.32
Complex and Asset 159.59 1.26
Complex and Relearn 191.74 15.33
Complex and Trust 155.23 8.71
Uncert and Asset 53.14 13.34
Uncert and Relearn 38.08 16.21
Uncert and Trust 48.20 9.60
Asset and Relearn 64.38 29.55
Asset and Trust 67.27 13.54
Relearn and Trust 94.36 57.32
Table 5.14, Discriminant Validity by X2Difference Test
A final strong test of discriminant validity is to check if the squared correlations in
the phi matrix are greater than variance extracted (Fornell and Larcker 1981, p.
46). Apparently there may be some problems with the uncertainty construct (table
5.15). In light of the chi squared difference tests they are not deemed particularly
serious.
Variance
Collab Trust Complx Uncert Asset Relearn Extracted
Collab 1 0.68
Trust 0.34 1 DAl
Complx 0.02 0.00 1 0.61
Uncert 0.52 0.61 0.00 1 0.51
Asset 0.36 0.05 0.00 0.69 1 OA7
Relearn 0.59 DAD 0.14 0.77 0.36 1 0.66
Table 5.15, PhI Correlations and Variance Extracted
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5.5 SUMMARY OF MEASURE VALIDATION
By conventional measures the scales seem to be reasonably reliably and valid.
Clearly the measures perform best at the full agg level. Discriminant and
convergent validity are reasonable although uncertainty and trust give reason for
concern. As for explained variance, the seller key informants provide more valid
data. There is clear support for aggregating information sharing, interpretation, and
memory integration into one construct of relationship learning.
In the next chapter the hypotheses are tested.
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6. HYPOTHESIS TESTS
This chapter presents a detailed description of the hypothesis tests as well as a
discussion of the results. Given the results of measure validation, I limit myself to
only testing the fully aggregated data with methods factors. Following Anderson
and Gerbing's (1988) two-step approach, after measure validation the next step is
to specify the structural relationships, in this case using structural equation
modeling in LisreI. It is through the structural relationships that causality is
inferred (Bollen 1989, p. 182). As with the measurement model, methods factors
representing the seller and buyer informants can be included, thus allowing the
variance to be partitioned into trait (construct of interest), method (systematic
informant bias), and random error (Phillips 1981).
6.1 TESTING INTERACTION EFFECTS
Kenny and Judd (1984) introduced the first structural equation model using
product variables to represent interaction effects (Joreskog 1998, p. 239). A
product variable is formed when two direct effect variables are multiplied together
and the product is introduced into the model as a new variable. Formulated as a
nonlinear regression equation it looks like this:
where there is a direct effect from each of the latent variables ~1 and ;z as well as
an interactive effect of the product of ~1 ~2 on the dependent variable y. a is the
intercept term, the ys are the coefficients, and ~ represents error.
Although the procedure has been developed and refined it remains technically
demanding and model complexity often leads to convergence problems during
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estimation (Rigdon, Schumacker, and Wothke 1998, p. 7). There are also
implications for sample size, estimation techniques, test statistics, and fit statistics
(Joreskog and Yang 1996, p. 85). With the relationship learning model this is
exacerbated by the addition of methods factors.
6.2 STRUCTURAL MODEL IN LISREL
I followed an example by Jonsson (1998) for specifying interaction effects. I
divided the analysis into two distinct strategies, one where I kept all hypothesized
relationships, and the other where I eliminated insignificant relationships such that
I arrived at a nested model. In both approaches I followed a plan of eliminating
offending estimates (like insignificant parameters), and adding theoretically
justifiable paths suggested by the modification indices. In both cases it was
difficult to attain a good structural model. I had convergence problems, starting
value problems, and severe problems with offending estimates.
df 51
Che 41.01
p-value 0.84
RMSEA 0.00
GFI 1.00
AGFI 0.99
NFl 0.99
NNFI 1.00
CFI 1.00
CN 593
Results of the full-model strategy are as follows. The fit
indices indicate a very good fit of the model to the data
(Table 6.1), although the Chi2 suggests that there is a risk
of over-fitting, thereby capitalizing on chance (Hair et al.
1998, p. 658). Considering the estimated loadings for the
traits and methods factors it becomes quickly apparent
that there are other problems as well. Trait variance and
method variance are calculated by squaring theta ("..z) for
each construct's respective factor loading, and error
variance is equal to theta-delta (8t1).Although the random error (81\)is not shown,
Table 6.1, Fit Indices:
Full Model
it is easy to conclude that relative to methods or random error variance, trait
variance is very low with only complexity getting above 16% (top half of table
6.2). This means that systematic and random error explain the vast majority of
what is happening in the data.
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Estimate Explained
Parameter Scale Variable (std. error) Variance t-value
1...1,1 Collab Seller 0.30 (0.10) 0.09 3.06
1...2,1 Buyer 0.23 (0.08) 0.05 2.71
1...3,2 Trust Seller 0040 (0.07) 0.16 5.37
~,2 Buyer 0.39 (0.07) 0.15 5.59
1...5,3 TRxCB Seller 0044 (0.09) 0.19 4.77
1...6,3 Buyer 0.35 (0.09) 0.12 3.85
1...7,4 Comple Seller -0.57 (0.09) 0.32 -6.50
1...8,4 Buyer -0.61 (0.09) 0.37 -6.92
1...95 Uncert Seller 0.39 (0.08) 0.15 4.61,
1...10,5 Buyer 0.38 (0.08) 0.14 4.65
1...11,6 Asset Seller 0.29 (0.08) 0.08 3.43
1...12,6 Buyer 0.30 (0.07) 0.09 4.21
1...137 Relearn Seller 0.09 (0.03) 0.01 3.32,
1...14,7 Buyer 0.10 (0.03) 0.01 3.19
'Ln "p:llp.T r.nlhh O 71 (O O'i'\ o 'i0 1~ 74
1...3,8 Trust 0.57 (0.06) 0.32 9.91
1...5,8 TRxCB 0.70 (0.06) 0049 11.03
1...7,8 Complex 0.61 (0.08) 0.37 7.78
~,8 Uncert 0.63 (0.06) 0.40 11.08
1...11,8 Asset 0.63 (0.05) 0.40 13.12
1...13,8 Relearn 0.82 (0.06) 0.67 14.85
1...2,9 Buyer Collab 0.74 (0.05) 0.55 16042
~,9 Trust 0.50 (0.06) 0.25 8.75
~,9 TRxCB 0.74 (0.06) 0.55 12.92
As,9 Complex 0.54 (0.10) 0.29 5.30
1...10,9 Uncert 0.59 (0.06) 0.35 10.21
1...129 Asset 0049 (0.05) 0.24 10.00,
1...14,9 Relearn 0.78 (0.06) 0.61 13.70
Table 6.2, Factor Loadings and Explained Variance: Full Model
The structural relationships representing the hypothesized causal relationships are
also troubling (Table 6.3). By including methods factors it was necessary to
represent all latent constructs as Ksi (;) variables, whereas independent variables
would normally be Eta (11)variables and dependent variables Ksi variables.
Consequently the structural relationships are specified in the Beta (13) matrix.
Assuming valid and reliable results, this would mean that HI concerning the
positive effect of collaborative objectives on relationship learning is not confirmed -
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Parameter Estimate (std. error) t-value
f31,2 Collab - Relearn -0.29 (0.61) -0.47
f31,3 Trust - Relearn 0.92 (0.29) 3.15
f31,4 TRxCB - Relearn -0.34 (0.91) -0.37
f31,5 Complex - Relearn 0.90 (0.31) 2.91
f31,6 Uncert - Relearn 0.90 (0.31) 2.91
f31,7 Asset - Relearn 0.90(0.31) 2.91
Table 6.3, Structural Path Coefficients: Full Model
because the loading is neither significant nor the correct sign. The interaction
effect (H3) is also not significant, although it is the correct sign. The standard
errors are also very high, especially for the interaction effect (0.91).
df 13
Chi2 16.74
p-value 0.84
RMSEA 0.03
GFI 0.99
AGFI 0.96
NFl 1.00
NNFI 1.00
CFI 1.00
CN 520
The results for the nested model are just as problematic.
The fit indices indicate a very good fit of the model to the
data (Table 6.4), and over-fitting is apparently not a
problem. Trait variance is definitely better (Table 6.5)
than for the full model (Table 6.2), however, it is still not
great. The relationship learning construct is very poor at
9% for the seller and 16% for the buyer.
Table 6.4, Fit Indices:
Nested Model
Considering the structural relationships (Table 6.6), the
model includes some insignificant relationships despite the strategy of eliminating
insignificant relationships. All possible combinations were tried yet no model was
acceptable. I settled on this model because it is the theoretically most rational
choice given the findings from the two-stage least squares analysis that will be
discussed next. It also fit the data better than any other model.
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Estimate Explained
Parameter Scale Variable (std. error) Variance t-value
Au Collab Seller 0.73 (0.09) 0.53 8.39
A2,1 Buyer 0046 (0.06) 0.21 7.85
A3,2 Trust Seller 0.53 (0.06) 0.28 8.29
~,2 Buyer 0.67 (0.09) OAS 7.81
As,3 TRxCB Seller 0.75 (0.07) 0.56 10.99
"-<>,3 Buyer 0.33 (0.07) 0.11 4.69
A7,4 Uncert Seller 0.52 (0.06) 0.27 8.58
As,4 Buyer 0.70 (0.07) 0049 10.52
A9,S Relearn Seller 0.30 (0.03) 0.09 8.91
AlOS Buyer 0040 (0.05) 0.16 8.67,
'L~ S",llPT rnlhh O hOm (7) O ~h R QR
A3,S Trust 0.65 (0.06) 0042 10.65
As;s TRxCB 0.65 (0.06) 0042 10.17
A7,S Uncert 0049 (0.06) 0.24 7.85
~,s Relearn 0.69 (0.07) 0048 10.52
A2,9 Buyer Collab 0.82 (0.14) 0.67 5.79
~,9 Trust 0040 (0.11) 0.16 3.58
A6,9 TRxCB 1.07 (0.20) 1.14 5043
AS9 Uncert 0.32 (0.09) 0.10 3.50,
AlO,9 Relearn 0046 (0.12) 0.21 3.96
Table 6.5, Factor Loadings and Explained Variance: Nested Model
All direct effects are the correct hypothesized sign and are significant at the a =
0.10 level. The interaction effect (~1,4) is the correct sign, however, it is not
significant.
Estimate
Parameter (std. error) t-value
~1,2 Collab -+ Relearn -0.62 (0.32) 1.93
~1,3 Trust -+ Relearn 0.77 (0.21) 3.70
~1,4 TRxCB -+ Relearn -0.30 (0.27) -1.12
~1,5 Uncert -+ Relearn 0.94 (0.26) 3.65
Table 6.6, Structural Path Coefficients: Nested Model
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6.2.1 INTERPRETING TIIE RESULTS OF TIIE STRUCTURAL MODEL
None of the structural models are within acceptable bounds. Due to the presence of
offending estimates, like insignificant relationships, the parameter estimates
cannot be trusted (Hair et aL 1998, p. 610). Either the effects indeed are not
significant, or something is interfering with attaining a reasonable solution. Two
distinct possibilities are that the complexity of the model may be confounding the
results (Joreskog and Yang 1996, p. 85; Rigdon, Schumacker, and Wothke 1998,
p. 7), or there are severe problems with multicollinearity.
Examining the correlations between variables for the combined data (Table 6.7)
tends to suggest that the structural relationships should be significant because all
correlations except one (trust and complexity) are significant at the a = O.OlleveL
The trust-complexity correlation is extremely close to significant at a = 0.01, and
easily significant at a = 0.05. Because offending estimates can substantially affect
the results and interpretation of the structural relationships, and there are several of
them, the complexity of the structural model is very likely causing at least part of
the problem.
Relearn Collab Trust CB*TR Uncert Com_plx Asset
Relearn 1
Collab 0.684 1
(0.000)
Trust 0.675 0.530 1
(0.000) (0.000)
CB*TR 0.750 0.903 0.815 1
_i0.00Q}_ _i0.000) (0.000)
Uncert 0.633 0.520 0.474 0.559 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (O.OOO}
Complx 0.243 0.253 0.102 0.182 0.119 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.0031
Asset 0.579 0.480 0.413 0.495 0.544 0.141 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Table 6.7, Correlations for Combined Data
However, multicollinearity is very likely the most serious issue. It can greatly
inflate standard errors (Newbold 1994, p. 560), which clearly evident. This will
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also cause t-values to be conservative, which may be the reason for the
insignificant relationships. It can also result in standard parameter estimates
exceeding 1, which is the case in table 6.5 (~,9, TRxCB) where the standardized
parameter estimate is 1.07. According to Joreskog, " ... if the factors are
correlated (oblique), the factor loadings are regression coefficients and not
correlations and as such they can be larger than one in magnitude. This can indeed
happen also for any factor loading or structural coefficient in any USREL model.
... a standardized coefficient of 1.04, 1.40, or even 2.80 does not necessarily imply
that something is wrong, although, as will be seen, it might suggest that there is a
high degree of multicollinearity in the data (1999, p. 1)."
The introduction of the interaction effect introduces a potentially high level of
multicollinearity into the data. Looking at the correlation matrix in table 6.1, the
correlation between the interaction effect (CB*TR) and collaboration is above 0.9,
indicating a strong possibility for multicollinearity (Hair et al. 1998). Therefore, an
alternative method that can account for the multicollinearity would hopefully give
a valid and reliable result.
6.3 ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION METHODS
While many researchers turn to moderated multiple regression models estimated
with ordinary least squares (e.g. Heide and John 1992), the technique can lead to
erroneous interpretations of models (Irwin and McClelland 2001). Given that the
interaction is formed as the product of two direct effect variables it introduces
correlated error terms between the interaction variable and its parents, and
multicollinearity between the variables is highly likely. From table 6.1, the
correlation between the interaction effect (CB*TR) and collaboration is above 0.9,
indicating a strong possibility for multicollinearity (Hair et al. 1998). Thus, for
ordinary least squares regression two of the classical assumptions are violated
(Studenmund 1997, p. 94).
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An alternative would be to use a multi-sample approach by creating a categorical
dichotomous variable to represent high and low levels of trust. This is not
recommended, however, because of the immediate loss of information in dropping
from an interval to an ordinallevel of measurement (Rigdon, Schumacker, and
Wothke 1998), and it can lead to erroneous interpretations of the results (Irwin and
McClelland 2001).
The best solution is to find an estimation method that allows for the indicant
product approach, like with Kenny and Judd (1984). Two-stage least squares
regression allows the indicant product approach yet avoids many of the problems
associated with ordinary least squares (Bollen and Paxton 1998; Li and Harmer
1998). It removes correlated error terms and reduces the potential for
multicollinearity. The relative simplicity of the technique also makes it easier to
attain solutions. The down-side compared to structural equation modeling is that it
does not allow for partitioning of the variance between the informants and random
error. At best a dummy variable can be introduced to determine if the difference
between informant reports is significant, however, this says nothing about the
proportion of error it introduces into the equation.
6.4 TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION
Figure 6.1 shows an example of an interaction model with the direct effects of
collaborative objectives (CB) and trust (TR), and the interaction effect of the
product of collaborative objectives and trust (CB x TR) on relationship learning
(RL).
Ovals enclose latent variables, boxes enclose observed variables, single-head
straight lines represent main effects, and single-head jagged lines represent
interaction effects. Curved double-headed lines represent bivariate correlation. ~1
(Ksi) and ~2 represent the latent construct main effects and ~1 ~2 the latent construct
interaction effect. The observed reflective indicators are the xs with their
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Figure 6.1, Two-Stage Least Squares Interaction Model
respective ()(Delta) error terms. The interaction variable (~1~2)has no error
because it is an exact nonlinear function of the direct effects ~1 x ~2). 'Yl1(Eta)
represents the latent dependent variable with a single y observed reflective
indicator with its E (Epsilon) respective error term. C; (Sigma) represents error for
the structural equation. 1311(Beta) and 1312represent the main effects coefficients,
and 1313 represents the interaction effect coefficient. A(Lambda) represents
loadings between latent and observed variables. <l> (Phi) is the covariance of the
latent independent variables.
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The equation expressing the structural relationships between the two interacting
variables is:
where 11is the dependent variable, a is the intercept. The ~s are the coefficients,
and the Ls are the latent variables. This equation decomposes into the equation (for
proof see Bollen and Paxton 1998; Li and Harmer 1998):
where y is the predicted value of the dependent variable, a is the intercept for the
regression line, ~11 and ~12represent the main effects regression coefficients and
~13 represents the interaction effect regression coefficient, Xl and X6represent the
respective scaling indicators for the latent variables, and Ul is a composite error
term and. As described earlier, the problem with estimating this type of interaction
with ordinary least squares regression is that the error term is correlated with the
independent variables. This is where two-stage least squares comes in, which
requires the creation and selection of instrumental variables.
Stage 1: Form product variables by taking each indicator of the first latent variable
and multiply it by each indicator of the second latent variable forming all possible
product pairs between variables. Combinations of the independent variables Xl and
X6are ineligible as instrumental variables because they correlate with the error
term. Instrumental variables are the remaining product variables plus linear
indicators, that is, X2- Xs and X7- XlO.The instrumental variables are regressed on
the variables XI,X6,and XIX6.toform predicted values, and the coefficient of
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determination (R2) is checked. R2 below 0.1 indicates that the selection of
instrumental variables is poor (Bollen and Paxton 1998, p. 135).
Stage 2: In the second stage, the predicted values are regressed on Yl to estimate
the coefficients in the original system by OLS regression, shown in equation 3
(Bollen and Paxton 1998, p. 129):
A
Yl - a + /311 Xl + /312 X6 + /313 XlX6 + Ul (3)
The coefficients from stage 2 are consistent with equation 1, however, the error
term does not correlate with the independent variables. Additional exogenous
variables that are independent of the error term can be added to the equation and
can even be used as additional instrumental variables, and the estimates are robust
against abnormal distributions (Bollen and Paxton 1998, p. 130).
6.5 ANALYSIS
I ran the analysis in three ways: the seller and buyer data separatelyas well as the
combined data set. With the combined data I used a dichotomous dummy variable
to control for significant differences between seller and buyer. Because the
variable was never significant I removed it from the analysis so that it would not
interfere with the model. Therefore, I do not report the dummy variable in the
results.
6.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Looking at the descriptive statistics in table 6.8, skewness and kurtosis indicate
that the distributions are relatively normal. The standard deviation of the
interaction effects is high relative to the other variables for all data sets. This is
because they are product variables.
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N Range Min Max Mean Std. Vari- Skew- Kurt-
Dev. ance ness osis
Relearn 280 5.83 1.00 6.83 4.56 1.18 1.39 -0.18 -0.68
S Collab 286 5.78 1.09 6.87 4.46 1.31 1.71 -0.08 -0.83
E Trust 286 5.35 1.35 6.70 4.76 1.20 1.43 -0.48 -0.52
L CBxTR 286 45.09 0.44 45.53 22.44 10.30 106.2 0.19 -0.83
L Uncert 308 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.65 1.34 1.80 -0.09 -0.93
E Complex 314 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.75 1.38 1.90 0.23 -0.62
R Asset 303 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.51 1.47 2.16 -0.20 -0.76
Valid N 261
listwise
Relearn 283 5.17 1.75 6.92 4.57 1.06 1.13 -0.11 -0.83
Collab 293 5.06 1.71 6.77 4.48 1.14 1.30 0.03 -0.88
B Trust 293 5.27 1.59 6.86 4.75 1.17 1.36 -0.31 -0.71
U CBxTR 293 39.82 3.84 43.66 22.03 9.45 89.32 0.26 -0.77
Y Uncert 305 5.00 2.00 7.00 4.74 1.22 1.49 -0.14 -0.95
E Complex 307 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.72 1.36 1.84 0.23 -0.64
R Asset 308 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.73 1.35 1.82 -0.17 -0.54
Valid N 271
listwise
C Relearn 563 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.57 1.12 1.26 -0.16 -0.72
O . Collab 484 5.72 1.14 6.86 4.69 1.20 1.43 -0.37 -0.52
M Trust 484 5.61 1.19 6.79 4.98 1.13 1.28 -0.73 0.18
B CBxTR 484 44.53 0.74 45.28 24.33 9.32 86.83 -0.01 -0.61
I Uncert 613 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.70 1.28 1.65 -0.12 -0.92
N Complex 621 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.74 1.37 1.87 0.23 -0.63
E Asset 611 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.62 1.41 2.00 -0.20 -0.63
D Valid N 442
listwise
Table 6.8, Descnptive Statistics
6.5.2 CORRELATIONS
I present the seller, then buyer, then combined correlation matrices. The input
variables for collaborative objectives and for trust are the predicted values for the
first indicator for each variable derived from the instrumental variables. The
interaction effect is the predicted value for the product of the first indicators for
collaborative objectives and trust.
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Relearn Collab Trust CB*TR Uncert Complx Asset
Relearn 1
Collab 0.764 1
_i0.000)
Trust 0.745 0.692 1
(O.OOOl (0.000)
CB*TR 0.793 0.936 0.873 1
(0.000) _(O.OOQ) (_O.OOO)_ .
Uncert 0.623 0.596 0.594 0.642 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (O.OOO)
Complx 0.293 0.245 0.134 0.170 0.165 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004)
Asset 0.613 0.570 0.501 0.554 0.598 0.221 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.9, Seller Correlation Matrix
Relearn Collab Trust CB*TR Uncert Complx Asset
Relearn 1
Collab 0.704 1
(0.000)
Trust 0.604 0.555 1
(0.000) (0.000)
CB*TR 0.727 0.899 0.847 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Uncert 0.647 0.535 0.462 0.542 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Complx 0.186 0.323 0.099 0.240 0.067 1
(0.002) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) (0.245)
Asset 0.539 0.479 0.461 0.505 0.476 0.052 1
iO.OOO) (0.000) (0.0001 _(O.OOO)_ _(0.000) (0.367)
Table 6.10, Buyer Correlation Matrix
Relearn Collab Trust CB*TR Uncert Complx Asset
Relearn 1
Collab 0.703 1
(0.000)
Trust 0.623 0.551 1
(0.000) (0.000)
CB*TR 0.725 0.904 0.824 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Uncert 0.633 0.525 0.457 0.542 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Complx 0.243 0.276 0.080 0.191 0.119 1
(0.000) iO.OOQ) (0.077) _(O.OOO)_ _(0.003)_
Asset 0.579 0.499 0.402 0.476 0.544 0.141 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Table 6.11, Correlations Combined
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Almost all correlations are significant in all three matrices indicating that the
variables are good candidates for 2SLS regression. Unfortunately the correlations
between collaborative objectives and the interaction effect are above 0.9 indicating
there may be problems with multicollinearity.
6.5.3 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS
I analyzed all possible combinations of independent variables onto relationship
learning (Relearn). Predicted values from the instrumental variables for
collaborative objectives (Collab), trust (Trust), and the interaction effect (CB*TR)
were used as input. Environmental uncertainty (Uncert), relationship complexity
(Complex), and asset specificity (Asset) were input in their original form. An
example of the full regression equation is as follows:
Relearn = a + f31Collab + f32Trust - f33CB*TR + f34Uncert +
f3sComplex + f3rAsset + error
Table 6.12 shows standardized beta coefficients and associated t-values in
brackets. Significant coefficients are flagged with a superscript to indicate
significant at a = 0.01A, significant at a = O.OSB, and significant at a = o.io'. The
F-statistic is shown, as is adjusted R-squared (R2adi). The individual regression
estimates are on the horizontal. The three combinations of seller, buyer, and
combined are run in the eight possible ways (follow the shading).
The explained variance (R2adi) is in the range of 49.4% to 69.8%,which I consider
quite good. In all cases the F-statistic is clearly significant, indicating that the
overall equation is significant. In one-sided t-tests the individual coefficients are
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consistently significant with the correct sign. The buyer data has the only problems
with inconsistent signs.
Though not shown, the variance inflation factors (VIF), which measure
multicollinearity, were stable for all combinations: around 15 for collaborative
objectives, 9 for trust, and 35 for the interaction effect. All other variables were
between 1-2. Preferably the VIF factors should be below 10 (Hair, Anderson,
Tatham, and Black 1998). The most serious implication is that the effects of these
three variables are difficult to separate (Studenmund 1997, p. 265). T-values will
also fall, meaning that they are conservative relative to their true value.
In general, uncertainty has a greater influence on relationship learning than either
complexity or asset specificity. The explained variance improves only marginally
by adding complexity or asset specificity, therefore, for the sake of parsimony they
could be dropped. While the t-statistics and F-statistic is better for the combined
data with only uncertainty, the seller side has a 10% higher explained variance
(R2adj is 0.680), the F-statistic at 143.0 is clearly significant, and all the coefficients
are significant at the a=0.05 level. This means that for the sake of simplicity we
could measure only the seller. Nevertheless, I will concentrate on the combined
data with the parsimonious equation. It is as follows:
With standardized coefficients the estimated equation for the combined data is:
y (Relearn) = O.625Collab + 0.447Trusf - 0.364CB*TR + 0.245Uncert + e
t-values (5.517) (4.886) (-2.063) (6.541)
t-values significant at a=O.Ol (cutoff 1.960 one-sided)
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1 0.492 9004
0.527 169.8
0.680 143.0
3 0.601 104.9
0.592 164.5
5 86.1
119.0
7 69.7
119.3
Table 6.12, 2SLS Regression Results
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6.5.4 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS WITH DEMOGRAPHICS
I tested the demographic variables (table 6.13) with the combined data (buyer and
seller) and found that across all combinations there are some significant
relationships.
Equation# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Collab
Trust
CB*TR
Uncert
Complex
Asset
0.047
(1.053)
0.033
(0.782)
Table 6.13, 2SLS Regression with Demographic Variables
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6.5.5 SUMMARY OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
(% sales/supply) This customer/supplier represents approximately __ %
of our total sales.
This variable is significant and negative once at the 0.=0.10 level in equation 4.
This means that the higher the percentage, the lower will be relationship learning.
(Respondent years with company) How long have you personally been with
.your company? years.
This variable is significant and negative once at the 0.=0.10 level in equation 1,
and significant and negative once at the 0.=0.05 level in equation four. This means
that the longer a person has been working at his or her respective company, the
lower will be relationship learning.
(Firm years in relationship) How long have the two companies been involved
in the relationship? years.
This variable is significant and positive twice at the 0.=0.10 level in equations 2
and 3. This means that the longer the relationship, the higher will be relationship
learning.
(Respondent years in relationship) How long have you personally been
involved in the relationship with the other company? years.
This variable is never significant.
(Type of business) What is the primary focus of your business?
Producer - Wholesaler - Retailer - Service Provider - Other
This variable is not shown in the table because to properly test it within a
regression equation would require creating four dummy variables (one less than
the number of categories: Studenmund 1997, p. 233). Instead, I ran a one-way
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ANOVA with relationship learning as the dependent variable and type of business
as the factor. The F-statistic was 2.137, which is below the critical value of 2.37 at
a=O.05 (df = 4 numerator, 556 denominator). This means there are no significant
differences between type of business with regards to relationship learning.
6.5.6 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
The pattern of the significant demographic variables is sporadic and the relative
level of significance is fairly low with only one variable significant at the a=O.05
level. Given this, adding the demographic variables to the analysis does not
provide any important information. This does not, however, negate their
importance for evaluating the suitability of respondents.
6.6 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES:
For ease of interpretation I present the hypotheses and discussion in order. I use
table 6.12 as my reference point, that is, the results without demographic variables.
Hypotheses Effect Result
HI: Collaborative objectives are positively related to + Strongly
relationship learning. supported
H2: Trust is positively related to relationship learning. + Strongly
sU_Pj)_orted
H3: As collaborative objectives and trust increase they - Generally
will interact to have a negative effect on relationship supported
learning.
H4: Environmental uncertainty is positively related to + Strongly
relationsh!Q learning. supported
He Structural complexity is positively related to + Strongly
relationship learning. supported
H6: Asset Specificity is positively related to relationship + Strongly
learning. supported
Table 6.14, Summary of Hypotheses
HI: Collaborative objectives are positively related to relationship
learning.
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There are only two instances where.this hypothesis is not supported, however in
both cases it is close to significant at the a=0.10 level. Given the possibility of
conservative t-values because of the presence of collinearity with the interaction
term (Studenmund 1997, p. 265), I conclude that this hypothesis is strongly
supported.
H2: Trust is positively related to relationship learning.
There are four instances where this hypothesis is not supported, all on the buyer
data, otherwise it is clearly significant. There is the possibility of conservative t-
values due to collinearity as well as potential reliability problems on the buyer side
data, therefore I conclude that this hypothesis is strongly supported.
H3: As collaborative objectives and trust increase they will interact to
have a negative effect on relationship learning.
In general, the evidence supports this hypothesis. With the buyer data it is never
supported, and the coefficient shifts sign in half of the equations. As with the
previous variable, this could be due to reliability problems and conservative t-
values. With the seller data it always has the correct sign and is significant in every
case except one, however it is close at the a=0.10 level. It is always significant
with the correct sign with the combined data. I conclude that this hypothesis is
supported.
The interaction effect can be subjected to a further significance test of the
incremental increase to explained variance using the following equation (Jaccard,
Turrisi, and Wan 1990, p. 18):
F (R ~ - R 1
2
) /( k 2 - kl)
-
(1 - R ~ ) /( N - k 2 - 1)
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Where F is the test statistic, R22is the explained variance for the equation with the
interaction, R12 is the explained variance without the interaction, k2 is the number
of parameters in the equation with the interaction, and k-is the number of
parameters without the interaction, and N is the total sample size. The result is:
F - (O.530 2 - 0.524 2) I(3 - 2)
(1 - 0.530 2) I( 630 - 3 - 1)
- 5.50
Critical Fl,626at a=0.05 is 3.84. 5.50 > 3.84, therefore, the interaction is
statistically significant.
14: Environmental uncertainty is positively related to relationship
learning.
For all equations this hypothesis is supported at the a=0.01Ievel, therefore I
conclude that it is strongly supported.
Hs: Structural complexity is positively related to relationship learning.
This hypothesis is supported in the majority of equations, six times at the a=0.01
level, therefore I conclude that it is strongly supported, although problems with
reliability in the measurement model should be kept in mind.
~: Asset Specificity is positively related to relationship learning.
For all equations this hypothesis is supported at the a=0.01Ievel, therefore I
conclude that it is strongly supported.
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6.7 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
There are three main points from the hypothesis tests that deserve highlighting:
1. The evidence is strong that all hypothesized direct effects are confirmed.
2. The evidence generally supports the hypothesized interaction effect. This
means there is a dark side of trust that can potentially have a negative effect on
relationship learning
3. Accounting for parsimony and simplicity, relationship learning can be
measured by collecting data from only the seller side on collaborative
objectives, trust, uncertainty, and relationship learning. However, data from
both sides of the dyad including all control variables presents the broadest
picture.
Regarding interpreting the interaction effect, I use the equation with standardized
coefficients and combined data for only collaborative objectives, trust, and the
interaction effect with relationship learning as the dependent variable:
.v (Relearn) = O.625Collab + 0.447Trusf - 0.364CB*TR + e
otherwise:
/33 (-0.364) indicates the number of units that the slope of Y (Relearn) on X,
(Collab) changes, given a one-unit change in X2 (Trust) (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan
1990, p. 25). This means that for every unit that trust increases, the slope of
relationship learning on collaborative intentions will decrease by -D.364.
Using the regression coefficients, I can calculate the effect of collaborative
objectives on relationship learning given different values of trust. I illustrate this
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using the two most extreme possibilities in our measurement, 1 for low trust and 7
for high trust. Starting with 1 for X2 yields:
y = 0.625X1 + 0.447(1) - 0.364XJ(1) + error
Which factors to the linear equation of collaborative objectives when trust is low:
y = 0.447 + 0.261X1 + error
Note the positive coefficient on Xj,
Starting with 7 for X2 yields:
y = 0.625X1 + 0.447(7) - 0.364XJ(7) + error
Which factors to the linear equation of collaborative objectives when trust is high:
y = 3.129 -1.923X1 + error
Note the negative coefficient on Xj.
This means that when trust is very low there is a positive relationship between
collaborative objectives and relationship learning, however, as trust rises the effect
drops and very quickly becomes negative. With the present sample it is already
negative when trust is 2, which is still very low.
The interaction effect may not be so serious in light of the other independent
variables. Referring to table 6.6, with the combined data the interaction effect is
significant in all cases except when all variables are included. Though not
presented, with only environmental uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset
specificity as independent variables (leaving out collaborative objectives, trust,
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and the interaction) and relationship learning as the dependent variable, all
possible combinations are significant. This means that when environmental
uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset specificity are all high they may
buffer the negative interaction effect of collaborative objectives and trust.
The conclusion to all this is that alone, trust and collaborative objectives have
positive effects on relationship learning. However, trust breeds' complacency in
collaborative relationships, which has a negative effect on relationship learning.
Factors like environmental uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset specificity
will counterweight the complacency, thus buffering the negative effects.
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7. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this final chapter Idiscuss theoretical and managerial implications, followed by
the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.
7.1 OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION
The objectives of the research were to (1) further develop the construct of
relationship learning, (2) relate it to existing inter-organizational theory, (3)
operationalize the constructs as perceptual measures, and (4) empiricall y test the
relationship learning model. Through this, the theoretical contribution is to
develop the construct and model, and to empirically demonstrate that relationships
can indeed learn and that trust carries a hidden cost that is largely unrecognized in
the extant literature. This has practical implications for how inter-organizational
relationships can be managed to enhance relationship learning. The scale provides
the first attempt at developing a measure for firms to assess their relationship
learning capabilities.
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This dissertation is in response to a limitation in organizationallearning theory.
While there is a growing literature on inter-organizationalleaming (e.g. Hamel
1991a; Larsson et al. 1998; Lukas et al. 1996; Lyles 1988; Pine et al. 1995; Powell
et al. 1996; Quinn et al. 1996; Wathne et aL 1996), it suffers from an imbalance.
Typically the firm is treated as an autonomous unit, the implications of which are
to focus on individual firms learningfrom each other. The attempt here is to
balance this focus by exploring how firms learn with each other. This distinction is
important (Child and Faulkner 1998, p. 288), because "from" may give rise to a
competitive learning race (e.g. HameI1991a), whereas "with" perpetuates mutual
synergies of innovation (e.g. Powell et al. 1996). Each approach entails a different
set of ground rules.
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7.2.1 THE LEARNING RACE
A learning race implies an underlying assumption of opportunism (e.g. Williamson
1975). Within this train of thought is the metaphor of firms being separated by a
pervious membrane through which flow skills and capabilities (HameI1991, p.
100). Inter-organizationallearning is a function of the degree of permeability and
the direction of permeability. Access to people, facilities, documents, and other
forms of knowledge determine permeability. While relevant as a conceptualization
within the context of opportunism, it biases the way we look at learning between
firms. It draws a boundary where in many cases a boundary is not discernable
(Håkansson andJohanson 1988, p. 369; Håkansson and Snehota 1995a). This has
two consequences. First, it denies that relationships may exist as entities
themselves. Relationships are living systems that develop independently of their
constituents (Moss Kanter 1994). The membrane keeps the organizations separate
no matter how much flows through it. The membrane exists, nothing in between. I
have argued, and my results support, that relationships do exist as quasi-
organizations. Therefore, while in some cases the membrane metaphor may apply,
a new metaphor may be more applicable where the relationship is an amorphous
fog blurring the boundaries and joining the two organizations.
Second, the membrane metaphor emphasizes the independence, rather than
interdependence of organizations. While the membrane is pervious, it still
separates the organization from its environment. This propagates the "me against
them" syndrome captured in the opportunistic perspective. I agree that
opportunism is alive and well in learning relationships (e.g. HameI1991),
however, it should not be treated as the norm. Trusting collaboration between
firms is a common and growing phenomenon (e.g. Astley 1984; Child and
Faulkner 1998; Contractor and Lorange 1988), especially in circumstances where
relationship learning is an important facet of the relationship (e.g. Doz 1996; von
Krogh and Roos 1996). As firms specialize they become more dependent on their
environment for innovation (Cohen and Levinthal1990; Powel et al. 1996), and
use trusting collaboration as a means for creating knowledge or accessing
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knowledge that resides outside firm boundaries (Huber 1991). Even from a
competitive strategies perspective (e.g. Porter 1985), clusters of complementary
firms are recognized as an avenue to competitive advantage. The existence of a
cluster is merely an extrapolation on the existence of a relationship as a quasi-
organization. Viewed this way, collaborative objectives and trust are fundamental
variables for relationship learning. Thus, rather than "me against them", "us
against them" may be a more appropriate perspective (Moss Kanter 1994, p. 100).
7.2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP LEARNING DEFINITION
When developing the case for the relationship learning construct, I divided the
argument between two dichotomies that I see in the literature. The behavioral-
cognitive dichotomy is widely recognized and debated (e.g. Fiol and Lyles 1985),
whereas the values-process dichotomy is not. My goal is to contribute to the way
researchers think about relationship learning, or even organizationallearning. The
idea comes from the market orientation literature (see Kohli and Jaworski (1990)
for a process definition, and Deshpande, Farley, and Webster (1993) for a values
definition). My meaning is not to splinter the field more than it already is, rather,
processes and values are reconcilable and intertwined. For example, Hamel's
(1991) values of openness, receptiveness, and intent are an integral part of the
relationship learning process. Nevertheless, the distinction is important.
Values are enduring beliefs that some mode of conduct or end-state is preferable to
its opposite, and form the basis for attitudes (Rokeach 1973). Attitudes are held by
an entity and directed at something (Fishbein 1980). A values orientation to
relationship learning may presuppose focusing on the entities that constitute the
relationship, whereas a process orientation accentuates the interplay between
firms. To be consistent with the focus on mutuality within the dyad, the
relationship learning definition is oriented to the process.
Relationship learning is the process of understanding and gaining new insights at
the intersection between firms (Lukas et al. 1996). Information processing is a
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critical aspect of this (e.g. Day 1994a; Lukas et al. 1996; Shrivastava 1983;
Sinkula 1994; Slater and Narver 1995). Specifically, information processing that
encompasses information sharing, mutual interpretation, and integration into
relationship memory (Selnes and Sallis 1999), leading to a potential behavior
change (Huber 1991, p. 89). Information sharing is recognized as facilitating
coordination of inter-firm activities (c.f. Anderson and Weitz 1992; Buvik and
John 2000; Cannon and Perreault 1999; Jap 1999). Mutual interpretation is related
to group sense-making (c.f. Ring and Van De Ven 1994, p. 194) leading to shared
understandings that form a collective sense of identity and purpose (c.f. Nonaka
1991, p. 97). Relationship memories are captured in the shared beliefs, values,
assumptions, norms, and behaviors that transcend the organizational boundaries
and are captured in the relationship (c.f. Lukas et al. 1996; Moorman and Miner
1997; Walsh and Ungson 1991).
The definition illuminates actionable alternatives to enhance relationship learning,
like improving mechanisms for information sharing, interpretation, or memory
integration. The values-process logic aids to refine the issues surrounding
relationship learning.
7.2.3 THE MODEL
To arrive at a model, data from field interviews was combined with the literature
on transaction cost economics, network theory, resource-based theory, and agency
theory. All of these theoretical approaches are, or can be applied to the inter-
organizational setting. None of them, however, specifically concerns relationship
learning. Transaction cost economics is concerned with how to most efficiently
organize transactions along a market-hierarchy dichotomy (Williamson 1975).
Network theory is concerned with the embeddedness of transactions within a
network of relationships, offering a socialized view of economic behavior
(Johanson and Mattsson 1987). Resource based theory traditionally focuses on the
individual firm and how unique resources can be combined in unique ways to
achieve competitive advantage (Barney 1991), although it has recently been
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extended to encompass inter-organizational relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Agency theory takes up the question of control mechanisms across the principal-
agent relationship (Ouchi 1979), and is amenable to the inter-organizational
setting. Lack of a specific guiding theory exposes the research to criticism
surrounding model specification.
I hypothesized that collaborative objectives, trust, environmental uncertainty,
structural complexity, and asset specificity all positively influence relationship
learning. I also hypothesized that trust interacts with collaborative objectives to
have a negative impact on relationship learning. The two-stage least squares
results strongly support accepting the hypotheses. However, the structural equation
modeling results are ambiguous, which could be taken as evidence of model
misspecification. There are standardized estimates that exceed 1, difficulties with
insignificant factor loadings, and relationships that change sign from one model to
the next. Conceivably these problems could be a result of misspecification,
alternatively, the problems could result from high multicollinearity (Joreskog
1999, p. 1; Newbold 1994, p. 560; Studenmund 1997, p. 265).
As an experiment I ran an ordinary least squares regression with relationship
learning as the dependent variable, and collaborative objectives, trust, and CB*TR
as the independent variables. I did not do anything to reduce multicollinearity. The
correlation between collaborative objectives and CB*TR was 0.906, indicating the
presence of multicollinearity (Studenmund 1997). The variance inflation factor for
the CB*TR parameter was 36.580, indicating a very high level of multic<?llinearity
(Hair et aL 1998). The evidence is strong, then, that multicollinearity is a problem.
Another perplexing result is the relationship between CB*TR and relationship
learning. In a correlation matrix, CB*TR is significantly positively correlated with
relationship learning (0.725 significant at a = 0.01), whereas in either structural
equation modeling or two-stage least squares it comes out as a negative
relationship. This also may indicate model misspecification. However, Irwin and
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McClelland (2001, p. 105) demonstrate how the correlation between a dependent
variable and a product interaction term can, with their data, range from -0.81 to +
0.97. This is because the correlation is a function of the component independent
variables that make up the interaction term. In a simple correlation matrix between
the dependent variable and the interaction term, the component variables are not
accounted for. Thus, when they are accounted for, which is the case in the
structural equation modeling and the two-stage least squares regression, it is quite
conceivable that the effect changes sign.
Still, there may be problems with misspecification. Wilson (1995, p. 337)
proposed a list of relationship variables for inclusion in empirical models of buyer-
seller relationships. It is legitimate to argue that anyone, or even all of these
variables should have been included.
• Commitment • Adaptation
• Trust • Non-retrievable investments
• Cooperation • Shared technology
• Mutual Goals • Summative constructs
• Interdependence/power imbalance • Structural bonds
• Performance satisfaction • Social bonds
• Comparison level of alternative
Table 7.1, Buyer-Seller Relationship Variables (Wilson 1995, p. 337)
The dilemma in developing the model comes down to paradoxical choices. On the
one hand, according to grounded theory, phenomena should be allowed to emerge
from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 1; Strauss and Corbin 1990, p. 23).
Alternatively, previous research provides confidence in proposed models
(Churchill 1979; Eisenhardt 1989). Mitigating this is the desire for parsimony
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, p. 42). Given that transaction cost
economics, network theory, resource-based theory, and agency theory do not
specifically address relationship learning, and given the lack of a theory that does,
145
the data did playa large role in arriving at the model. This is why I term the
approach as quasi-grounded theory. Nevertheless, the explained variance in the
two-stage least squares regression is consistently high ranging from 50-70%, and
in the best model (without complexity and asset specificity) with combined data it
is 68%. Even in the full model with the combined data it is 63%. The low t-value
on the interaction effect in the full model (-1.201) is not too troubling because it is
quite likely conservative because of a substantial degree of multicollinearity (VIF
= 35.919) despite the two-stage least squares estimation.
A final theoretical issue is the potential buffering effect of environmental
uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset specificity. With the combined data
(Table 6.6), the interaction effect is significant in all cases except when all
variables are included. Though not presented, with only environmental
uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset specificity as independent variables
(leaving out collaborative objectives, trust, and the interaction) and relationship
learning as the dependent variable, all possible combinations are significant and
positive. This means that when environmental uncertainty, structural complexity,
and asset specificity are all high they may buffer the negative interaction effect of
collaborative objectives and trust.
7.2.4 SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
All hypothesized relationships were supported. For the direct effects, this is no
great surprise. The interaction effect, however, is somewhat perplexing. Dwyer,
Schurr, and Oh (1987) developed a framework for how inter-organizational
relationships start, evolve, and dissolve. Central to the development and
maintenance of relationships are establishing norms of conduct that allow for
future exchange and increased risk-taking in the relationship. The most
fundamental norm is trust, which provides the foundation for understanding
expectations and for cooperation in the relationship. As commitment increases,
value systems converge creating a fruitful interdependence. Dodgson (1993) and
Doz (1996) extend the framework, recognizing the pivotal role of learning in the
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relationship. Common to all three studies is the central role of trust. Dodgson goes
so far as to say that, "Effective learning between partners depends on the
construction of a "climate" of trust engrained in organizational modes of behavior,
and supported by the belief in the mutual benefits of collaboration throughout the
organization (Dodgson 1993, p. 78)."
The negative interaction effect, then, seems counterintuitive. Trust is recognized as
a positive force in inter-organizational relationships (e.g. Child and Faulkner 1998;
Dodgson 1993b; Jap and Weitz 1996), with few exceptions (e.g. Eisenhardt et al.
1997; HameI1991a). Our findings expose a potential hidden cost. A likely
explanation is that as trust develops the parties relinquish explicit control in favor
of implicit faith. Besides the risk for opportunism, the parties may become
complacent or even reticent to ask sensitive questions (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and
Bourgeois 1997). Their value systems may converge to the extent where they fail
to recognize alternative perspectives. They develop a common psychological
identity (Gaertner et al. 1996,p. 273) and lose the ability for higher levellearning
because there is no impetus to question norms, policies, and objectives.
Isomorphism negates the relationship learning process. Factors like environmental
uncertainty, structural complexity, and asset specificity counterweight this
complacency, thus buffering the negative interaction effect.
7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY
Measuring phenomena across organizationallevel dyads is a dubious process
(Heide and John 1994; John and Reve 1982; Phillips 1981), exacerbated by the
fact that data is frequently collected from key informants who report on higher
order constructs. The constructs are often latent, meaning that they are not directly
observable or measurable. Higher order means that the respondent is not
representing their individual perspective, but rather, the perspective of an abstract
entity, usually an organization. Using key informants, especially when only one is
used per organization, compromises the level of measurement, giving heed to the
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argument that it is the individual' s perceptions being measured, not the
organizational phenomena.
Phillips (1981) and John and Reve (1982) tested the reliability and validity of key
informant reports with dyadic data, with mixed results. With few exceptions (e.g.
Anderson and Weitz 1992; Bagozzi and Phillips 1982), pooling dyadic data in
channels research is problematic (e.g. Anderson and Narus 1990; John and Reve
1982; Kumar et al. 1993; Phillips 1981). Informant bias leads to poor model fit,
thus many researchers resort to analyzing each side of the data separately (e.g. Jap
and Weitz 1996). What Heide and John (1994, p. 540) recognized, and what this
dissertation capitalizes on, is that the issue is not the key informant reports per se,
but the theoretical nature of the construct in question. Heide and John (1994, p.
534) suggest that perceptual differences between key informants can in fact be
used to measure particular inter-organizational constructs that are a collective
property of a higher order construct. Relationship learning is such a construct and
is thus amicable to dyadic measurement.
The issue becomes how to assure the validity and reliability of the results.
Arbitrarily aggregating measures to form constructs risks masking incongruous
relationships between indicators or sub-dimensions, and hiding measurement
problems. To address this I combined the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) matrix
approach (Campbell and Fiske 1959), modeled as a covariance structure (Joreskog
1974), with Bagozzi and Edwards' (1998) general approach for representing
constructs in organizational research through applying structural equation
modeling at varying levels of aggregation. Stepwise aggregation provides
justification for either aggregating, or not aggregating. With relationship learning
it provided guidance for refining the constructs and aggregating the sub-
dimensions of information sharing, interpretation, and memory integration into
one construct. This, in tum, improved model fit. It also mitigated difficulties with
treating ordinal variables as continuous by helping to normalize the distributions
(Bollen 1989, p. 438). In conjunction with the MTMM approach, the aggregation
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approach builds confidence in the validity and reliability of the measurement
model, and thus the results. The reasonably high trait variance, despite different
organizations, backgrounds, countries, and cultures, supports what Heide and John
(1994) contend, that key informants can in fact be used to measure particular inter-
organizational constructs that are a collective property of a higher order construct.
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
The paradox of trust is that it is at once enabling and crippling. In isolation it is a
positive force for relationship learning, yet, combined with collaborative
objectives it has a dark side. That the interaction comes out as a negative effect
relative to relationship learning is, I believe, a surrogate-warning signal for
isomorphism. Institutional theory holds that organizational adaptation is a function
of isomorphic pressure (Martinez 1999). In lieu of a better plan, institutions
conform to the status quo in their environments. They gain legitimacy through
playing the game as others do. Conformity supplants thinking!
This begs the question, how does isomorphism relate to relationship learning?
Innovation is strongly influenced by externallinks to the firm (Cohen and
LevinthaI1990). The underlying logic is that novel ideas are difficult to cultivate
within the firm because they are not prioritized. Resources usually get funneled to
core capabilities and skilled people avoid non-core projects (Leonard-Barton
1992). Firms get trapped exploiting and extending existing capabilities at the
expense of exploring new alternativ es that challenge the status quo (March 1991).
Yet, many managers recognize that as environmental uncertainty and the rapidity
of technological change increases so does the importance of exploring novel ideas
(Stata 1989). Therefore, they cultivate inter-organizational relationships.
Broadly, an inter-organizational relationship is a mutual orientation of at least two
organizations toward each other wherein interaction norms are established
(Johanson and Mattsson 1987). As the norm of reciprocity develops (Oliver 1990,
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p. 244), a collective consciousness is born and the relationship attains a unique
identity (Van de Ven 1976, p. 25). Psychological contracts supplant formal
agreements and the parties build mutual interpretations (Ring and Van De Ven
1994). In other words, they isomorphize. In their effort to understand each other
and make the relationship work, they inadvertently undermine one of the reasons
for being in the relationship.
In line with the normative literature on organizationallearning (e.g. Argyris and
Schon 1996; Garvin 1993; Quinn, Anderson, and Finkelstein 1996; Senge 1990),
relationships need to develop the ability to question the status quo. Concentrating
too much on developing trust may prove dysfunctional because more trust may
mean less learning. Just like within organizations, rotating people in and out of the
relationship may help neutralize some of the isomorphism.
Innovative firms are often involved with more new products, technologies, and
markets than less successful innovators (McKee 1992). Having a diversity of
relationships may also be fruitful because innovation is not simply a function of
extemallinks, it is also a function of a broad scope of extemallinks.
7.5 LIMITATIONS
The research process constitutes a series of interlocking choices that inevitably
lead to compromise. Consequently, the results must be interpreted within the
context of certain limitations.
In choosing to define relationship learning as a process I measure the magnitude of
information sharing, interpretation, and memory integration, however, this says
nothing directly about quality. Knowing a lot is not comparable to knowing the
right things, thus a small amount of high quality learning may prove superior to a
large amount of inferior learning.
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So far as using dyadic data, two opposing problems arise. I attempted to address
the problem of validity and reliability issues through my methodology. However,
while extending research that focuses on only one side of the dyad, this still
ignores the complexity of the network of inter-firm ties (Anderson et al. 1994;
Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001). The learning in one relationship is quite
certainly a function of the learning in other relationships, thus the level of
abstraction may not be high enough.
Finally, in the multimethod-multitrait matrix approach (Campbell and Fiske 1959),
in structural equation modeling (Joreskog 1974), the optimal result would have
been to achieve good model fit with no methods factors and low error. This would
indicate no significant perceptual differences across the dyad. The next best
scenario is to improve fit by including methods factors, which is indeed what
happened. Nevertheless, by partitioning the variance I was able to show that the
greatest portion of variance was accounted for by the traits, close to 50%. The
judgment as to whether this is sufficiently high lies with the reader.
7.6 FUTURE RESEARCH
Difficulty in attaining a good structural model gives clear evidence that there is
more work to be done specifying the structural relationships, although given the
combinations I ran I believethis goes beyond mere re-specification. There are
other variables that may be important, like reciprocity (e.g. Granovetter 1985;
Joshi and Stump 1999; Oliver 1990). It may be that the values dimensions (e.g.
Hame11991a) of openness and receptivity should play an explicit role in the
model.
Regarding trust, my original plan was to measure it at the interpersonallevel, the
inter-organizational level, and across levels between a person and an organization.
The measures failed to discriminate. Despite this, I believe it could be very useful
to pursue developing a better measure of these three dimensions and look at how
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they interact in inter-organizational relationships (e.g. Doney and Cannon 1997;
Zaheer et al. 1998).
When partitioning the variance, particularly for sellers, the systematic error for
trust was high at 50% (36% for buyers). This indicates that perceptions varied in a
systematic fashion across respondents. It may be fruitful to determine if there is a
connection between, for example, type of business and trust. It may be that
because of systematic differences between industries relative to trust levels, some
industries are more conducive to relationship learning than others. Determining
what the key systematic differences are and whether they are transferable may
provide valuable practical implications for how to enhance relationship learning.
Finally, the quantitative study is based on perceptual measures. A study that
incorporated more concrete measures would provide a more robust test of the
theory.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE
The following interview guide was used as a general framework for conducting the
interviews of both the suppliers and customers who took part in the research
project. It underwent some revisions as the interviewing process progressed,
reflected in the following version.
Question 1(generalleaming)
1. Can you describe how you learn from your customer/supplier?
Please give examples.
2. Do you consider the relationship with your customer/supplier complex?
a) Is this related to the complexity of the product?
b) Does this complexity motivate information sharing?
3. What changes has your company made based on what you have learned from
your customer/supplier?
For example: new products or systems.
Question 2 (memory and processing)
1. How is learning memorized in your organization?
a) Individuals?
b) Systems?
c) Databases?
d) Products?
e) Other?
2. What factors influence how information (from the customer/supplier) is stored
in your organization?
a) Systems for storage?
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b) Incentives?
c) Organization of people?
d) Other?
3. What factors influence how information (from the customer/supplier) is
processed in your organization?
a) Organization of people?
b) Authority (centralized or decentralized)?
c) Competence?
d) Trust in the customer' s/supplier' s expertise in the area?
e) Other?
Question 3 (driving forces and benefits)
1. What is motivating learning in the relationship?
a) Curiosity?
b) Expertise?
c) Desire to influence?
d) Other?
2. What factors are influencing your motivation to share information with the
supplier?
a) Trust?
b) Real need for improvements? In what way?
c) Market turbulence?
d)Other?
3. What benefits has your company achieved through a learning relationship with
the customer/supplier?
a) Better products?
b) Better service?
c) Reduced costs?
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d) Increased commitment to the relationship?
e) Other?
Question 4 (learning by the other party)
1. How do you think your customer/supplier is learning from you?
a) What do they learn?
b) What are the consequences?
2. Do you perceive that your customer/supplier has changed based on learning
from your company?
For example: new products or systems.
Question 5 (organizational questions)
1. Is decision making centralized in your organization, or do people have a great
deal of autonomy?
2. Is information about the customer/supplier shared openly in your organization?
a) Is there much opportunity for informal "hall talle", or are people expected
to use formal channels of communication?
b) Do people from different departments mix easily?
c) Do junior members of your organization mix easily with senior members?
3. Are there many contact points between your organization and the
customer/supplier?
a) Do these contact points facilitate the transfer of information?
Question 6 (suggestions)
How can the relationship be changed so that both parties learn more and faster?
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE
* indicates items removed in the analysis.
GOALS: Measured on a seven point scale from Low (1) to High (7) with a
category for Not Relevant (?).
1. To what degree do you discuss company goals with the other party in this
relationship (Borys and Jemison 1989; Hame11991; Sheth and Parvatiyar
1992)?
2. To what degree are these goals developed through joint analysis of potentials
(Borys and Jemison 1989; Hamel 1991; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992)?
3. To what degree are these goals formalized in a joint agreement or contract
(Borys and Jemison 1989; Hame11991; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992)?
4. To what degree are these goals implemented in day-to-day work (Borys and
Jemison 1989; Hamel 1991; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992)?
5. To what degree have you developed measures that capture performance related
to these goals (Borys and Jemison 1989; Hame11991; Sheth and Parvatiyar
1992)?
COMPLEXITY: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
6. * There are several different products exchanged in our relationship!
7. These products are generally very complex!
8. * These products are highly customized for this relationship!
9. There are many operating units involved from both organizations!
10. There are many contact points between different departments or professions
between the two organizations (Cohen and LevinthaI1990)!
TRUST: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly
Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
11. * I trust the contact people from the other organization (Doney and Cannon
1997)!
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12. * I trust that the contact people from the other organization are concerned
about my well being (Doney and Cannon 1997)!
13. * I believe that the other organization will consider my company's well being
when making important decisions (Doney and Cannon 1997)!
14. I believe the other organization will respond with understanding in the event of
problems (Doney and Cannon 1997)!
15. I trust that the other organization is able to fulfill contractual agreements
(Doney and Cannon 1997)!
16. We trust that the other organization is competent at what they are doing
(Doney and Cannon 1997)!
17. There is general agreement in my organization that the other organization is
trustworthy (Doney and Cannon 1997)!
18. There is general agreement in my organization that the contact people in the
other organization are trustworthy (Doney and Cannon 1997)!
INFORMATION SHARING: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly
Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
19. * Our companies exchange information on successful and unsuccessful
experiences with products exchanged in the relationship (Slater and Narver
1996)!
20. * Our companies exchange information related to changes in end-user needs,
preferences, and behavior (Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
21. Our companies exchange information related to changes in market structure,
such as mergers, acquisitions, or partnering (Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
22. Our companies exchange information related to changes in the technology of
the focal products (Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
23. * Our companies exchange information as soon as possible of any unexpected
problems (Anderson and Narus 1990)!
24. Our companies exchange information on changes related to our two
organization's strategies and policies!
25. Our companies exchange information that is sensitive for both parties, such as
financial performance and company know-how (Heide and John 1992)!
26. It is my company's policy to openly share information in this relationship!
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27. The interaction between our two organizations is mediated through an
extensive network of people from both sides (Cohen and LevinthalI990)!
28. It is common to establish joint teams to solve operational problems in the
relationship (Hedberg 1981)!
29. It is common to establish joint teams to analyze and discuss strategic issues
(Hedberg 1981)!
30. The atmosphere in the relationship stimulates productive discussion
encompassing a variety of opinions (Moorman 1995)!
31. * We have a lot of face-to-face communication in this relationship!
32. It is my company's policy to encourage interpersonal contact between
companies in this relationship (Moorman 1995)!
33. In the relationship we frequently adjust our common understanding of end-user
needs, preferences, and behavior!
34. In the relationship we frequently adjust our common understanding of trends in
technology related to our business!
35. * In the relationship we frequently evaluate, and if needed adjust our routines
in order-delivery processes!
36. We frequently evaluate and if needed update the formal contracts in our
relationship!
37. We frequently meet face-to-face in order to refresh the personal network in this
relationship!
38. We frequently evaluate, and if needed update information about the
relationship stored in our electronic databases!
UNCERTAINTY: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to
Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
39. End-user needs and preferences change rapidly in our industry (Heide and
John 1990; Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
40. The competitors in our industry frequently make several aggressive moves to
capture market share (Heide and John 1990; Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
41. Crises have caused some of our competitors to shut down or radically change
the way theyoperate (Meyer et al. 1990)!
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42. It is very difficult to forecast where the technology will be in the next 2-3 years
in our industry (Heide and John 1990; Huber 1996; Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
43. In recent years, a large number of new product ideas have been made possible
through technological breakthroughs in our industry (Heide and John 1990;
Jaworski and Kohli 1993)!
CONSEQUENCES: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly Disagree (1)
to Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
44. The relationship with the other company has resulted in lower logistics costs!
45. Flexibility to handle unforeseen fluctuations in demand has been improved
because of the relationship!
46. The relationship with the other company has resulted in better product quality!
47. Synergies in joint sales and marketing efforts have been achieved because of
the relationship!
48. The relationship has a positive effect on our ability to develop successful new
products!
49. Investments of resources in the relationship, such as time and money, have
paid off very well!
50. The relationship helps us to detect changes in end-user needs and preferences
before our competitors!
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Measured on a seven point scale from Strongly
Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7) with a category for Not Relevant (?).
51. Our company has made significant investments dedicated to this relationship
(Heide and John 1990)!
52. Our company has made several adaptations to accommodate the other party's
technological norms and standards (Heide and John 1990)!
53. The other company can easily be replaced if the relationship was terminated
(Heide and John 1990)!
54. Our company's systems and processes can easily be adapted to a new partner
(Heide and John 1990)!
55. In our company we are very satisfied with this relationship!
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56. In our company we find this relationship more attractive than other relevant
alternatives!
57. In our company we are highly motivated to continue this relationship!
58. In our company we are highly motivated to collaborate in this relationship!
59. In our company we talk favorably about this relationship!
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Completed by the recruiter during the
recruitment process.
60. Choose the appropriate question:
a) This customer represents approximately __ % of our total sales.
b) This supplier represents approximately __ % of our total supply.
61. What is the primary focus of your business?
Circle one
f) Producer g) Wholesaler h) Retailer i) Service
Provider
j) Other
62. How long have you personally been with your company? -Jyears.
63. How long have the two companies been involved in the relationship?
years.
64. How long have you personally been involved in the relationship with the other
company?
_____ -Jears.
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APPENDIX 3: SPSS SYNTAX
* This fust syntax shows an example of how some of the seller data is summed
into aggregated variables.
compute scollab=(s1 +s2+s3+s4+s5)/5.
compute scomplex=(s7 +s9+s1 0)/3.
compute suncert=(s39+s41 +s42+s43)/4.
compute sasset=(s51 +s52)/2.
compute srelearn=(s21 +s22+s24+s25+s28+s29+s30+s33+s34+s36+s37 +538)/12.
compute strust=(s14+s15+s16+s17 +518)/5.
compute spert=(s44+s45+s46+s4 7+s48+s49+s50)/7.
missing values all (99).
recode all (9=99) (sysmis=99).
execute.
* This syntax shows how to export the aggregated data and create a file that Prelis
can read. It includes the buyer data as well.
Write outfile = "c:\lisreI83\relearn\fullagg.dat"
/ scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset srelearn brelearn
spert bpert st rust btrust (14F6.0).
execute.
* This syntax shows how to create product variables that are used as instrumental
variables for two-stage least squares regression.
compute sc1xst1=s1*s14.
compute sczxstzesz-sts.
compute sc2xst3=s2*s16.
compute sc2xst4=s2*s17.
compute sc2xst5=s2*s18.
compute sc3xst2=s3*s15.
compute sc3xst3=s3*s16.
compute sc3xst4=s3*s17.
compute sc3xst5=s3*s18.
compute sc4xst2=s4*s15.
compute sc4xst3=s4*s 16.
compute sc4xst4=s4*s17.
compute sc4xst5=s4*s18.
compute scsxstzess-sts.
compute sc5xst3=s5*s16.
compute sc5xst4=s5*s17.
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compute scsxsts-ss-sta,
missing values all (99).
recode all (9=99) (sysmis=99).
execute.
* This syntax shows how the instrumental variables (original variables, product
variables, and exogenous variables) are regressed on the first indicator of the
collaborative objectives construct, the trust construct, and the product of the first
two indicators (the interaction) to form predicted values.
REGRESSION
/MISSING LlSTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.OS) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT st
/METHOD=ENTER s2 s3 s4 sS s1S s16 s17 s18 sc2xst2 sc2xst3 sc2xst4 sc2xstS
sc3xst2 sc3xst3 sc3xst4 sc3xstS sc4xst2 sc4xst3 sc4xst4 sc4xstS scSxst2
scSxst3 scSxst4 scSxstS scomplex suncert sasset
/SAVE PRED.
REGRESSION
/MISSING LlSTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.OS) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT s14
/METHOD=ENTER s2 s3 s4 ss s1S s16 s17 s18 sc2xst2 sc2xst3 sc2xst4 sc2xstS
sc3xst2 sc3xst3 sc3xst4 sc3xstS sc4xst2 sc4xst3 sc4xst4 sc4xstS scSxst2
scSxst3 scSxst4 scSxstS scomplex suncert sasset
/SAVE PRED.
REGRESSION
/MISSING LlSTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.OS) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT sc1xst1
/METHOD=ENTER s2 s3 s4 ss s1S s16 s17 s18 sc2xst2 sc2xst3 sc2xst4 sc2xstS
sc3xst2 sc3xst3 sc3xst4 sc3xstS sc4xst2 sc4xst3 sc4xst4 sc4xstS scSxst2
scSxst3 scSxst4 scsxsts scomplex suncert sasset
/SAVE PRED.
missing values all (99).
recode all (9=99) (sysmis=99).
execute.
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This final syntax is and example of two-stage least squares for the predicted values
and exogenous constructs. SPSS offers a 2SLS option where this is all done
automatically, however, there is some loss of.control over the process so I chose to
do it the long way.
REGRESSION
/MISSING LlSTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOl
/CRITERIA=PIN(.OS) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT srelearn
/METHOD=ENTER pre_4 pre_S pre_6 suneert scomplex sasset .
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APPENDIX 4: PRELIS SYNTAX
This shows the syntax for importing the data from the fullagg file created in SPSS.
14 variables are imported, then the interaction effects are calculated by the NE
command, thus 16 variables are exported as a correlation matrix. The CO
command declares the variables to be continuous, otherwise for variables with less
than 16 distinct values the program will use the ordinal default. Prelis generates
various descriptive statistics before exporting the matrix.
DA NI=14 NO=315 MI=99 TR=PA
RA FI=c:\lisreI83\relearn\fullagg.dat
CO ALL
lA
scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset sreleam brelearn
strust btrust sperf bperf
NE strxscbestrust=scollab
NE btrxbcbebtrust=bcollab
CO scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset
CO srelearn brelearn strust btrust sperf bperf strxscb btrxbcb
auMA=KM KM=c:\lisreI83\relearn\fullagg.cor
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APPENDIX 5: LISREL SYNTAX
This is an example of the syntax for the fullagg measurement model with methods
factors. In other words it is a MTMM matrix in structural equation modeling. Of
the 16 imported variables, performance is dropped so only 14 are used in the
analysis. The MO and LK lines show the creation of the buyer and seller latent
variables, as well as the other variables. The FR lines specify the paths, the VA
lines set variances. ST suggests starting values for iterations, and the final two
lines specify how the program should run and what output to give.
DA NI=16 NO=315 MA=KM
KM FI=C:\lisreI83\relearn\fullagg.cor
LA
scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset
srelearn breleam strust btrust sperf bperf strxscb btrxbcb
SE
scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset sreleam brelearn
strust btrust strxscb btrxbcb / .
MO NX=14 NK=9 PH=SY,FI TD=SY,FI
LK
collab complex uncert asset relearn trust trxcb seller buyer
FR LX(1,1) LX(2,1) LX(3,2) LX(4,2) LX(5,3) LX(6,3) LX(7,4) LX(8,4) LX(9,5)
FR LX(10,5) LX(1l,6) LX(12,6) LX(13,7) LX(14,7)
FR LX(1,8) LX(3,8) LX(5,8) LX(7,8) LX(9,8) LX(1l,8) LX(13,8)
FR LX(2,9) LX(4,9) LX(6,9) LX(8,9) LX(1O,9) LX(12,9) LX(14,9)
VA 1 PH(1,1) PH(2,2) PH(3,3) PH(4,4) PH(5,5) PH(6,6) PH(7,7) PH(8,8) PH(9,9)
FR PH(1,2) PH(1,3) PH(1,4) PH(1,5) PH(1,6) PH(1,7) PH(2,3) PH(2,4) PH(2,5)
FR PH(2,6) PH(2,7)
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FR PH(3,4) PH(3,5) PH(3,6) PH(3,7) PH(4,5) PH(4,6) PH(4,7) PH(5,6) PH(5,7)
FR PH(6,7) PH(8,9)
FR TD(l,l) TD(2,2) TD(4,4) TD(5,5) TD(6,6) TD(7,7) TD(8,8) TD(9,9)
FR TD(ll,ll) TD(12,12) TD(13,13) W(14,14)
FR TD(1,13) TD(2,14) TD(ll,13) W(12,14)
VA .3 TD(3,3)
ST.7 ALL.
Path Diagram
DU IT=500 se MI TV AD=OFF
This is an example of the syntax for the fullagg structural model with methods
factors. The main difference from the measurement model is that the latent
variables are Eta rather than Ksi, and BE specifies the structural relationships in
the Beta matrix.
DA NI=16 NO=315 MA=KM
KM FI=C:\lisreI83\relearn\fullagg.cor
LA
scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset
srelearn brelearn strust btrust sperf bperf strxscb btrxbcb
SE
scollab bcollab scomplex bcomplex suncert buncert sasset basset srelearn brelearn
strust btrust strxscb btrxbcb /
MO NY=14 NE=9 PS=SY,FI TE=SY,FI BE=FU,FI
LE
collab complex uncert asset relearn trust trxcb seller buyer
FR LY(l,l) LY(2,1) LY(3,2) LY(4,2) LY(5,3) LY(6,3) LY(7,4) LY(8,4) LY(9,5)
FR LY(lO,5) LY(1l,6) LY(12,6) LY(13,7) LY(14,7)
FR LY(1,8) LY(3,8) LY(5,8) LY(7,8) LY(9,8) LY(1l,8) LY(13,8)
FR LY(2,9) LY(4,9) LY(6,9) LY(8,9) LY(lO,9) LY(12,9) LY(14,9)
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VA 1 PS(l,l) PS(2,2) PS(3,3) PS(4,4) PS(S,S) PS(6,6) PS(7,7) PS(8,8) PS(9,9)
VA 1 PS(1,2) PS(1,3) PS(1,4) PS(1,6) PS(2,3) PS(2,4) PS(2,6) PS(2,7)
VA 1 PS(3,4) PS(3,6) PS(3,7) PS(4,6) PS(4,7) PS(l,S) PS(2,S) PS(3,S) PS(4,S)
VA 1 PS(S,6) PS(S,7)
FR PS(8,9) PS(6,7) PS(1,7)
FR TE(l,l) TE(2,2) TE(4,4) TE(S,S) TE(6,6) TE(7,7) TE(8,8) TE(9,9) TE(1O,10)
FR TE(ll,ll) TE(12,12) TE(13,13) TE(14,14)
FR TE(1,2) TE(7,8) TE(1l,13) TE(12,14)
VA .3 TE(3,3)
FR BE(S,l) BE(S,2) BE(S,3) BE(S,4) BE(S,6) BE(S,7)
ST.7 ALL
Path Diagram
OU IT=900 ME=UL se MI TV AD=OFF
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